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PREFACE
When Henry Kissinger assumed responsibility in 1969 for
directing the National Security Council in the new Nixon
administration, he probably did not fully anticipate how
important, even decisive, a role he would play in determin-
ing American foreign policy in the next several years. I
am concerned with the divergence between the ideas of Kis-
singer as a scholar and the policies of Kissinger as a
statesman. An almost unique case affords the opportunity
to examine how the ideas of a scholar undergo modification
as they are implemented in actual practice.
By the late 1960 , s, it was evident that the postwar
bipolar global structure of power was rapidly disintegrat-
ing. Military bipolarity persisted, though in a less pro-
nounced form, but political multipolarity increased. The
independent foreign policies of France and Rumania, the
Sino-Soviet dispute, and Third World nationalism confirmed
this trend.
Since the late 19^-0* s America's position in the world
had been buttressed by its many alliances. Its ties with
Western Europe and Japan had been essential to the main-
tenance of its power and prestige in the world. But in a
period of profound political and ideological change, would
the relationships with Western Europe and Japan continue to
be so important? Would the new Nixon administration articu-
late and implement new principles in alliance relationships
that stressed coalition and cooperation?
This study will examine Kissinger's policies toward
Western Europe from 1969 to 1976. Kissinger's scholarly
publications were of high quality and most of his writing
was concerned with the relationship between the United
States and Western Europe. The most thorough and compre-
hensive presentation of his views on Western Europe can be
found in his two books* The Necessity for Cho ice (1961),
and The Troubled Partnership. (1965). Both are highly
critical of America's Western European foreign policy in
the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. However, none
of the books published on Kissinger as a statesman deal in
a comprehensive manner with his policies towards Western
Europe.
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ABSTRACT
Scholar Versus Statesman! The Record of Henry Kissinger
The United States and Western Europe
February, 1982
Jeffry R. Bend el, B.A. , Ohio University
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of
Massachusetts
Directed byt Professor Peter J. Fliess
The assessment of a contemporary statesman presents
difficulties. The primary problem is that the ultimate out-
come of policies cannot be foreseen. The secondary problems
include unavailability of documents and literature. How-
ever, it should still be possible to analyze the policies
that shall, eventually, determine whether a statesman will
succeed or fail. Every statesman must have a vision and act
to implement that vision. Henry Kissinger placed the highest
priority upon the development of detente with the Soviet
Union and China but the relationship between the United
States and Western Europe was not as important. The ultimate
wisdom of his vision is a matter of serious concern to both
contemporary and future analysts.
I am concerned with the divergence between the ideas of
Kissinger as a scholar and the policies of Kissinger as a
statesman. An almost unique case affords the opportunity to
vii
examine how the ideas of a scholar undergo modification as
they are implemented in actual practice. The first two
chapters examine the principal tenets of Kissinger's
philosophy of international relations and the relationship
between the United States and Western Europe. I then focus
upon the theory and practice of American foreign policy
with respect to its multilateral and bilateral relations
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
European Community (EC); West Germany, France, and Britain.
Each chapter presents a summary of Kissinger's writings and
an analysis of his policies probes the specific circum-
stances that account for modifications of his policies.
NATO's Strategy, NATO's Organization and the relation-
ship between the United States and its NATO allies are
examined with respect to Kissinger's previously elucidated
views as a scholar and the subsequent practice of his
diplomacy.
The European Community and its external relations and
economic and political problems between the United States
and the EC were of concern to Kissinger both as a scholar
and a statesman.
The central themes of Kissinger's work on Germany are
examined with respect to specific problems in United States-
viii
West German relations. West Germany and the EC, The Offset
Costs Issue, Energy, and American troops in Europe are dis-
cussed with regard to their bilateral and wider implications.
France merited considerable attention in Kissinger's
work, and the relationship between the United States and
France was particularly important to him. However, the
central themes of French foreign policy today should be con-
sidered within the framework established by de Gaulle and
modified by his successors. The Atlantic Alliance, Europe
and the Middle East are the areas in which Franco
-American
differences are examined with respect to the Gaullist legacy
and the ideas and policies of Kissinger.
As a statesman Kissinger must deal with Britain both as
a European power and in terms of the uncertain relationship
with the United States.
In the concluding chapter I discuss the central tenets
of Kissinger's philosophy of history and the impact of his
statesmanship upon the world with respect tot Detente i The
Soviet Union and China, the Middle East, Japan, economic is-
sues, and morality and foreign policy. I then examine the
relationship between the world of the scholar (the realm of
theory) and the world of the statesman (the realm of practical
solutions) and assess Kissinger's successes and failures in
reconciling the worlds of the scholar and the statesman.
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CHAPTER I
KISSINGER'S PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
My objective is to assess the record of a contemporary
statesman, Henry Kissinger, who is both a scholar and a
statesman. Prior to his tenure in public office, Kissinger
had become an outstanding scholar in the field of interna-
tional relations and a trenchant critic of American foreign
policy. Few statesmen and no twentieth century American
Secretaries of State have produced scholarly works of high
quality that have articulated the central tenets of their
views on international relations prior to their tenure in
office. Consequently, the case of Kissinger presents a
unique opportunity to examine the relationship between the
ideas of the scholar and the policies of the statesman.
This study will be limited to Henry Kissinger's poli-
cies toward Western Europe. I shall try to determine how
the ideas of a scholar undergo modification as they face
the needs of the world of action. Both multilateral (NATO
and the European Community) and bilateral relationships
(West Germany, France, and Britain) will be examined.
Henry Kissinger is an extraordinarily able scholar of
international relations. He has written perceptively and
1
2with imagination on the subject of international relations,
particularly on problems of the trans
-Atlantic relationship
between the United States and Western Europe. In 1969,
Kissinger became Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs and in 1973 was named Secretary
of State. From I969 to 1976, when a change of administra-
tion occurred, Kissinger's influence on American foreign
policy was considerable, at times perhaps even predominant.
His extraordinary influence upon American foreign policy
is acknowledged by most analysts. However, a definitive
assessment of the extent of this influence will have to
wait until documents and other supporting material become
available. Thus, it will not be possible to answer every
question concerning Kissinger's influence upon various
aspects of American foreign policy.
Kissinger's importance is all the more surprising when
the relatively powerless position of either of his two posts
from 1969 to 1976 is compared to the powers of the Presi-
dent. Certainly no one can acuse Richard Nixon of letting
someone else guide American foreign policy. Nixon's primary
interest was in foreign policy and, given his reluctance to
share its execution with a broad range of interested parties,
it is surprising and yet understandable—considering the
domestic and international circumstances of Nixon's presi-
dency—that Kissinger should have achieved such extraordinary
influence.
3To some extent Kissinger's importance arises from the
tragic events that surrounded the American involvement in
Vietnam. Considering the highly adverse diplomatic situa-
tion of the United States when the new Nixon administration
assumed its duties, it is understandable that the Nixon team
did not succeed in withdrawing the United States from Viet-
nam unscathed, causing an excessive strain upon the presi-
dency. This strain manifested itself in the "Watergate"
syndrome which seriously weakened Nixon 1 s position and
finally resulted in his resignation in August of 1974.
Gerald Ford, a man of limited experience in foreign affairs
and faced with a delicate domestic situation, became the
next President.
Vietnam, Watergate, Nixon's resignation, and the badly
weakened presidency of Gerald Ford were all complex, inter-
related events that were to make and unmake many a career.
The one leading figure to emerge relatively unscathed from
the turmoil of these events was Henry Kissinger. Although,
according to one commentator, Kissinger "was a bureaucratic
infighter of superlative skills," I do not wish to pass
judgment upon his responsibility in the crisis that was to
cause the resignation of a president. What is pertinent
here is that as Nixon's star waned, Kissinger's waxed.
Moreover, an inexperienced President Ford found that he had
to rely most heavily upon the advice and authority of a now
very influential and uniquely important Secretary of State
for ensuring the continuity of and implementing American
foreign policy.
In considering the factors that led to Kissinger's in-
fluence upon American foreign policy, it is appropriate to
realize that, as Raymond Aron states, both Kissinger and
Nixon saw the world through the same lenses. 1 This is also
true of the presidency of Gerald Ford. Indeed, one may
categorize all three as tactically flexible conservatives,
although this may apply to a lesser extent to Ford. Diplo-
matic circumstances, a severe domestic crisis, an unusual
personal rapport between two men—these factors, when linked
with Kissinger's extraordinary talents, explain the pre-
eminent influence of Henry Kissinger upon American foreign
policy.
The Scholar-Statesman
It is the major theme of this paper to trace the con-
nection between the scholar—operating in the realm of
ideas—and the statesman- -operating in the realm of prac-
tical solutions. Obviously these areas of endeavor are
connected and interrelated. And yet, to know is not neces-
sarily to do. It is one thing to know the solution to a
problem, it is quite another to garner the necessary sup-
port, overcome obstacles, and actually implement and suc-
cessfully conclude policies.
Moreover, a combination of the best qualifications for
5these two areas is rarely found in a single individual, A
brief glance at American history will confirm this. In the
19th century, there were no scholar-statesmen who attained
eminence. 2 In the 20th century Woodrow Wilson occupies a
prominent place. Yet, while Wilson was an acknowledged
authority on Congressional matters, the wisdom of his
guidance of American foreign policy during and after World
War I is open to serious question. ^ Wilson's ideals were
laudable, and yet he manifested a serious lack of political
judgment in their implementation.
Another prominent scholar-statesman was George P.
Kennan. However, Kennan's scholarly activities were far
more important than his activities as a statesman. He has
published a number of notable books and yet, while he
served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and
as Chairman of the State Departments Policy Planning Com-
mittee after World War II, he never had a major role in the
It
formulation and implementation of American foreign policy,
except for the Policy of Containment, which was perhaps
Kennan* s most notable contribution to the formulation of
American foreign policy. Unfortunately, other than in
Western Europe, his policy of containment was never imple-
mented as he wished.
President Kennedy brought a number of scholars into
his administration and, while they were influential in cer-
tain respects, the President generally exercised a strong
6control over foreign policy.
When in I969 Henry Kissinger was appointed Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, President
Nixon hoped that his abilities could help to resolve suc-
cessfully the ever worsening crisis over Vietnam. However,
given the circumstances of the Vietnam war, it is not sur-
prising that his performance in office has had mixed results.
Knowledge alone does not guarantee that a problem can be
solved, but assuredly no solution can be successful without
some degree of knowledge. Are certain problems in interna-
tional politics intractable? To what degree are the prob-
lems of international politics subject to rational control
and resolution? It is the task of the analyst of political
affairs to recognize the limitations of the rational ap-
proach and to determine the precise amenability of each
problem without excusing the failures or lapses of judgment
of statesmen.
Kissinger's Perspectives on International
Relations
Before discussing the reasons for Kissinger's policies
towards Western Europe, it will be useful to review the more
general aspects of his view of international relations. But
a word of caution must be introduced. All statesmen have
preconceived ideas prior to assuming power. However, when
they are faced with the actual responsibilities of power,
many of these ideas undergo modification or are abandoned.
It would be an injustice to Kissinger to deny that he might
be similarly affected. Men are self-conscious beings, and
prior knowledge of individual perspectives does not guar-
antee certain knowledge of subsequent actions. However,
the case of Kissinger raises the particular question of a
profound student of international relations, having the op-
portunity to implement his ideas in practice i to what ex-
tent were his thoughts applicable and when and how did they
have to be modified?
A Psychological Inquiry
An examination of Kissinger's world view may reveal
some general precepts from a psychological perspective.
Again limitations germane to the subject matter must be
borne in mind. However, some initial observations can be
made.
It should be noted that while Kissinger arrived in
this country at an early age, his outlook has been colored
by his European experience. At Harvard, Kissinger studied
Europe's past, present, and future to the virtual exclusion
of all else. Thus his formative impressions were rein-
forced by the tensions of the thirties, which Kissinger
experienced in Germany, and were further strengthened by
his intense immersion in European studies in this country.
One may be tempted to see a psychological parallel in
8the saga of Joseph in Egypt. Joseph too arrived in Egypt at
an early age. and became an Egyptian as he rose to become the
second most powerful person in Egypt. And yet Joseph re-
mained an Israelite as well. Kissinger also reflects this
duality
i
he is a European in America. Many Europeans are
more aware of the element of tragedy in international rela-
tions than most Americans. The European Continent is strewn
with the wreckage of dreams. Kissinger himself was person-
ally touched by tragedy; moreover, he was a student of Euro-
pean diplomatic history; therefore, the awareness of tragedy
is an important aspect of his statesmanship.
^
It is not only a greater appreciation of the role of
tragedy in international relations that separates Kissinger
from the mainstream of American views. He also has a great-
er understanding of the hydra-headed nature of power. He is
at once more willing to use power qua power divested of the
political and moral confusion that often surrounds and ob-
scures the American usage of power. He is also less naive
about the efficacy of power in attaining political goals,
less certain than Americans that power will once and for all
resolve political problems.^ Therefore, Kissinger would not
hesitate to apply force while simultaneously maintaining
diplomatic contacts with the adversary. Force and diplomacy
are two interrelated aspects of international relations in
Kissinger's view.?
Interwoven with American ideas on the use of force are
American ideas on morality. It is a rare occasion when Amer-
ica's use of force in the international realm was not ac-
companied by a moralistic statement distorting, warping, or
obscuring the rationale for using force. To Kissinger inter-
national morality has centered upon the need for the state
to survive intact. Americans too often develop a moral edi-
fice that basically views the use of force as a very regret-
able incident in international relations. Morality, for Kis-
singer, centers upon the survival of the state % therefore,
the occasional resort to force should elicit no surprise. 8
Tragedy, power and force and morality are all important
elements of international relations. Men can and do differ
about the relative meaning of these terras. Moreover, dif-
fering perceptions of political reality do exist between
Europeans and Americans. Thus Kissinger is a European, his
ideas on vital aspects of the international order are Euro-
pean. It required exceptional diplomatic circumstances and
the election as President of a man whose international views
were on the periphery of American thought before Kissinger
finally obtained the influence that he sought.
Kissinger's sensitivity to his experiences in Germany,
his immersion in European studies and his basically European
outlook all conditioned and influenced his acts as a states-
man. One example will suffice to illustrate this point. In
extracting the United States from Vietnam, Kissinger probably
agreed with Nixon on the need for applying force often on a
10
massive scale after 1969. But, simultaneously, intense nego-
tiations were carried on with the North Vietnamese while both
of Hanoi's allies, the Soviet Union and China, were the sub-
jects of a very active diplomacy. Finally. Kissinger made
clear to all three powers that the United States would not
and could not be humiliated 1 it would only withdraw on the
basis of a negotiated peace. To the American public Kis-
singer spoke of the need for "honor" in meeting America's
commitments. The liberal use of force when required, the
active all-inclusive diplomacy, the careful limitation of
international morality, and Kissinger's knowledge of the
ever present abyss of tragedy, all highlighted an essen-
tially European diplomatic response to an American crisis.
Kissinger's World View
However, as a scholar, what ideas did Kissinger express
concerning morality, the statesman, and diplomacy? Kis-
singer's general outlook on international relations is best
o
expressed by the term Realpolitik . 7 However, he has also
displayed a concern for the moral element in international
relations.^ Indeed the avoidance of nuclear war has to him
always been the highest moral imperative. He has also been
concerned with human rights and the plight of the undeveloped
countries. 11 A close examination of Kissinger's world view
may well reveal more continuity than is usually thought to
exist between his ideas as a scholar and his actions as a
11
statesman. However, regarding areas that were, for various
reasons, of secondary concern to him - such as Western Euro-
pe - the discrepancy between what he wrote and what he did
is considerable. I now wish to turn to an examination of
the primary and secondary ideas on international relations
that he has expressed as a mature scholar.
Morality.
To Kissinger, "The ultimate test of morality in foreign
policy is not only the values we proclaim but what we are
willing and able to implement." 12 This statement contains
the essence of his views on morality, ranging from nuclear
weapons to human-rights problems. In his view "peace is a
fundamental moral imperative in the nuclear age." 1^ Con-
sequently, he has written extensively on the problem of arms
control and nuclear weapons. He has been highly influential
in, and indeed, one of the architects of detente with the
Soviet Union. For him the greatest moral imperative is the
avoidance of nuclear war. He has consistently upheld this
position and it is not surprising that relations with the
Soviet Union should have been the cornerstone of his foreign
policy.
With respect to human-rights, Kissinger is also aware
of limitations. He has pointed to "Quiet Diplomacy" as
aiding hundreds of political prisoners and enabling many
Jewish emigrants to leave the Soviet Union. With respect
12
to American support of regimes that practice repressive po-
licies, such as South Korea and Iran, Kissinger posed a
series of questionsi "If we insist that others accept all
our moral preferences, are we then ready to use military
force to protect those who do as we urge? And if those who
refuse our prescriptions are deprived of our support, what
will we do if the isolation of those governments tempts ex-
ternal pressures or attack by other countries even more re-
pressive? Will we have served moral ends, if we thereby
jeopardize our own security.
Kissinger is concerned with morality, but only to the
extent that it can be realized. He is certainly not a
Wilsonian idealist but has a more modest, prudent view of
morality that is no less sincere in its conviction but
recognizes greater limitations in its implementation.
The Statesman
Kissinger was greatly concerned with the role of the
statesman? this is particularly evident in his work as a
graduate student. His doctoral dissertation, A World Re"
stored , contains perceptive and trenchant views on the obli-
gations of the statesman. 1^ Another paper, also written
when he was a graduate student, is concerned with Bismarck.
1^
The importance he attaches to the statesman is evident
from the quantity and quality of his writings on the subject.
Nor would he affirm that the role of the statesman (and by
13
implication the nation-state) is of diminished importance in
the modern world. The acid test of a "statesman, then, is
his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and
to make this knowledge serve his ends." 17 Thus, neither
Castlereagh, Metternich, nor Bismarck fare well in his esti-
mation. "A statesman who too far outruns the experience of
his people will fail in achieving a domestic consensus, how-
ever wise his policies, witness Castlereagh, a statesman who
limits his policy to the experience of his people will doom
himself to sterility % witness Metternich." 18 As for Bis-
marck, Kissinger correctly points out how his policies brought
great tragedy on Germany i "In the end the things Bismarck
had warned or fought against occurred \ any alliance with
France was impossible after 1871, Germany was increasingly
tied to Austria, and the requirements of the national inter-
est were highly ambiguous after all. Thus Germany's greatest
modern figure may well have sown the seeds of its Twentieth
Century tragedy." 1^
Kissinger thus takes a rather critical view of each of
these great statesmen; he applauds their successes, but,
based on the merits that are the hallmark of true greatness,
none of them pass the test. None fully recognize the "real
relationship of forces" and thus made "this knowledge serve
his ends." Most importantly, none built a structure that was
lasting. 20 For Kissinger, these are the acid tests of true
greatness in a statesman.
14
Diplomacy
For Kissinger, there was simply no substitute for a
sound, well-ordered diplomacy. For conducting relations
among nations, the skills and intelligence of the diplomat
were at a premium. Thus Kissinger's views on diplomacy are
what could be expected of a student of 19th Century Euro-
pean diplomacy. However, even in an age of modern com-
munications, Kissinger considered the diplomats' skills to
be indispensable. Indeed, his general view of diplomacy
closely parallels that of Hans J. Korgenthau and George F.
Kennan. Consequently, diplomacy is a useful tool for
carrying on the business of nations? to engage in diplomatic
activities, it is not necessary also to extend one's moral
approval
•
Associated with these main themes are Kissinger's con-
cerns with stability, his distaste for violent, revolution-
ary change, a dislike of moral absolutes, his insistence on
the stark reality of tragedy, and the need to insure the
survival of the state.
Stability is absolutely necessary in the nuclear age.
Vast upheavals in the international order pose an immense
danger because of the presence of nuclear weapons. Thus his
remark that if he had to choose between injustice and order
and justice and disorder, he would always choose the former.
Kissinger disliked Communism on similar grounds because
15
it posed a serious threat to the stability of the interna-
tional order through its emphasis upon violent, revolutionary
change. He was vehemently opposed to the (more irresponsible)
policies of the Soviet Union and China, but he did not think
that this ruled out the need for negotiations between the
West and the East. The need to avoid moral absolutes, the
omnipresence of tragedy, and the harsh necessities of sur-
vival are imperatives of the international order that cannot
be ignored.
These are the primary and secondary ideas in Kissinger's
world view. What type of intellectual framework is the re-
sult? Is it possible to discern in Kissinger's world view
the ideas that he would later put into practice?
Kissinger's view of international politics emphasizes
the clash and compromise that occurs among the real movers
of world politics i the nation-state, the single most im-
portant unit in world politics. 22 But other transnational
actors exist. It does an injustice to a thinker of Kis-
singer's caliber to imagine that he does not understand the
importance of multi-national corporations and other trans-
national actors. But the survival of the nation-state and
its way of life are of supreme importance.
The task of guiding the state falls to the statesman,
necessitating a rather wide range of discretionary powers.
The necessity for maneuver, for diplomatic surprises (many
of which may be unpleasant) , for secrecy and the need for
16
rapid, quick adjustments - if the diplomatic situation war-
rants - these exemplify the actions that may have to be un-
dertaken by the statesman.
This is a sobering picture of Kissinger's view of in-
ternational relations. Yet, it is entirely possible to have
foreseen much of the future direction of his foreign policy.
A perceptive observer in 1969 - acquainted with the main
tenets of Kissinger's views - might have predicted some of
his policies. Thus I agree - with qualifications - with
those who contend that he wrote one thing and did another. 23
As regards his policy towards Western Europe, there was a
divergence between his ideas as a scholar and his practices
as a statesman. Was his scholarship faulty? Or were his
judgments - as a statesman - the result of incorrect assess-
ments? Yet Kissinger's rationale for his often callous
actions towards Western Europe and Japan would be that the
very desperate diplomatic situation of the United States ne-
cessitated placing - for the time being - the highest im-
portance upon American interests. The penchant for secrecy,
the dislike of the bureaucracy, the virtual exclusion of the
public and others interested in foreign policy, the increas-
ing centralization of foreign policy decisions in the White
House, the often brutal tactics with respect to alliance
diplomacy, the seemingly unrestrained use of force in Indo-
china, the emphasis upon relations with adversaries who
could aid in extricating the United States from Vietnam, the
17
preoccupation with "high politics" that caused Kissinger so
badly to underestimate the intent of the Arabs to use the
oil weapon, all these views and policies are entirely con-
sistent with Kissinger's world view. Implicit in this view
is the potential for some or all of the above policies de-
pending upon the circumstances. Nixon and Kissinger thought
that the war in Vietnam was tearing American society apart
while America's ability to maintain its power and prestige
in the world was being seriously undermined.
Since the survival of the state and its way of life are
the supreme objectives of statesmanship, a non-doctrinaire
approach by the practitioner of Realpoliti k is called for.
Their personal predilections 5 for example, their distrust of
the bureaucracy and their dislike of delegating serious re-
sponsibilities to subordinates reinforced Nixon's and Kis-
singer's ideological perspectives. Odd as it may seem, Kis-
singer's greatest success was with the Soviet Union (and
China) and his greatest error the excessively prolonged
withdrawal from Vietnam (and the tendency to minimize the
importance of Western Lurope and Japan). None of these po-
licies was inevitable, but to a serious student of Kis-
singer's perspectives on international relations, they oc-
casioned no great surprise.
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CHAPTER II
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SEVENTIES
It is not easy to assess the record of a contemporary
statesman. It is always difficult to arrive at balanced
judgments j this is particularly true in a period of rapid
change. Not only has the United States suffered a disaster
in Vietnam, but the failure of American statesmen to antici-
pate and take appropriate measures to lessen a growing de-
pendence on a vital necessity of the industrial state -
oil - must be considered as an important failure of American
statesmanship. These disasters have occurred in a period
that marks the demise of the Cold War order while the nature
of the newly emerging configuration of world politics is not
clear.
By the beginning of the Seventies the American public
displayed a considerable sophistication and maturity con-
cerning foreign affairs that many earlier observers would
have been reluctant to predict. This development was all
the more remarkable in view of the oil embargo and the quad-
rupling of prices that occurred in 1973 and the fall of
Saigon two years later.
Nevertheless, there still remain some unanswered
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questions concerning America's role in the world. More than
100 years ago de Tocqueville pointed out that consistency of
purpose, foresight, secrecy, and maneuverability were quali-
ties that were necessary for the successful conduct of for-
eign policy. 1 He was remarkably prescient in his vision; in
general, the United States still remains deficient in the
characteristics that are necessary for the conduct of a suc-
cessful foreign policy. However, democracies very often are
deficient in these characteristics even though these quali-
ties are no less important today. Moreover, the historical
record is clear. The United States drifted into two world
wars without adequate military preparation, it ended these
wars with inadequate political preparation, and it suffered
two major and related disasters in the Seventies in Vietnam
and the Arabs' use of the oil weapon. Were these events
merely failures of statesmanship? It seems that the roots
are far deeper than mere lapses of judgment. They have to
do with the very manner in which the government of the
United States is organized for the conduct of its foreign
policy and with the values and objectives cherished by the
2American people.
Both domestic and international conditions should make
cold war protagonists as well as advocates of world leader-
ship for America aware of the limitations imposed upon
foreign policy by democracy in general and the United States
democracy in particular.^ The decade of the Seventies has
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been confusing and tumultuous, climaxed by two major foreign
policy disasters for the United States. The task of analy-
sis is to determine whether these disasters could have been
avoided and to what extent they were caused by the failures
of statesmen and governments. The theory and practice of
American foreign policy towards Western Europe should pro-
vide conclusions that are not only germane to that topic but
have more general application.
American Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe
To understand American foreign policy toward Western
Europe I should like to cite, however briefly, Soviet-
American relations.
The central problem of American foreign policy is its
relationship with the Soviet Union. Despite the presence
of serious economic and environmental issues in world poli-
tics, a general nuclear war between the two superpowers is
still the supreme catastrophe that threatens mankind. The
nuclear arms race between the superpowers is thus far re-
strained only by rather tenuous, limited agreements. No
steps have been taken actually to reduce the vast nuclear
arsenals of the superpowers. Both have vast conventional
armaments as well, particularly in Central Europe, the most
heavily armed area of the globe. I do not wish to enter
into the arguments over Soviet capabilities and intentions.
Suffice it to say that when a superpower faces a group of
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medium and small powers and that superpower is potentially
capable of hostile actions of varying kinds, then prudence
demands that the other superpower neither exacerbate nor
ignore that potential. Thus, geopolitical factors suggest
an assessment of the importance of Western Europe in the
world today.
Today the relationship between the United States and
Western Europe (and Japan) is a vital concern of American
foreign policy. Americans and West Europeans are linked
by many sentimental and strategic bonds. Western Europe is
a leading center of economic, technological, and political
power in the world. The European Community (EC) also is
potentially the most important experiment of our era in
overcoming the political fragmentation of a world of so-
vereign nation-states. Arnold Toynbee has stated that over-
coming the division and fragmentation of the global order
should be one of the foremost priorities of statesmen every-
where.
'
Consequently, there are a collection of states on each
side of the Atlantic that, for historical and contemporary
reasons, should cooperate on the many issues of mutual con-
cern that confront them both. But politics often confounds
logic. Towards the end of the Johnson administration and
more markedly in the Nixon administration, serious strains
became apparent in both the multilateral and bilateral rela-
tions of America and Western Europe.
2k
The NATO organization seemed to continue on a course of
slow decline while increasingly intractable problems ap-
peared to diminish further its future capabilities. The EC
became mired in internal problems while the Americans
treated Brussels almost with contempt at various times. Bi-
lateral relations were little better. The state of West
German-American relations remained generally good and yet a
few problems, concerning West Germany and the EC, the offset
costs issue and American troops in Europe, inflamed passions
on both sides to a considerable degree. 6 The Franco-Ameri-
can relationship at least grew no worse than previously and
in certain respects perhaps even improved somewhat. Yet
very serious differences remained between the two, particu-
larly over the problem of energy. The once vaunted "special
relationship" with Britain continued to fade. Britain's do-
mestic preoccupations and gravely weakened economy limited
its ability to influence world affairs and, though Britain
(and Denmark and Ireland) entered the EC in 1973, doubts and
hesitations remained concerning Britain's commitment to that
organization.
There seemed to be a cloud of mutual suspicion, even
animosity, that reached a peak in 1973"7^» over Euro-American
relations in general.? Ill temper and spiteful rhetoric were
8particularly apparent on the American side. These frictions
occurred in a period when Americans and Europeans were facing
many problems that could only be resolved by mutually
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supportive efforts. Thu8 in a period of rapid change, when
economic and environmental issues have assumed a new impor-
tance, Western Europe remains an area of vital concern for
American foreign policy.
Here I shall briefly discuss some of the general prob-
lems that are part of the Euro-American relationship. The
place of Western Europe in American foreign policy has never
been the subject of a particularly searching analysis.
^
European interests often automatically concorded with those
of the United States. However, there have been occasions
when they have diverged and even clashed with disastrous
consequences for both sides.
Americans and Europeans - as indicated earlier - are
joined by a number of unique sentimental and strategic ties.
Yet, in viewing the historical record, the frequency of
serious differences between Americans and Europeans is
striking. The results of such differences were apparent
before, during, and after both world wars. The Mideast
October war in 1973 again brought to light very serious dis-
agreements between Americans and Europeans. ^° Despite their
strength and long duration, Euro-American ties have been
greatly strained. It is quite possible that similar inci-
dents might recur, with tragic consequences for all in-
volved.
Since the end of World War II Euro-American relations
in NATO and other multilateral institutions and in bilateral
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relations have generally been conducted - with only a few
serious lapses - in a spirit of partnership. All members
of the coalition recognize the wisdom of mutual cooperati,
in the attainment of shared objectives i l) to defend West-
ern Europe against the Soviet threat, 2) to reconstitute the
economic and political life of the European states that were
devastated in World War II, 3) to enable Western Europe to
regain its place in the world and the industrial democracies
to advance their mutual global interests. But in the 1970s
these objectives have changed. To some extent the Soviet
threat remains, but all Western European countries have re-
covered from World War II and through the EC are increasingly
able to advance their own interests in the world. It there-
fore seems necessary to reassess the importance of the Euro-
American relationship.
In a period such as the Seventies, when turmoil and
profound change mark the demise of one order while the out-
lines of the emerging order are but dimly perceived, three
additional factors add to the uncertainty of the situation.
The social, economic, and political problems that emerged in
the European states before World War I have reappeared and
rendered their internal equilibrium more precarious at a
time when a high degree of international stability is need-
ed. 11 Social fi ssures in Britain, Italy, and France have
reached the point where class animosity and conflict are at
the highest levels in many years. Especially in Britain it
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is difficult to see how some of these problems can be re-
solved without incurring the risk of inflicting serious
wounds upon the democratic-constitutional order.
Economic stagnation coupled with inflation has also
dealt a serious blow to the economic systems of Britain and
Italy, and to a lesser extent France. To find solutions to
the economic difficulties of these states is no easy matter.
The economic disparities between members in both NATO and the
EC have widened, making agreement on common policies much
more difficult. The result is added centrifugal pressures
that already plague Europe.
Political activity has greatly increased at either end
of the political spectrum. Groups on the political fringe
are increasingly willing to use force to attain their poli-
tical objectives and pose a grave threat to the constitu-
tional order. The problem has been aggravated by political
fragmentation. In pre-World War I Britain, this difficulty
was apparent in the Irish question. Today, not only the
situation in Northern Ireland but separatist demands in
Scotland and Wales are raising serious questions about the
political unity of the United Kingdom. Nor is Britain
alone. Spain (Basques and others) and France (Bretons and
Basques) face similar problems. Finally, the possibility
exists of the Euro-Communists' participation in or control
of a Western European state. 12 Are the Euro-Communists
really ready to accept a pluralistic political system and
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legitimation by the electoral process? How will NATO deal
with the problem of cooperation with a European country
where Euro
-Communists participate in or control the govern-
ment? Can NATO retain credibility as a defense against a
Soviet (Communist) threat when Euro
-Communists are members
of NATO? How can this be explained to Western publics? To
summarize, will domestic problems make it difficult or im-
possible to maintain the position of the European states
in NATO? How will the domestic problems of the states af-
fect the further integration of the EC? Western Europe must
insure against an adverse tilting of the balance of power
while defending - increasingly through the EC - its inter-
ests in the world.
The second major problem has already been alluded to.
What will be the attitude of the Western public towards mil-
itary expenditures and the support of NATO if in ten years
even the Cold War is but a dim memory? Inflation, the ris-
ing cost of military equipment, the lack of real military
and other integration in NATO are all taking an increasing
toll of NATO's capabilities. With pressures mounting every-
where to cut military budgets, will public indifference to-
wards the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe in-
crease? NATO is the expression of the West's resolve to
maintain the balance of power in Europe. However, far
reaching reform and a more mature, balanced perspective on
the part of the political leadership and the public is a
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prerequisite if the military balance in Europe is to be
maintained. Potentially hostile policies and geopolitical
realities can be ignored only at the peril of all concerned.
There is a final problem, more subtle, perhaps more
complex, than most. It has to do with the psychological
consequences that the Europeans have suffered as a result of
the destruction and chaos of two world wars. The constant
need - more acute in some periods than in others - of the
West Germans for reassurance and support by the United
States i the often exaggerated posturing of France in its
quest for grandeur, particularly under de Gaulle; and
Britain's increasing loss of self-confidence have all been
manifestations of this same problem. When considering, for
example, the ramifications of the Suez crisis and the Sky-
bolt affair, can it be said that Americans have conducted
themselves with due regard for these various difficulties?
Probably, Americans, in no small measure, have contributed
to the partial demise of self-confidence that is part of
the profound crisis affecting Britain today. Wars are
catastrophes that are often unambiguous signals of the de-
cline of civilizations. Will future historians consider
that the world wars marked the inevitable decline of Europe
that was only temporarily arrested by the intervention and
thereafter diminishing support of the United States? Has
the Europeans' belief in themselves been irreparably damaged
to the extent that their capacity to govern themselves and
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to contribute to the betterment of the world is doubtful?
There are no certain answers to these questions.
These are some of the more general problems in Euro-
American relations. During the latter part of the Johnson
administration and during Henry Kissinger's terra in office,
relations between nations on both sides of the Atlantic
worsened. It must be admitted that Kissinger himself - that
most perceptive observer of European affairs - contributed
greatly to this state of affairs. 1 ** If the present diffi-
culties lead to a reaffirmation of the vital role of the
Euro-American relationship - Europeans as well could recog-
nize and reaffirm the importance of this relationship from
their side - then present difficulties can be resolved. If
this period, however, represents a prelude to - perhaps even
a worsening of - the situation, then there may be no further
chances to restore concord between the United States and
Western Europe.
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CHAPTER III
MULTILATERAL RELATIONS
, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATYORGANIZATION (NATO)
TJie_ScholaC
NATO and European Spcu ri-hy
Kissinger thought that one of the most profound questions
concerning international relations centered upon the ability
of the West to cooperate in the attainment of its political
objectives. 1 Two objectives - security and cooperation on
common goals - were of the utmost importance. Kissinger
warned that if the Western powers became disunited, "sooner
or later, these states on the fringe of the Eurasian land
mass would be drawn into the Communist orbit." 2 Americans
then would be truly isolated, they would live in a foreign
world.
However, there are other reasons for the West to attain
cohesion, for neither Americans nor Europeans alone can hope
to deal individually with all the concurrent revolutions and
challenges of our times. To build a world order based on the
inherent values of Western civilization, the closest coopera-
tion between America and Europe is necessary.
Yet Kissinger thought that neither the Eisenhower nor
the Kennedy administrations really demonstrated that they
3^
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could effectively deal with the issues of NATO strategy, arms
control, nuclear weapons, German unification, or European
security. 3 He was pessimistic and highly critical of the
responses of both administrations to these problems and
thought that "unless the North Atlantic group of nations de-
velops a clearer purpose, it will be doomed."**
Strategic doctrine, political cohesion, and NATO's fu-
ture are three areas that reveal Kissinger's concerns on the
problems facing the Atlantic Alliance.
Strategic Doctrine
Kissinger was greatly concerned with strategy. Over the
years he has devoted a great deal of attention to strategic
matters, and it was his work in this area that first brought
him national recognition with the publication of Nuclear
Weapons and Foreign Policy in 1957.
Strategy was a vital concern for the United States in
the nuclear age. Faulty strategic doctrine could inhibit or
bring disaster. Indeed, Kissinger demanded that "it should
be the task of our strategic doctrine to create alternatives
less cataclysmic than a thermonuclear holocaust. "5 This is
why he was uncompromisingly opposed to the doctrine of mas-
sive retaliation for "the penalty for doctrinal rigidity was
military catastrophe." What he advocated was a strategic
doctrine that provided the maximum room for diplomacy and
recognized that the nuclear age contained not only risks but
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opportunities.
Yet Kissinger thought that Americans had very oft,;en
failed to understand strategy and deal adequately with stra-
tegic problems. They were "more comfortable with technology
than with doctrine." There can be little doubt that for
Kissinger strategy and its attendant problems were of fore-
most concern.
In the three books that he published between 1957 and
1965. Kissinger was a trenchant critic of American strategic
doctrinei Eisenhower's policies with respect to Europe were
bankrupt, indeed since the founding of NATO and the creation
of the Marshall Plan there had been no really promising
American efforts to inspire the North Atlantic nations to
develop a clearer purpose."'7
Common strategy was a shambles. The allies depended to
an excessive degree upon the American nuclear deterrent. The
whole NATO deployment in Europe was faulty, being "too strong
for a trip wire, too weak to resist a major advance." This
could tempt Soviet pressures and obscured from many Americans
the fact that it was the presence of the U.S. in Europe that
deterred the Soviet Union.
There were other adverse effects of NATO's sole reli-
ance on a retaliatory strategy. First, America's allies saw
themselves protected by the United States which (subsequently)
released them from the need to make their own military ef-
gfort. Second, some of the European allies had doubts about
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America's behavior in a crisis and its future dependability
consequently, they sought to develop their own independent
retaliatory capability. These circumstances and policies ha«
equally adverse consequences, local defense efforts were
weakened while the independent retaliatory forces were vir-
tually worthless.
This indicated that the British and the French either
lacked confidence in the American understanding of its Euro-
pean interests or they were concerned that the United States
would not run certain risks on behalf of Europe. For Kis-
singer both of these policies were signs of the early disin-
tegration of NATO. And the United States - often self-
righteous and critical of France and Britain - was doing
nothing to rectify this increasingly dangerous situation. 9
The Europeans were constantly seeking reassurance that they
would not be abandoned.
Kissinger considered American strategic doctrine after
1961 as particularly inept. 10 He saw no military reason for
the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal that proved to be such
a bone of contention among the allies during the early six-
ties; he recognized the inadequacies of NATO's conventional
defense posture, continuing problems with NATO's organiza-
tion, and the deficiencies of troop deployment and logistics
structure. He also criticized policies of the Eisenhower
administration. The stationing of intermediate-range mis-
siles (IRBM's) in Europe and the so-called double-veto
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system were "panic measures" brought about chiefly by the
need to do something to counter the Soviet Union's success
with Sputnik. These were merely technical responses to what
were the far more essential political problems of the Atlan-
tic Alliance. 11
Political n0frp^ ?r
Kissinger clearly saw that with the completion of post-
war reconstruction and the decline of the Soviet threat dif-
ferences would emerge between the United States and Europe.
He never assumed that an integrated Europe would find its
interests to be identical with those of the United States. 12
In fact, he argued that differences between America and Eur-
ope should be recognized for then "it may be possible to
agree on a permissible range of divergence." Each partner
should regain a measure of flexibility. Europe should also
assume a greater responsibility for its defense and its fu-
ture course in the world. Excessive centralization of de-
cision-making in the hands of the Americans relieved the
allies of their responsibilities. At the same time this
could create great differences of opinion when a conflict of
interests became apparent.
Kissinger recommends "an allied structure which makes
possible a variety of coordinated approaches on some issues."
The problem was to restore some measure of responsibility to
America's allies. The decade and a half of American hegemony
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must not beguile Americans into believing that they always
best represent the general interest. Kissinger thought that
some autonomy of decision-making was essential for the cohe-
sion of the Atlantic alliance. x3
These adjustments are vital for the future of the Al-
liance. Excessive paternalism will destroy it. What is
needed is to "require wisdom and delicacy in handling the
transition from tutelage to equality." Assertions of dis-
tinctly European interests are to be welcomed as they are
really the growing pains of a new and healthier relationship.
Here Kissinger also criticizes America's style, its in-
grained optimism, excessive attention to abstract models and
technological solutions that express themselves in a rest-
less quest for "new" solutions and technological remedies.
Finally, for the sake of its own stability, America could
benefit from a counterweight to impetuosity and supply his-
torical perspective to many "final" solutions. 1 ** Kissinger
calls for "the establishing of a psychological balance be-
tween us and Europe." The basic problem is to strike a
balance between unity and respect for diversity. Excesses
on either plane can have adverse consequences. He asserts
that "to strike this balance is the big unsolved problem
before the Western Alliance. "1-5
It is evident that Kissinger has a profound concern for
the political problems facing the Alliance. And, as men-
tioned above, he recommended an organizational change that
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should not be confused with a final solution hut does at-
tempt to provide a new structural balance in Euro-American
relations.
This "allied structure" should be constituted as an
Executive Committee of the NATO Council. There would be six
members, five of whom would be permanent (the United States,
Britain, France, West Germany and Italy), the sixth non-
permanent rotating member would represent the smaller NATO
countries. The NATO Council (excluding the permanent mem-
bers) could elect the rotating member. A two-thirds vote
would be binding. Members of the Executive Committee should
be no lower than Deputy Foreign Ministers, who would meet at
least bi-monthly.
The role of the Executive Committee would be to formu-
late common Atlantic purposes, to give guidance on military
matters, and to develop a common strategic doctrine.
But there would have to be provision for dissent. Each
ally - whether or not a member of the Executive Committee -
could appeal its decision to the NATO Council, where a two-
thirds majority would carry. Each country could dissent and
for an interim period refuse to be bound by such a vote.
Thus provisions for dissent would be maintained along with
mechanisms for carrying out the will of the majority.
Given this framework the European countries might wish
to form a closer union. A closer union could become a real-
ity if, for example, the Western European Union were given
41
responsibility for the European component of the Allied Nu-
clear Forces. For Kissinger "Atlantic partnership and in-
creased European cohesion thus could be pursued simultan-
eously with no advance commitment to giving priority to
either course." The course of European evolution could be
left to the Europeans while Americans could make their main
contribution in the reconstitution of Atlantic relation-
ships. 16
NATO's Future
.
Kissinger clearly attached the utmost importance to
NATO as a manifestation of the Western powers* determination
to ensure their collective defense. But he was aware that
collective defense is difficult to maintain in an era of
detente, when the external threat has diminished but not
vanished. He also realized that organizational structures
such as NATO were not sufficient to ensure unity among the
Allies. Consequently, he attached the highest importance to
the maintenance of NATO while recognizing that NATO's ef-
ficiency depended upon a consensus on political objectives. 1 ''
These circumstances would rule out the use of NATO as an
instrument for detente as well as for defense. For Kissin-
ger a military alliance simply did not have the necessary
diplomatic flexibility.
Neither military nor legal obligations are sufficient
to assure an adequate NATO response to Soviet aggression.
Under prevailing conditions no statesman will risk a catas-
trophe simply to fulfill a legal obligation. What is im-
portant, indeed vital, is that the necessary "degree of po-
litical cooperation has been established which links the
fate of each partner with the survival of all the others." 18
In an era of East-West diplomacy and rapidly changing
circumstances, it is obvious that Kissinger did not neglect
NATO's problems. Yet he was also aware that the Western
allies stood at a crucial juncture in their history. Under-
lying all the problems of strategic doctrine, rapidly chang-
ing conditions and the many difficulties faced by the West
is the challenge of the times. This challenge centers upon
the need to move beyond the political fragmentation caused
by the nation-state and to find political forms that will
meet the needs of the times. The central question concerns
the ability of the West to move "from the nation-state to a
large community and draw from this effort the strength for
another period of innovation. "19 For Kissinger this chal-
lenge is vital, as the ability to master this problem will
largely determine whether the West will remain relevant to
the rest of the world. The dynamic periods of western his-
tory have occurred when unity was formed from diversity.
Kissinger argues that "the deepest question before the
West may thus be what kind of vision it has of its future." 20
The disagreements that have occurred on both sides of the
Atlantic must be turned into a source of strength. The West
must manage to "relate diversity to community." This genera-
tion need not surrender to the doctrine of historical in-
evitability. Indeed, history derives its meaning from the
"convictions and purposes of the generation which shapes it."
Several themes emerge from Kissinger's writings on NATO.
He is concerned with NATO
• s strategy and its organization,
with the problem of defending Europe in an era of detente,
with political cooperation and cohesion among the allies, and
the long-range necessity for the Alliance to move beyond the
confines of the nation-state to a true level of community.
Once again the West would be instrumental in demonstrating
the potential of new forms of political organization that
would have a decisive influence on world politics.
From 1969 to 1976 Kissinger, as a Statesman, was in a
position to implement the ideas that he had written about as
a scholar. I shall deal with his efforts under three head-
ings 1 NATO's strategy, NATO's organization, and Alliance re-
lationships.
Kissinger was never exclusively interested in strategic
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problems. Though his reputation was initially founded chief-
ly on his criticism of and recommendations for American
strategic thought, in later years he became much less pre-
occupied with strategic problems. While he completely dis-
agreed with the strategy of massive retaliation, he found the
doctrine of flexible response less objectionable. He did not
agree with certain aspects of flexible response (such as the
problem of tactical nuclear weapons), however, he accepted
the central premise of the doctrine. 21
While Nixon and Kissinger were preoccupied with the
Vietnam negotiations, with the SALT talks, and with the Mid-
dle East, European problems (with the exception of the
treaties signed in 1971 and 1972 involving Berlin and West
Germany) by contrast, did not seem to be as important. John
Stoessinger writes "During his first three years in office,
however, Kissinger paid little attention to America's allies
in Western Europe and even less to Japan. Most of his time
was taken up with Indochina, the Soviet Union, and China.
The fate of Europe, which had occupied him so much during
his earlier days, had virtually drifted from his range of
vision. He was aware, of course, of serious strains in NATO,
and criticized the new economic competitiveness, the selfish-
ness, and the growing nationalism of the Western European
countries. Many of Europe's leaders seemed weak and inef-
fectual to him, and when they were strong, like Charles
de Gaulle, they appeared opposed to the U.S. To Europe, in
^5
turn, the U.S. seemed to have lost its sense of priorities
and gotten bogged down in a suicidal ^ ^ ^
European leaders found Kissinger's attitude high-handed and
accused him of placing the interests of U.S.-Soviet detente
before the interests of Europe. By 1973. it was quite clear
that America's main military alliance was in serious disre-
pair and that the relationship with Western Europe was drift-
ing from respect and friendship into mutual resentment and
hostility. "22 „owever> the administration was aware Qf
neglect of Euro-American relations. Consequently, it was
announced with great fanfare that 1973 would be the "Year of
Europe. ••23
During a famous speech in April, 1973. Kissinger dis-
cussed some of the more general problems that troubled Amer-
ica's relations with Europe. I shall later on refer to this
speech in greater detail. Here I wish to discuss what Kis-
singer had to say about NATO's strategic doctrine.
He agreed that the policy of flexible response was, in
principle, the basic strategy for NATO. But he warned that
the requirements of flexibility are complex and expensive.
There must be sensitivity to new conditions, and this re-
quires continued consultation among the allies in response
to changing conditions. An adequate defense posture must
also be maintained and "it must be seen by ourselves and by
potential adversaries as a credible, substantial and ra-
tional posture of defense." He also discussed! l) defi-
k6
ciencies in important areas of conventional defense that
should be rectified. 2) in terms of doctrine unresolved
questions still remain such as the role of tactical nuclear
weapons. 3) in NATO deployments and in its logistic structure
problems still remain.
Kissinger affirmed that "we owe to our people a rational
defense posture at the safest minimum size and cost, with
burdens equitably shared."
NATO has serious inadequacies in its conventional de-
fense? anti-tank weapons are insufficient, a new, main battle
tank is needed for the late seventies and eighties (the
United States and West Germany are developing a new tank), 25
the number of front-line troops is inadequate, inventories
of ammunition and spare parts are "critically low", 26 rein-
forcements are often insufficient or improperly organized,
and NATO's conventional defense posture is deficient. A
very serious problem for NATO planners is how to utilize
their forces with the greatest efficiency in view of stead-
ily increasing costs. If the number of front-line troops
were to decline, NATO planners may wish to add mobility and
firepower to existing units. Reserves would then acquire
much greater importance. The border units would hope to
slow the thrust of an invading force long enough for the
very mobile regular units and rapidly mobilized reserve
troops to stop the invasion force completely. But can
enough first-rate reserve troops be trained? The reserve
^7
forces would^ to supplement the regular units. Moreover
this strategy is not one of forward defense but envisages
stopping the invader on West German territory where this
force will still he in possession of considerable West Ger-
man territory. Thus if NATO will have to manage with fewer
troops its strategy must reflect this reality. 2?
However, it is probable that in a conventional war.
future technological developments will favor the defense.
Anti-tank weapons can now be managed by one soldier and are
increasingly accurate. "Bomblets" shot from artillery can
delay or halt invading armies or tank columns. Helicopter
gunships are another lethal addition to NATO forces. And
laser and wire-guidance systems make all weapons systems in-
creasingly accurate. Consequently, invasion forces may have
to exceed by considerable margins the ratios that were his-
torically necessary to achieve breakthroughs. This, of
course, may lessen the advantage conferred by surprise at-
tack and perhaps allow more time for diplomacy to avert con-
flict. 28
NATO's doctrine also suffered from two weaknesses con-
cerning conventional strategy and tactical nuclear weapons.
Its conventional defense posture was predicated upon the
idea that a conventional conflict in Europe would be of long
duration. The model envisaged is World War II. There would
be time for reinforcements, time for the superior manpower
and material of the West to be mobilized. Moreover, this
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doctrine influenced the organization of Western (and, par-
ticularly American) divisions which have too many men en-
gaged in logistics and insufficient front-line troops. In
an era of rapidly rising military costs, this strategy be-
comes increasingly questionable.
What is questionable or inefficient under some circum-
stances may become a serious concern in a different situa-
tion. It is generally recognized that the Warsaw Pact
Forces are equipped for a lightening-war t to force a quick
breach of NATO's defenses, with heavy armor, and then to
achieve rapid penetration of NATO territory. The potential
danger of the situation is readily apparent. NATO needs to
be guided by a new strategy that "establishes a new defense
pattern, emphasizing immediate firepower, greatly reduced
support and long-lead reserve forces, strengthened logistics
for a short conflict, and quick deployment of combat units." 29
In November, 1974, a small step was taken in this direction
with the announcement by Defense Secretary Schlesinger that
two new combat brigades would be established in Germany. The
number of troops would remain the same in Europe while there
would be a reduction of comparable support troops.
Beyond this step nothing was done by Nixon and Kissinger
to alleviate the increasing imbalance between NATO's conven-
tional defense strategy and the deployment of its forces. At
present there is a rough balance of power in Central Europe.
The West is even superior in firepower and the quality of
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its weapons systems, but in rapidly changi„g circumstances,
can the present balance of power be taken for granted? The
question is not if change will occur but how NATO's major
deficiency, the strategy for conventional defense, should be
rectified. However, not enough was done by Kissinger to
garner the necessary political support to remedy this de-
ficiency.
Concerning the role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO
doctrine, little has been done to clarify matters. Through
the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, European members can in-
fluence the manner in which nuclear weapons are to be used
in Europe. However, no attempt has been made by Kissinger
or anyone else to clarify the role of tactical nuclear wea-
pons in NATO • s doctrine. 3° Does the present ambiguity con-
cerning tactical nuclear weapons best serve as a deterrent?
Are 7000 tactical nuclear weapons really necessary in Europe?
As plans for force stabilization and then force reductions
acquire greater importance in Europe, the role of tactical
nuclear weapons will have to be fully clarified with respect
to both quantity and Doctrine.
NATO's troop deployments and logistic structure con-
tinue to cause problems for the Alliance. After the drain
placed on men and material in NATO by the Vietnam War,
trained personnel and material stocks needed to be rebuilt
to former levels. And in 1977 troops were still inadequately
deployed to represent a true forward defense of NATO territory
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for too many American troops were concentrated in Southern
Germany, somewhat removed from potential invasion routes on
the plains of Northern Germany. Consequently, it is still
questionable if a credible defense of NATO territory could
be made by the allies without the use of nuclear weapons.
Diverse logistic structures still represent a major problem
for NATO planners. While the United States - West German
main battle tank may ease the situation somewhat, formidable
problems remain.
3
2
It is not at all surprising that the resolution of the
preceeding problems did not have a very high priority on the
administration's agenda. Kissinger was well acquainted with
all of these problems, but in the Nixon-Kissinger years -
when foreign policy was centralized in the White House -
sustained attention to NATO's secondary concerns was rare.
The view was that the administration's diplomatic concerns
were centered upon adversaries and, furthermore, Kissinger's
often tactless behavior in Alliance relationships undercut
many of his policies. Stanley Hoffmann writes that "Ominous
threats, such as those President Ford and Kissinger uttered
concerning Portugal's participation in NATO, or the pre-
sence of U.S. forces in Europe, can be double-edged and are
of uncertain effect. "33 Nixon's and Kissinger's policies
were uncoordinated, conflicting, and excessively unilateral. 3^
Their often abrasive diplomatic style amid the general acri-
mony surrounding Euro-American relations almost ensured that
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they could not garner among Americans and Europeans the ne-
cessary support that was vital to initiating the policies re-
quired for changing NATO's strategy and tactics. Instead,
charges and counter-charges were hurled back and forth
across the Atlantic. Some positive steps were taken, but
more could have been accomplished by the man who, as few
ethers, was so well acquainted with NATO's problems.
For many years, scholars (including Kissinger) have
lamented the weaknesses of NATO's organization. My comments
will be brief. The ossification of the central institutions
of the Alliance is a serious problem. Alastair Buchan has
discussed this problem as well as the usefulness of the
Atlantic Council as a diplomatic forum. 35
Others have warned that the military command structure
should be modernized and that a European should hold the
position of Supreme Commander. Drew Middleton suggests that
the headquarters organization "would require weeks of warn-
ing and preparation before it could function effectively in
war."36
It is clear that NATO's organization is in need of
modernization in rapidly changing circumstances. One posi-
tive step, taken with the direct encouragement of the White
House, was the announcement in 1970 of a European Defense
Improvement Program where the members of the Eurogroup
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(except for France, Portugal, and Iceland) pledged to spend
an additional $1 billion over the next five years to im-
prove the European forces as well as the NATO infrastructure,
This initiative was followed by similar efforts of the Euro-
37group.-"
However welcome such initiatives are, they cannot com-
pensate for the increasingly serious organizational problems
of NATO. Modernization of the NATO organization will re-
quire a large cooperative effort by both the Europeans and
the Americans. Was such a major effort possible in the
acrimonious and suspicious atmosphere surrounding Euro-
American relations in the Nixon-Kissinger years? David
Landes has stated that, he would, "pinpoint an area, single
out the improvement of image and interpersonal relations to
help restore the sense of community and affection that once
existed on both sides of the Atlantic. "38 NATO's organiza-
tion will always reflect varying degrees of imperfection.
But the time is fast approaching when major reforms will
become imperative. In an age of detente and increasing
East-West contacts, the Western allies must retain the
political determination and organizational means to ensure
their collective defense.
Alliance Relationships
If there is a single theme that may be found in Kis-
singer's scholarly writings and in his numerous speeches
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after 1969. it is the emphasis placed upon political co-
operation. It is understandable that after 1969 Europe did
not have a very high place in Nixon's and Kissinger's diplo-
macy. Serious domestic turmoil occurred over the adminis-
tration's slow withdrawal of American military power from
Vietnam. American diplomacy was directly engaged in Vietnam
and intensive efforts were also directed at Hanoi's allies;
the Soviet Union and China.
Consequently, differences between the Americans and the
Europeans were becoming more acute as the Americans first
became involved in Vietnam and then attempted to withdraw
while Europe became increasingly preoccupied with its inter-
nal problems and construction of the European Community (EC).
These differences are cause for serious concern according to
Fritz Stern who states "the balance between unity and discord
is precarious. There are not only substantive differences be-
tween the U.S. and its European allies; there is - at least
on the nongovernmental level - a growing impatience on both
sides. The roots of discord go deep; to ignore or under-
estimate the shifts of power and attitudes might heighten
the dangers of drifting apart. In the past an external
threat has always served to unite the alliance. Now we can-
not count on the automatic reappearance of solidarity."-^?
Thus rapidly changing circumstances in a more complex world
required that more, not less, time and attention be given
to Euro-American relations. Nixon's and Kissinger's pro-
5h
longed diplomatic attention to adversaries occurred at the
expense of relations with America's major Hi... Actually
adversaries and allies should have received raore equal at-
tention as time and circumstances allowed. However, by the
time Kissinger realized that trans-Atlantic relationships
were increasingly acrimonious and corrective measures needed
to be taken, it was really too late. Shortly after Kis-
singer announced "The Year of Europe" in his speech in
April. 1973. the administration was caught unprepared by the
sequence of events that began in the Middle East in October
and culminated in a severe crisis in Euro-American rela-
tions. Thus 1973. "The Year of Europe", ended with an al-
liance debacle that was exceeded by only two other crises in
the Atlantic Alliance, the Suez crisis in 1956 and the Sky-
bolt affair in 1962. There would be no purpose here in as-
certaining which of these crises had the more serious conse-
quences. Each was avoidable and each has done considerable
and lasting harm to alliance relationships. However, it is
probably safe to say that the crisis in Euro-American rela-
tions in late 1973 will not have such serious or prolonged
effects on the Western Alliance as did the two previous
crises. It is, nevertheless, paradoxical that Kissinger
himself, who was so trenchant a critic of the events that
led to the crises of 1956 and 1962, should have been involved
in an almost equally serious crisis.'*0
Kissinger's "Year of Europe" speech was "a plea for
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partnership" in which he asked that Americans and Europ<
partake cf "mutual efforts on mutual issues."** He stated
that the United States planned to build "a new Atlantic
Charter" with its European allies in 1973 to overcome the
economic, military, and diplomatic strains that had re-
cently developed. It was apparent that the United States
and Europe "had reached another critical point in their re-
lationships", consequently, America, Europe, and Japan need-
ed to define anew the common political interests and ideas
of the old and the new world. The speech was not well re-
ceived in Europe. Kissinger and the National Security
Council (NSC) staff were quite surprised at the discord it
produced. 2*2 Moreover, according to the London Economist i
"The Atlantic Alliance was in worse shape than in any time
in its 2*J<-year history, and not just because of that row
about the Middle East war, not just because detente erodes
defense budgets, not just because of the different impact
the oil embargo has had on America and Europe. The heart of
the matter is that 1973 has been the year when the nine
countries of the EC wanted to define what binds them to each
other, and Mr. Kissinger has simultaneously wanted it to be
the year when they defined what binds them to the democracies
on the other side of the Atlantic."^
During the early seventies a number of monetary, eco-
nomic, and political problems plagued the relations between
Americans and Europeans. Then, from 1973 > "the Watergate
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crisis began to take increasingly large amounts of Presi-
dential time and energy. Despite Kissinger's intentions, no
United States-European declaration was to be forthcoming,
only an eventual NATO declaration largely on security and
political affairs (in June of 1974 at Brussels the United
States and its European Allies signed a declaration that ob-
ligated them to achieve increased consultation).^
However, in the Middle East, a crisis was rapidly de-
veloping. Kissinger had always warned that threats to Amer-
ican security "may not always take an unambiguous form."
And this is precisely what was to occur when the October war
led to the oil embargo and the subsequent quadrupling of the
price of oil. The White House ignored a State Department
(Office of Fuels and Energy) warning in early 1973 concerning
the possibility of an impending oil crisis and underestimated
the political will of the Saudi 1 s to use the oil weapon. 45
Kissinger's behavior toward the Europeans was less than cir-
cumspect both during and after the crisis. His negative com-
ment "I don't care what happens to NATO, I am so disgusted"
was widely reported, and resented, in Europe. In December,
Kissinger had further words for the Europeans' behavior dur-
ing the crisis referring to them as "craven," "contemptible,"
"pernicious," and "jackal-like. "^ Again, these remarks were
not uttered discreetly, but they were widely disseminated by
the press.
NATO's role as the collective manifestation of the
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West's determination to achieve and maintain a collective
defense was further imperiled by the first public breach
between the United States and West Germany during the Octo-
ber War. The press discovered the shipment of war material
from West Germany to Israel, and Bonn asked that this cease
at once.^ James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, then
made an overt threat to move American military equipment
out of Germany, and there were also bitter American re-
criminations that its European allies had deserted it in
its hour of need.^8
During the October War American actions were, all too
often, not preceeded by adequate consultation. Its allies
were not informed of its plans. To illustrate the point
i
"in the Cuban Missile Crisis of I962 President Kennedy dis-
patched special envoys, envoys known to and trusted by
European statesmen to explain his position. Nothing of the
kind occurred on this occasion."^ An astute commentator
has summed up the Nixon-Kissinger policies to 19?4i "Aside
from Gerard Smith's careful briefings regarding Salt I, the
record of this administration in serious consultation has
been miserable. " -5°
The October War (could an Administration less obsessed
with Vietnam have begun a diplomatic effort sufficient to
avert or mitigate the outbreak of war?), the failure of the
administration to consult or even inform its NATO allies,
the serious public breach in United States-West German
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relations, the previously noted accusations hurled by the
Americans at the Europeans, could any of these occurrences
have aided the cause of allied solidarity?
NATO was placed under severe pressure by American de-
mands to use NATO facilities to pursue its policy of sup-
porting Israel in the war. But was it wise for the Ameri-
cans to have insisted on European participation in such an
effort when Europe was so vulnerable to the use of the oil
weapon? Europe's economic and political weaknesses were
evident from the moment the oil embargo reached serious
proportions. Did Nixon and Kissinger appreciate how vul-
nerable Europe was to the "oil weapon?" Moreover, the Arab
oil embargo and subsequent price increases have contributed
to a critical inflation, "the end results of which are in-
calculable. "51
Since this crisis in Alliance relationships, some de-
gree of harmony has been restored. But Europe's political
and economic margins for maneuver have been greatly nar-
rowed. Suspicions persist on both sides of the Atlantic.
In less favorable circumstances and in an often acrimoni-
ous atmosphere, can Americans and Europeans find anew corn-
grounds to pursue and resolve the great challenges that
an only be solved by their common efforts?
Summary
The splintering of the Western Alliance can no longer
mon
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be ignored. Was the strength of the Western Alliance and
growing European unity in the post-war era a natural de-
velopment or the result of unusual conditions?52 Consulta-
tion and cooperation among the democratic states is vital
if the values of Western Civilization are to be maintained
in today's dangerous and uncertain world.
In the areas of NATO strategy. NATO organization, and
alliance relationships many weaknesses are apparent. The
administration did not try to remedy very many of NATO's
secondary deficiencies in view of its more important con-
cerns elsewhere.
Nixon and Kissinger did not deliberately undertake to
damage NATO and trans
-Atlantic relations. But in an era of
rapidly changing conditions, were they excessively con-
cerned with stability? As Stanley Hoffmann writes "Hence
Kissinger's predicament and the contradiction between his
call for a pluralistic "legitimate" order accommodating
change in the world and his interpretation of NATO as a
kind of Holy Alliance based not only on a common interest
in external security, but also on a common constellation
of political forces. Indeed both his failures and his suc-
cesses in the business of preserving American primacy show
an obsession with stability, which puts him far closer to
Metternich than to his own criticism of the Austrian
Statesman and also quite close to his predecessors* po-
licy. "53 Hoffmann then asks "Metternich' s excuse was the
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^agility of his country
, Us desperate ^ ^
status quo outside. Is the social and political order of
the U.S. equally brittle and tied to conservatism every-
where?"^
Moreover, from 1971 to 1975, their policies often were
too calculating, insensitive, and undertaken with little or
no prior consultation. With respect to detente and in-
creased East-West contacts as well as the problems faced by
the allies, an active diplomacy that emphasized consulta-
tion and cooperation was vital. The Berlin Agreement of
1971 and the intra-German accords of 1972 represented the
kind of diplomatic effort that the administration could suc-
cessfully conclude in Europe. Both of the superpowers were
either directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations.
Moreover, except for some particulars, both superpowers are
in basic agreement with the status quo in Central Europe.
Unfortunately, there has always been considerable
sympathy in the United States for limiting or otherwise
greatly constraining the role of the United States in Europe.
Every year, until recently, a large number of Senators voted
to reduce the number of American troops in Europe unilater-
ally. Labor unions concerned with economic competition from
Europe, are increasingly protectionist. Nor are the ranks
of academicians free from advocates of withdrawal or "dis-
engagement" from Europe. The European balance of power must
be maintained, and that presupposes American engagement in
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Europe. This is the lesson of the inter-war years.55 M<
over, the continuation of detente presupposes a balance of
power. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in the London
^PnpM^i states "if you want to have continuity of detente
you have to have continuity of the balance of power, the
equilibrium. Continuity of detente cannot persist if you
let the military equilibrium deteriorate. "56 A large> di _
verse organization such as NATO will inevitably be imper-
fect, particularly from the perspective of military strate-
gists and planners. However, if NATO is to serve as the al-
lies* mechanism for their collective defense, it is vital
that the West's determination is always apparent to the
Soviet Union.
The danger is that many of the imperfections and de-
ficiencies in NATO could - over a considerable period of
time - prove to be of such magnitude that the means and
therefore the determination of the allies to defend them-
selves might be imperiled. Thus another administration has
lost the opportunity to achieve reforms in NATO i with the
further passage of several years, future changes will be
all the more difficult to achieve. Moreover, the alliance
debacle of 1973 and Kissinger's often tactless behavior will
make it that much more difficult to achieve once again that
atmosphere of mutual trust and harmony that must be re-
established before the Western Allies can transcend their
differences and develop new political organizations that
62
will reflect a trans-Atlantic con^unity. A scholar narced
Henry Kissinger once called this the preeminent challenge of
our times.
"
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CHAPTER IV
MULTILATERAL RELATIONS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The. Schola r
As noted in his work as a scholar Kissinger devoted
.uch thought to NATO * s problems and the broader problems
faced by the Atlantic Alliance. He recognized the impor-
tance of the movement for European unification, however,
the scope and depth of his work on the EC is not comparable
to his efforts on NATO. However, he was aware of the po-
tential seeds of discord that could develop between a
united Europe and the United States basically because he
never assumed a complete identity of interests. I shall
examine two areas that were of concern to Kissinger, the
movement for European integration and the relations between
the United States and an integrating Europe.
The Movement for Tryteg-rati rm
Kissinger indicates that American policy towards
postwar Europe was remarkably consistent in its support of
the movement toward European integration. 1 The United
States advocated a European organization to allocate
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American economic aid in the early days of the Marshall Plan.
In this it was greatly influenced by such eminent Europeans
as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. American support for
European unification also extended into the military sphere
as was manifested by its support of the abortive European
Defense Community (EDC).
But even though Secretary Dulles threatened an "agon-
izing reappraisal" of American foreign policy if the treaty
failed, American policy did not change when this occurred.
From 1955 to 1957 when the delicate process of reviving the
Community approach and endowing it with structure and sub-
stance was occurring, the United States welcomed this de-
velopment. It even resisted British efforts to dilute the
emergent Community by turning it into a free trade area. 2
The Americans supported the dream of Monnet and Schuman to
move from economic to political union. They opposed the
attempts of the Scandinavian countries and Austria (and
Britain) to treat the EC simply as an economic enterprise
and encouraged these countries to make a firm commitment to
the EC's political unity.
In the early days of the Kennedy administration, the
President proclaimed the doctrine of Interdependence be-
tween the United States and a united Europe, considering
European political unity a prerequisite to the formation
of an Atlantic community. Kennedy's goal was an economic-
ally and politically integrated Europe as an equal partner
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with the United States. The burdens and obligations of
world leadership would be shared by both.
A united Europe, most American commentators assumed,
would have only one form. There would be supranational
federal institutions controlled by a European Parliament.
Not surprisingly the main reason for the preference for
supranational institutions was the American example. Many
Americans were convinced that their Federal system was di-
rectly applicable to Europe, and prominent spokesmen, among
them President Kennedy, urged that Europeans adopt the
American Federal system. 3 Moreover, the nation-state was
becoming obsolete
; therefore, if the individual nation-
states of Europe were to exercise any real power and influ-
ence in the world, they should follow the American Federal
model.
Kissinger thought that the American proponents of Eu-
ropean integration were guilty of several errors of judg-
ment. He questioned the applicability of the American
Federal system in foreign settings. The American Federal
system had developed on a new continent. The new states
had a common historical experience and were of approxi-
mately the same size. Cultural and linguistic factors had
a common origin. Moreover, the states had no past tradi-
tion of sovereign independence and had just jointly con-
ducted a successful common war against a now defeated but
still powerful enemy i Britain.
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The situation in Europe was fundamentally different.
Each European state, great and small, is a product of many
centuries of historical development. A strong sense of
tional identity was often acquired only at the end of
turies-long struggles against the attempts of other Euro-
pean states to achieve domination. Moreover, foreign policy
ar.d national defense, two xi±al attributes of sovereignty,
developed from the European states struggles. Kissinger also
pointed out that attempts to establish supranational insti-
tutions in Europe today involve a far cleaner break with
their past than was true of the American states when they
formed a federal union.
Kissinger also warned that the attitudes of the Euro-
pean states towards supranational institutions vary greatly.
The countries that suffered most in the war, Germany and
Italy, are perhaps more willing than others to become parts
of a larger entity. The smaller states too are more willing
to adopt supranational institutions as historically they
have often been dependent on others. Moreover, they can
achieve greater influence in a supranational organization
than their resources and size would permit if they were to
act individually. The most reluctant countries are those
with the longest history as great powers i Britain and
France,
During the Kennedy administration it became apparent
what factors were responsible for the slackening of the
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European drive for integration. Europe had largely re-
covered economically and politically from the War
. The
threat of invasion from the East had also diminished, in
part as a result of American policy. Moreover, Europe's
desire and need to unite in order to play a global role was
diminished by the process of decolonization, which reduced
its interest in world affairs. Finally, it became in-
creasingly obvious that progress toward economic integration
is not necessarily paralleled by progress in political inte-
gration. Economic questions often involved matters of a more
technical nature that could be resolved fairly easily. Po-
litical questions involved considerations of power and pres-
tige and on many issues compromise was very difficult or im-
possible. But, as Kissinger pointed out, the most difficult
question of all was still unresolved i whatever the struc-
ture, origin, or degree of European integration, what kind
of policies would such a Europe pursue, and would its poli-
cies be consistent with the interests of the United States?
The United States and the European Community
Kissinger was unrelenting in his criticism of those who
accepted the thesis that European integration - with supra-
national institutions - would bring about a complete harmony
of interests between the United States and Western Europe.
Moreover, many of these American spokesmen assumed that a
united Europe would involve itself in remote areas of the
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globe. Americans seemed to assume that their goals repre-
sented the common interest and were, therefore, beyond
challenge.
This argument was rejected by Kissinger. Americans
really seem to be more concerned with sharing costs than
discussing foreign policy objectives. Thus American spokes-
men have continually endorsed the theme that a fragmented
Europe must mobilize its resources before its voice and in-
fluence can be felt in support of the common effort and the
common view. Kissinger's criticism rested on two grounds.
First he questioned that availability of resources is re-
lated to willingness to assume global responsibilities.
Indeed, the experience of the United States itself would
seem to contradict that thesis. He emphasized how during
the greater part of its history, the United States possessed
the resources but not the inclination to play a global role.^
Many European states, on the other hand, played a global
role when their resources were much less than they are
today.
Second, the United States has, by an often intemperate
emphasis upon decolonization, forced the European states to
relinquish their role abroad. Decolonization, following the
traumatic effects of two world wars, has lessened European
interest in other areas of the world. The European states
were also confident that long before their interests were
directly threatened, the United States would become involved.
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As Kissinger said "in other words, they treat Africa's
extra-European concerns in much the s.e way that the United
States looked at Europe's quarrels until 1941.-7
Nor does Kissinger agree that the constant invocati
of "interests versus responsibilities" by American spok
is helpful. Europeans do not have world responsibiliti
because in the period following World War II they we
forced to give up their global interests. The global in-
volvement of the United States has tended to reduce the in-
centive of the Allies to assume their share of global
responsibility.
Consequently, Kissinger warns that European unity is
not a cure-all for either trans-Atlantic disagreements or
for lessening the burdens of America's global role. 8 Indeed
he warns that the reverse may be true. As Europe unifies,
its differences with the United States may increase. Both
have a common interest in the defense of Europe but, in
other areas, a common unity of interests is less clear.
Thus Kissinger warns that a wise alliance policy will not
insist on common perspectives. It will take account of the
fact that different positions may well be normal when global
concerns are scrutinized. It is thus vital for alliance po-
licy to allow for differing perspectives on global ques-
tions.^
Kissinger warns that in the coming decade an increas-
ingly powerful China may well exploit tendencies toward
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turmoil in various parts of the globe. Moreover, the
plexity of global change is such that if the United Stat,
insists on remaining the sole trustee of policy everywhere,
the strain on America's resources may be too great. The
United States should encourage the Europeans to develop a
measure of autonomy. Kissinger warns that "it is not al-
ways the least responsible allies that wish to reserve some
measure of control over their destiny." 10
The central fact is that the interests of the United
States and Europe are not identical in all situations. The
common recognition of this fact should make possible agree-
ment on a permissible range of divergence. Americans must
choose between immediate convenience or long-term vitality.
Centralization of decision-making is always attractive, but
there are long-term costs. The excessive concentration of
decision-making authority in the hands of the senior partner
deprives the allies of a sense of responsibility. But the
most dangerous aspect of this policy is that when a conflict
of interests does become apparent, the resulting fissures
may be irreconcilable.
Multilateral Relations i The European Community
The Statesman
The European Community in the Seventies
The nation-state is a type of political organization of
Western origin that has spread throughout the globe. It has
served as the model of political organization for most of
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the human race, particularly in the period following World
War II. By the seventies it was clear that while the nation-
state was not quite obsolete, new forms of political organi-
zation were necessary eventually to supersede the nation-
state in part or in whole.
By 1977 the magnitude of national and international
problems in every sphere often exceeded the resources of even
the continent-states such as the United States. Trans-na-
tional cooperation on a broad range of issues is a vital
necessity if the aspirations of the majority of the human
race are to be fulfilled. The immense tasks that confront
every society today cannot be resolved in one or two genera-
tions. Yet, an impressive beginning has been made by Euro-
peans in overcoming political fragmentation.
The desire of the Europeans to cooperate politically
manifests itself most clearly in the EC. Cooperation does
not, of course, guarantee the successful resolution of prob-
lems. But, while cooperation is no panacea, it is more dif-
ficult to resolve the problems that confront societies today
without a major effort at cooperative endeavors.
This is why the EC is so important not only to Europe
but to the world. By 1977 the optimistic goals of only a
few years ago appeared beyond reach. Indeed, the period was
marked by such difficulties that consolidation appeared to
be the necessity of the hour.-1-1 The EC was beset by poli-
tical and economic problems, by difficulties with its chief
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rival, the United States, and by the difficulties inherent
in its cumbersome structure. Problems large and small
seemed, at times, to threaten the very existence of the
EC. 12 Wg these itg relationsh . p
loomed large. Andrew Pierre notes that "The first half of
the 1970'
s has been marked by ungainly disputes among the
Atlantic countries which have weakened the fiber of the pre-
sent Atlantic relationship and opened its continuation to
serious question. Relations with Europe will, however, re-
main a central component of American foreign policy.
"
13
Thus it is often said that America can or should do nothing
to promote the cause of European unity, that what the Euro-
peans do with respect to the EC is something that only they
can and should be concerned about.
Kissinger rejects that view. He was well aware that
the United States could seriously damage the EC by, for ex-
ample, insisting upon retaining centralized decision-making
powers. As a statesman, then, one should expect that he
would allow the EC to assume increased responsibility. More-
over, it would also be reasonable to assume that he would
understand why the EC could not, for example, endorse and
support American policies in the Middle East. Consequently,
the benevolent and, at times, actively beneficial policies
of the United States, are needed if the EC is to achieve its
objectives. The EC can perhaps flourish under the encourage-
ment, even the neglect of the United States. Even in the
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event of full American support, the successful conclusion of
this great experiment cannot be taken for granted. But, in
case of United States hostility, the EC probably could not
survive the consequences.^ At this stage in Europe's de-
velopment, given the vulnerability of the European states,
it is not surprising that the policies of a trans-Atlantic
superpower would have a profound effect on the efforts of a
group of small and medium sized European states to form a
larger collective entity. Kissinger, as few others, was
well aware of the EC's vulnerability. Yet he showed little
inclination to share decision-making with the EC. Moreover,
as will be demonstrated, he expressed considerable annoyance
with the EC's often slow and cumbersome procedures.
It is essential for American policy-makers to realize
that while they can exert limited influence on Europe's
quest to unite, they can, as Kissinger warns, cripple the
efforts of the European states to unite in a larger col-
lective entity. I shall next examine in general terms the
role of the EC in the world. Then I shall discuss the
United States and the EC focusing upon economic problems be-
tween the two and the emergence of serious political dif-
ferences between Washington and Brussels as a result of
Nixon's and Kissinger's foreign policy.
The EC and the World
Scholars disagree regarding the prospects for the EC,
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To some it has demonstrated an unusual degree of resiliency
and strength after the "oil crisis", thus they see
.rounds
for a guarded optimism. Others see the actions of the EC
after the oil crisis as reflecting grave weaknesses because
of the member's unilateral and selfish policies. 1* Any ex-
periment as ambitious as the EC is certain to present ambi-
guities. The EC is an expression of Europe's contemporary
needs and circumstances and, while it may be difficult to
determine precisely where it is going, there is no doubt of
the impact of a new kind of foreign policy in one of the
strategic areas of the world.
A Civilian Pnwgr
Francois Duch£ne has applied the term civilian power to
the EC. He states that the EC is a new type of political
power that stresses the use of economic power and legal and
contractual norms in its foreign policy. 16 It is not and
does not aspire to be a military power; instead, it hopes to
appeal to high ethical standards in its external relations.
The EC is a customs market, 60fo larger than the United
States. Almost kOfo of world trade emanates from it. There
is no doubt of its present and potential impact in an area
that is becoming increasingly vital to the entire world
i
the development of economic relationships, not only within
the developed nations themselves but between the developed
and the underdeveloped nations of the world.
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Moreover, the individual member nations of the EC are
becoming increasingly dependent upon external markets for
sustained economic growth. This dependence stands out most
clearly in the case of Belgium, which derives almost 0 f
its Gross National Product ( GNP ) fr0m community trade.
While Belgium is exceptional in this respect, the Nether-
lands. West Germany, and indeed all the other members are
increasingly dependent upon exports. This has meant that
slowly but surely the members of the EC have been forced to
eschew unilateral economic moves that violate the organiza-
tion's spirit and intent. The members are interdependent
in the economic sphere as never before. The crisis of 1965,
inspired by de Gaulle, and the oil crisis of 1973 have been
surmounted by the EC. And the community has grown with the
addition of a reluctant Britain and two other members,
Ireland and Denmark.
Today the EC is a factor of major importance in world
economic relations. But it is not completely identified with
Europe. West Germany can promote economic agreements with
the Soviet Union and the East European states. France can
do the same with its former colonies in Africa. A number of
European states are not yet members, thus the process of
identifying Europe with the EC is not yet complete. This
is why a powerful economic competitor like the United States
can, by divide and rule tactics, inject elements of dis-
harmony into the developing economic and political relation-
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ships among the members of the EC.
The EC is particularly vulnerable to tactics of divide
and rule because of the uni que nature of its organisation.
Its structure, including the Brussels bureaucracy, is often
slow and cumbersome in reaching compromises. I„ an age of
rapid decisions and active diolomnrv +v,uxpi acy, the process of nego-
tiating with Brussels appears nK the n*wis ea as diplomacy of inaction.
This is understandable but may - at times - severely test
the patience and restraints of foreign governments.
From January 1973 on. the external trade of all members
had to be conducted by the EC Commission in Brussels. 18 Al-
though this has not been strictly adhered to, this action
does represent the very real and active steps that the EC
has been taking in the area of economic diplomacy. Agree-
ments have been negotiated with a number of underdeveloped
countries in the Lome7 Convention signed in February, 1975.
An active Mediterranean policy has been initiated that pro-
mises to make the EC a major influence in that region.
Greece. Turkey, and Spain have either concluded association
agreements with the EC or are interested in becoming members
as soon as possible. While the EC has not had an Eastern
policy, it is very much aware of its potentially important
impact on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Russians
and the East Europeans tend to be rather ambivalent about
the EC. The Russians have been very cautious but, in March,
1972, Brezhnev told the Soviet Trade Union Congress that the
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Soviet Union had no wi sh to undermine the EC, furthermore
he hinted that the Soviet attitude towards the EC might de-
pend upon the EC attitude towards the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CEMA). 19 m 1975 the first formal
meeting between officials n-r nuuici i of the Commission and the CEMA
Secretariat occurred.
The East Europeans are ambivalent about the EC, how-
ever, external trade is generally more important to them
than to the Soviet Union. In the case of Hungary, for ex-
ample, foreign trade is vital to its plans for economic
20growth. In addition, there are numerous other attractions
of trade and economic relationships with the West for the
East Europeans. But the East Europeans have to be aware of
the dangers of too pervasive an impact of the West. At the
same time they must resist economic subordination to Rus-
sian and CEMA plans for their national economies. Thus the
East Europeans are faced with difficult problems. But there
is little doubt that in the future the impact of the EC in
this region will be important. 21
The EC thus is a new force in world politics, parti-
cularly in the realm of economic relationships. There are
difficulties in dealing with an entity that represents a
collection of diverse states with often conflicting inter-
ests. Will the EC gradually assume complete responsibility
for the conduct of its members' foreign economic policy and
perhaps eventually foreign policy as well? 22 Or will it
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and its member states retain S0Vereignty ^ ^
creating an often uneasy internal relationship with each
member claiming jurisdiction in specific areas.
Kissinger was aware of the adverse as well as the posi-
tive aspects of European integration. But he never wrote
as extensively about the EC as he did on NATO. His writ-
ings on the EC were basically completed by l964. Since then
the EC has become a more tangible force in Europe. As
Francois Duch£ne suggests "the European Community is slowly
taking root as an important part of the international system
and that American policy should cooperate with it for that
reason, notwithstanding the demise of yesterday's grand de-
signs." With a knowledge of Europe equalled by few Ameri-
cans, Kissinger also tended to be skeptical, at times ex-
tremely so, of the thesis that a united Europe would in the
short-term share America's burdens both in Europe and the
world. Thus he was very much aware of the fact that, for
an American statesman, dealing with the emergent EC could be
an exhausting and trying experience. With the administration
beseiged domestically because of its excessively delayed
withdrawal from Vietnam, the crisis in the Middle East and
other problems, is it to be wondered at that, in the words
of one commentator, "occasional activity regarding Western
Europe was predominantly secretive and bilateral, also
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Nixon avoided the EC Cohesion and paid undue deference to
de Gaulle." 24
I shall turn first to economic issues between the
United States and the EC t general problems, the Monetary
Crisis of 1971. and energy and raw materials. Then I shall
focus upon the political relationship between the United
States and the EC. While the interrelationship of economics
and politics is obvious, this division of subject matter
should provide a better means to obtain a complete analysis
of the totality of relationships that exists between the
United States and the EC.
Economic Problems i_go
r!±I:ai
.ce
It was obvious that America would have to sacrifii
short-term economic for long-term political gains that
would accrue from a united Europe. This was not particu-
larly difficult to see prior to America's involvement in
Vietnam. But the Vietnam war exacerbated the inflation that
subsequently placed a heavy strain upon the American economy.
Moreover, by the middle of the sixties, the economy was ex-
periencing difficulty in competing with the often more
modern and efficient economies of Western Europe and Japan.
With an adverse diplomatic and domestic situation to con-
tend with, Nixon and Kissinger (Kissinger had little know-
ledge of and not much interest in international economics)
were less prone to sacrifice American economic interests in
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the hope of eventually benofi -Hn«rA D nenti g from a united Europe.
Moreover, due to the exce^ivo a ™n essi e degree of centralization and
secrecy that developed with respect to foreign policy in
the White House, complex economic issues often received in-
adequate attention compared to more pressing political is-
sues.
In the three areas previously mentioned, the adminis-
tration's performance was not very good. Economic groups
in the United States who were ostensibly suffering from Eu-
ropean and Japanese economic competition were quick to re-
gister their complaints with the White House. The admin-
istration, seldom in a very favorable situation domestically
-
due both to its and its predecessors' policies - was glad
to provide some means to dissipate domestic fears against
foreign competition.
The United States complained of economic damage in
three areas - tariff discrimination, agricultural pro-
tectionism, and preferential trade agreements with third
countries.
The United States complained that the EC was becoming
an inward-looking trading bloc raising a tariff wall to
discriminate against outside exports. Strictly speaking,
there was some truth in this contention. However, any large
nation or group of nations may well have preferential tariff
arrangements. Indeed, the EC has maintained high tariffs on
a much smaller range of goods than the United States. 25
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Moreover, the EC is the only major industrialized area of
the world in which the United States had a trade surplus in
the early part of the seventies. 26
Much American criticism has also been leveled at the
EC Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It is claimed that the
CAP is protectionist. Due to the fluctuations in agricul-
tural production, this may be true at times. There have
been disputes over wheat and chicken and other products.
However, the basic problem is that since farmers are a po-
tent political force on both sides of the Atlantic, in years
of surplus there are clashes over markets. Admittedly, this
is a problem for which there are relatively few short-term
solutions. But over the long-term, with a decline in the
world surplus of food, there should be sufficient markets
for farmers on both sides of the Atlantic.
American complaints about preferential agreements by
the EC with third world countries also appears exaggerated.
Despite the agreements with ex-colonies in Africa, American
exports to these countries rose by 158^ between 1958 and
1971. 2? More serious are American charges that the EC's
Mediterranean policy is preferential. The arrangement of
preferential terms for each others' exports by both the EC
and the Mediterranean countries (including Greece, Turkey,
Morocco, Spain, Malta, and Israel) does violate the pre-
cepts of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
In response to American charges, the EC announced in May,
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1973 that the policy of seeking reverse preferences with the
EC's trading partners (particularly the Mediterranean coun-
tries) would be abandoned. 28
It was not to be expected that issues affecting various
powerful economic groups on either side of the Atlantic
would be resolved easily. In 80rne respects> a8 ^ ^ ^
of the CAP. no real solution is readily available except to
wait for long-term trends to reduce the often excessive sur-
pluses of the fanners. In the area of bilateral preferential
arrangements, the EC did violate the spirit and intent of the
GATT but. as mentioned, this policy has been abandoned. In
summary, clash and compromise are unavoidable, particularly
when there are economic problems between the EC and the
United States. What is deplorable is the manner in which
negotiations were conducted by Nixon's Secretary of the
Treasury John Connally and the way in which he dealt with
the monetary crisis of 1971
The Monetary Crisis of 1971
One manifestation of America's relative economic de-
cline, exacerbated by the inflationary effects of the war in
Vietnam, was an increasingly adverse balance of payments.
By 1970 this concern reached a high point. Europeans seemed
more prone to debate the matter while patience at the White
House ebbed.
In August, 1971 Nixon ended the convertibility of the
8?
re-
dollar into gold and furthermore imposed unilateral
strictions on foreign imports into the United States. By
this unilateral move, with no prior consultation or warning,
America virtually abolished the international monetary ar-
rangements that had existed since the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment at the end of World War II. Europe's reaction was
bitter and hostile. This is not to say that there did not
exist in Europe some, even considerable, sympathy for Amer-
ica's financial problems. What alarmed Europeans were the
unilateral measures and shock tactics by which the Americans
chose to correct their difficulties. Kissinger was not un-
aware of the dangers of this course of action as he writes
in White House Years, "The other industrial nations resented
being pressured into adoptions of their economic policies
even though they knew very well that without pressure they
would almost surely not have acted at all. Many were
shocked by the new American assertiveness. We would have
to tread a narrow path between maintaining enough pressure
to provide an incentive for the adjustments we were seeking,
and evoking a trade war as well as jeopardizing political
relationships built up over decades. I sought to make my
contribution in finding that balance". 2^
Given the administration's preoccupation with adver-
sary relations, Europeans had begun to feel a certain un-
ease about just what direction American policy would take.
Europeans were already nervous after the Rome meeting of
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finance ministers in the Fall of 1971. Connally, in
too subtle manner, sought trade concessions and parity re-
alignments from the Europeans. The Europeans lacked the
requisite authority but Connally dismissed their pleas as
mere evasions. Connally was representative of the aggres-
sive nationalism that many Americans thought was necessary
in order to safeguard their interests when dealing with
foreigners.
Of equal concern to Europeans was the relationship be-
tween Connally and Nixon. Did Connally' s aggressiveness
represent Nixon's feelings? Were Connally and Nixon pre-
paring to weaken opposition at home at the expense of in-
ternational cooperation?
The Smithsonian Agreements (1973) - conducted under the
aegis of Connally' s successor, George Schultz - provided for
more flexible exchange rates among the major currencies.
Due to vast structural changes in the world economy - cur-
rency movements, energy, the Eurodollars - the industrial
countries realized that a return to the fixed parities of
Bretton Woods was no longer feasible.
It is difficult to fix the precise degree of blame for
American actions at this time. Kissinger was almost exclu-
sively absorbed in the Vietnam negotiations. He had limited
interest in economics, and as foreign policy was increas-
ingly centralized under the direction of Nixon and Kis-
singer, when Kissinger was made Secretary of State, he
89
consented to the transfer of the economic function fro, his
office.30 But wag there ^ ^ a ^^^^^
in Connally's, Nixon's, and Kissinger's perspectives with
regard to their policies toward Europe? Connally was a more
extreme nationalist than Nixon or Kissinger. Yet Kissinger
-
while often sympathetic to the European viewpoint - often
found himself seriously at odds with European policies.
Professor Max Mark has written "there is little to suggest
that relations between Western Europe and the United States
will ever revert to that intimacy which existed in the im-
mediate post-World War II period. "31 It is not surprising
that this level of intimacy is unobtainable in the decade
of the seventies but must one go to the extreme of aggres-
sive nationalism (as did Connally) and the politics of
maneuver and secrecy which always seemed to be facets of
the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy?
Energy and Raw Materials
While relations between the United States and the EC
were becoming increasingly acrimonious due to a number of
serious economic and political problems, a further blow was
delivered to trans-Atlantic harmony. The outbreak of the
October war in the Middle East in 1973, the oil embargo,
and subsequent quadrupling of the price of oil became sub-
jects of controversy between the United States and the EC.
The administration, satisfied with the apparently successful
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disengagement of the United States from Vietnam, was
prised by and unprepared for the resumption of conflict in
the Middle East and the subsequent oil crisis. It must be
recognized that the failure to foresee and prevent the
emergence of a situation in which the United States and its
allies would be held hostage to the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting States (OPEC) constitutes a major failure of
American statesmanship.
Unfortunately, the energy issue affected every facet of
trans-Atlantic relationships. The EC was dealt a heavy blow
and the subsequent disparities between the members of the EC
will make the monetary and economic union of the EC by 1980
problematical at best. 32 As Robert Lieber has written
M it is essential that American policies be based in (sic)
the recognition that the European Community has not done
harm to fundamental U*S. interests. To this end, it makes
sense for the U.S. to encourage further progress toward
European unity, even when this may create short-term costs
for individual American sectors. M 33
Some commentators have indicated that Nixon and Kis-
singer may well have encouraged OPEC, prior to the October
war, to increase its price for oil in the belief that this
would further weaken competition from Europe and Japan as
the United States is better situated to provide its own
energy supplies. 3^ While Nixon and Kissinger undoubtedly
regretted the quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973, it
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appears that the general problem of oil prices really did
not concern them until the October war. Their diplomatic
priorities, quite simply, lay elsewhere. And it must be
remembered that the advent of the October war and the sub-
sequent oil crisis was entirely unexpected by everyone.
The energy crisis was an unmitigated disaster for the
Atlantic nations. The disagreements between the United
States and Europe on how to handle the crisis were exceeded
only by the acrimonious public exchanges between Kissinger
and the French foreign minister Michel Jobert on how to
organize Kissinger's proposed International Energy Agency
(IEA).35 once again Nixon and Kissinger displayed their
talent for abrupt diplomacy that seemed more assured of
seeking confrontation than cooperation.
Once again, during and after the October war, the al-
lies were treated in a manner reminiscent of the "Connally
method." Kissinger has written that "the test of a States-
man, then, is his ability to recognize the real relationship
of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends."^^
However, Kissinger's actions in this period diverged from
his views on statesmanship. Why the less than circumspect
public confrontations with the French foreign minister?
Did Kissinger really think that such tactics would promote
French appreciation of the need for the IEA? That such
tactics would encourage the French to sympathize with Ameri-
can foreign policy in the Middle East? This seems hardly
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likely to be the case.
Kissinger demonstrated that he could do no better than
preceding administrations in dealing with the French. Had
he forgotten his numerous criticisms of past American policy
in dealing with the French? Kissinger and others have
criticized the French for their lack of a real commitment
to European unity. Such policies as Kissinger's, however,
confirmed to many in France that they should seek a more in-
dependent role for France and, by implication, the EC.
The most serious charge against Kissinger, however, is
that, with his excessive concern for the withdrawal of
American military power from Vietnam and the attainment of
some stability in Indo-China, the development of serious
problems elsewhere could have been given greater considera-
tion than was the case. Kissinger should have realized the
great peril to Western Europe, Japan, and the global economy
if a Fourth Arab-Israeli war was accompanied by a subsequent
oil embargo. Apparently the potentially disastrous effects
of an oil embargo upon the allies received little or no
attention at the White House. 37 y et, how could Kissinger
have failed to realize the extraordinary vulnerability of
both the allies and Japan to an oil embargo or precipitous
price increases? How could he have misunderstood the "real
relationship of forces" and mishandled a crisis that
threatened gravely to damage a quarter-century of American
efforts to encourage the reconstruction and development of
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the political and economic systems of Western Europe and
Japan? The American failure to anticipate the energy crisis
is an understandable but major failure of statesmanship
whose consequences were of the most serious order. How-
ever, what was so regrettable were Kissinger's often need-
lessly abrupt actions during this crisis. As a scholar.
Kissinger wrote that "the closest cooperation between North
America
- indeed the entire Western Hemisphere - and Europe
is essential" and to be encouraged by the United States.^
In his conduct, in his obvious annoyance at the fledgling
EC. Kissinger showed that in the energy crisis of 1973, he
was not inclined to be particularly charitable towards
America's oldest allies.
The United States and the EC
Francois Duch£ne has written that "the EC must try to
domesticate relations between states and it must be a force
for the diffusion of civilian and democratic standards, or it
will be more or less the victim of power politics run by
greater military and more cohesive powers than itself.
The EC is an experiment of singular importance in the con-
temporary world. Obviously such an experiment has its nega-
tive aspects but the importance of the EC does not simply
pertain to the present period. Indeed "Europeans are prob-
ing ways in which mature nation-states can slowly submerge
elements of sovereignty in order to cope with new problems
without losing the cultural values or identity of old civil-
izations."^ Kissinger has constantly written of the need
to "build a new community of people on both sides of the
Atlantic" and for the West to show the way towards the de-
velopment of new forms of political cooperation that trans-
cend the limitations of the nation-state.^1
The attitude of the Nixon-Kissinger administration
toward the EC was distinctly negative. Stanley Hoffmann
writes "The Nixon-Kissinger dealings with allies, until and
including 1974. deprived them of confidence and leeway.
The European Economic Community has not recovered from the
joint shocks of the oil crisis and of American haughtiness,
including Washington's unwillingness to let the Europeans
play a diplomatic role in the Middle East or Cyprus, its
decision to preempt the common energy policy and to be the
chief strategist for the industrial powers at North-South
meetings."^2 The problem of European subordination to
American short-term interests is mentioned by the London
Economist i "But the biggest question is whether the will
really exists in Europe that there should continue to be
the sort of a Community that Mr. Kissinger is talking
about. "^3 in an alliance of democratic states - when the
Euro-American relationship is changing from tutelage to
partnership - public opinion and political leaders in
Western Europe will eventually question the necessity of
supporting an alliance that they think inadequately
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reflects their own perceptions and interests.
Earlier American Presidents - with the support of the
State Department - had consistently, if not successfully,
worked to help the EC achieve its full potential. It is
difficult to say that Kissinger continued this policy. The
attitude of the administration towards Atlantic institutions
was often ambiguous or even hostile. In November, 1972 the
American Ambassador to the Organization of Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) resigned because of policy dis-
agreements. In terms of economic relationships, the OECD
would have been a very useful forum for consultation! how-
ever, for a year and a half, no new American Ambassador was
named to the post in order to ensure that the Europeans
understood Nixon's basically negative attitude towards the
organization. When an ambassador was named, he turned out
to be an obscure protege of Barry Goldwater's.
Questions could also be raised with respect to NATO
and other institutions. The American Permanent Representa-
tive resigned because of inadequate support in mid-1971 and
yet, for nine months, this vital post remained unfilled.
When it was filled, the NATO Representative was often poorly
briefed (Rumsfeld) or discussed rather irrelevant issues
(Kennedy). Hoffmann again writes "Kissinger's style (and
the style of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Connally) either undermined
established institutions (such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)), whose director was sacrificed to Washington's
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displeasure and whose role was affected by the demise of
the fixed-rate system) or ignored or even interfered with
their attempts (weak enough) at coalescing, whenever we
deemed it dangerous (as in the case of the United Nations
or the EEC)".^ American foreign policy was basically too
secretive and bilateral, there was too little consultation
and actions were often taken abruptly. Given the adminis-
tration's attitude towards the OECD and the EC, many Euro-
peans were concerned about American support for the cause
of European unity. *5
It was not only the prolonged effort to withdraw from
Vietnam but also the administration's excessive concern for
its adversaries that caused difficulties in the Alliance.
As Andrew Pierre has noted "we should remember that the web
of contemporary international politics is such that the more
we negotiate with the East, the better we must structure our
relations within the West." 2*6 Kissinger ignored this as-
sessment of the international situation, this was a major
cause for the administration's debacles in Alliance policy.
Previous administrations had sponsored meetings between
top officials, including the President, and members of the
EC's Commission. Other contacts subsequently developed, for
example, the semi-annual meetings between the United States
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs and the
European Commissioner in charge of foreign affairs and trade
policy. Kissinger was indifferent to these contacts. He
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preferred to pressure the Council of Ministers to be recep-
tive to American positions and to play a role that consti-
tutionally and procedurally it could not undertake. When
Nixon was to travel to Europe in the first months of 1969,
only very grudgingly was the Commission invited to an au-
dience with him at his hotel. The Commission headquarters
were five minutes from Nixon's hotel but he refused to go
there (ostensibly to avoid offending the French). Thus
from Nixon's initial months in office it was quite clear
that there would be little sympathy for or understanding of
the necessity to encourage the development of the EC. With
respect to its policies in the circumstances of the early
seventies, Nixon and Kissinger apparently were unwilling to
regard the EC as anything more than an obstacle in the pur-
suit of American short-term interests. J. Robert Schaetzel
has stated that "both Kissinger's speech and the 1973
Foreign Policy Report of the President stated the tradi-
tional litany of support for European unity in the past
tense while the references to the present and the future
stressed the EC's increasingly regional economic policies."^
Can there be any question but that the Nixon-Kissinger
foreign policy with respect to the EC was to subordinate
the contemporary and potential usefulness of the EC to the
immediate interests of the United States.
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Summary
It is obvious that Nixon and Kissinger had, at best,
limited concern for the EC. As J. Robert Schaetzel states
"the planning for the President's European Trip (Fall 1973)
showed the administration's ambiguous attitude toward the
collective European institutions. Brussels was added to
the President's provisional itinerary only *t±„ j^r***^
visit to Washington. While a meeting with the NATO Council
was contemplated, the White House refused to make any spe-
cific commitment about what European community body or
bodies the President would meet with.',Zf8
It is clear that the Nixon-Kissinger administration
would both symbolically and practically render only very
grudging support to the EC. The administration made little
or no effort to attempt to influence the bureaucracies'
traditional belligerency towards the EC. All too often
were the EC or its representatives bypassed, embarrassed or
even humiliated by the administration's tactics.
The Europeans must bear part of the blame for this
state of affairs. Concurrently with the American involve-
ment in Vietnam, they became increasingly preoccupied with
the construction of Europe, as was to be expected. An ex-
periment of this kind involving a number of sovereign states
will, of necessity, demand a major share of the time and
energy of the participants. Is it expecting too much of
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American statesmen that during this crucial transitional
Phase they should realize the reasons for Europe's turning
inward?
At the beginning of his administration Nixon reportedly
had some degree of enthusiasm for the EC. 1* Kissinger has
constantly written of the necessity of a politically unified
Europe in helping to solve regional and global problems
which cannot be solved by the United States alone. He has
also written of the necessity to encourage "new centers of
initiative" in world politics.
It is apparent that the EC is increasingly identified
with Europe. Francois Duchesne has found signs of progress
in the EC in the economic and political areas. The economic
behavior of the EC after the Crisis of 1973 was impressive
as most countries switched resources into exports and
dampened inflation. Also, politically, there has been in-
creased consultation between the Nine with respect to the
European Security Conference and the talks on Mutual Force
Reductions. ^°
Alastair Buchan stresses the "linkage between achiev-
ing greater efficiency in NATO by rationalizing procurement
and the need for parallel progress on a common industrial
policy within the EC. "51 Abrupt power plays and excessive
unilateral initiatives can shatter or badly erode the still
fragile structures of a politically fragmented Europe that
is attempting to overcome the divisions of the past and to
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demonstrate in the future the manner in which sovereign
states can both cooperate to solve common problems and still
retain their individual identies. It is unfortunate that
Nixon and Kissinger put so high a priority upon America's
short-te™ interests with respect to the Europeans. What is
more difficult to understand is how a scholar with a compre-
hensive philosophy of history should have failed to aid (if
only symbolically) the Europeans in a most critical period
of transition in the construction of a United Europe.
The problems pertaining to Europe's (and Japan's) eco-
nomic security will now be of greater importance. Well be-
fore the October war tensions in the Middle East were rising
with the price of oil. If Nixon and Kissinger had not been
so completely preoccupied with extracting the United States
from Vietnam, would a major diplomatic effort have averted
the outbreak of the October war. the use of the oil weapon,
and the subsequent quadrupling of the price of oil? Richard
Cooper points out that "the sharp rise in oil prices will
necessitate - for some countries - changes in the structure
of their national economies and this - as one side effect -
will further postpone European monetary unification."^2 Now
the goal of economic and monetary unification by 1980 ap-
pears to have suffered a setback. Unfortunately, the margins
in which the unification of Europe can occur has been nar-
rowed, for now the Europeans are more dependent for their
economic security upon OPEC and Washington. 53
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From 1971 to 1975 Nixon's and Kissinger's policies
toward the EC were characterized by abrupt, unilateral moves.
During the preceding two years and from 1975-76 the admi
tration tried to be more cooperative. Yet the lack of
consistent, coherent policy indicates the lack of
sensus regarding the EC. Policy towards the Soviet Uni
and China was consistent and often brilliantly innovative.
The difference between the administrations views and poli-
cies toward the EC is striking. Moreover, Kissinger's
claims that the United States had to act alone or nothing
could be done lacks credibility. Occasionally this might be
a correct assessment but between the extremes of abrupt,
unilateral action and doing nothing there exists a consid-
erable range of alternatives. It is not at all apparent that
Nixon and Kissinger carefully examined all the available
possibilities before initiating their policies.
In an alliance of democratic states consideration of
public opinion and democratic institutions is of critical
importance. This is even more the case during a period of
transition - from tutelage to partnership - between the
United States and Western Europe (and Japan). The public
must be involved in (through democratic institutions) and
understand (the educational aspect of leadership) the poli-
cies of their governments. The West European governments
are not without blame yet Nixon and Kissinger did very lit-
tle of a constructive nature in this area. Instead - for
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»ost of the time - their policies of abrupt maneuvers> uni_
lateral moves, and excessively assertive national toward
the EC confused and angered both Americans and West Europeans.
In an age characterized by conflicting tendencies and
trends, it nevertheless should be a paramount objective of
United States policy to educate its citizens (and the members
of the EC must do the same) as to the necessity of support-
ing the EC
i
for its successful development is a vital con-
cern of American foreign policy. However, in terms of demo-
cratic leadership, educating and involving the public con-
cerning the EC. Nixon's and Kissinger's legacy is distinctly
negative. Yet in 1964 Henry Kissinger wrote that for the
West "its challenge now is whether it can move from the
nation-state to a larger community and draw from this effort
the strength for another period of innovation. " 5>* The con-
temporary problems facing the people on both sides of the
Atlantic cannot obscure this fundamental challenge.
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CHAPTER
v
BILATERAL RELATIONS i WEST GERMANY
Introduction
Bilateral relations with +*,
m i maJ °r Eur°Pean states arean important aspect of America's r.l *i w
g o
5 e at^nshiP with Europe.Early proponents of multilateral institute
and in ,
ions such as NATOa, m particular, the vr v, ^ -,
'
E
° PlaCed to° ™oh emphasis onthe eventual demise of ^ nation.state>
the sixties ana seventies nationalism has revived in Europe
*» origins of this development are not simply dUe to EUch
'
excesses as occurred in Prance under de Gaulle. rhis is not
to deny the effects of the Gaullist movement, hut the re-
vival of nationalism in Europe occurred hoth because of the
"reemergence of the past" and hecause in the sixties the
memory of World War II faded with the success of post-war
reconstruction and the development of the welfare state.
Furthermore, these developments coincided with and were
stimulated by the rise of nationalism in areas that had
been under colonial rule.
Consequently. American foreign policy has to deal with
both Europe's multilateral institutions and bilaterally with
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-rope's raajor M minor Btates
. Qiven ^
:7' tus wm - *
—
of Patience M zistanding on both sides that has not alwavs h 1lox y been present.ix always was - and «?tm •still remains - Very doubtm th&t ^
major European states, with a lomr M ^ .ng history of diplomatic
activity
, win transfer or merge their sovereign identities
with collective institutions. In the foreseeable future
Europe's major states are likelv to *i K y retain considerable room
for diplomatic maneuver.
On the American side a complicating factor for foreign
policy makers has been the post-Vietnam assertiveness of
Congress. Not only did the Vietnam catastrophe undermine
America's claim to moral and political leadership but it
also weakened confidence in the executive branch. With
respect to United States-West European relations, many Euro-
peans are worried about the direction and consistency of
American foreign policy. Raymond Aron has mentioned that
Europeans tend to be very skeptical and wary of an enhanced
foreign policy role for the American Congress. 2 But as
neither the executive branch nor the Congress is infallible,
someway must be found for both to support an appropriate and
consistent foreign policy. For any post-Nixon administration
this will be an extremely delicate and difficult task.
Finally, the seemingly intractable nature of many cur-
rent problems will exhaust patience and understanding on
both sides. For many problems such as inflation, energy,
110
America's enormous trade deficits, the Soviet
and re Stl essness in E + ^ arms ^"-up.b l astern Eurot)Ppe
»
ther© are no immediatp
answers. However Inn*- +
'eai e
» -Long-term solutions „t0 some may be founrihr0Ugh C°nSUltati0n
— - WeTtern 3ions, out consultation and cooperation must be sustained,
cannot be predicated upon momentary impulses. Can the
nations of the North ^^ ^ ^
cooperation needed to solve problems that transcend the
capabilities of any single state? What were the policies
of the Nixon-Kissinger administration with respect to the
major European states? The next three chapters win deal
*-th American foreign policy towards West Germany. France,
and Britain.
The Gpp^ Pr^KT_rm
Since at least 1871 the "German problem" has been at the
center of European politics. When the long quest of the Ger-
man people to attain national unity was successful in 1871.
this raised the question as to the role a unified German
state would play in Europe.3 The successes of Bismarck's
policies secured a place for Germany in the concert of Euro-
pean powers. But Kissinger wrote of Bismarck that all the
things he had warned or fought against occurred anyway, no
alliance with France was possible after 18?1, Germany was
increasingly tied to Austria, and it was difficult to spe-
cifically determine Germany's national interest.'*
Ill
Kissinger goes on to sav th,+ r° y at Germany's P-rv> Q +~c+
^
s neatest modern
tragedy. -> J
Thus, in an age when self-determination and national
unity are the driving forces of mankind, are the Germans tobe denied the fulfills of their historic drive for na-
tional unity? Two world wars have not answered this ques-
tion. But thirty-five years after the defeat and collapse
of Germany the remnants of the Reich have attained con-
siderable importance in the world. The German Democratic
Republic (GDR) is the seventeenth ranking industrial power
in the world and the largest trading partner of its osten-
sible occupier, the Soviet Union. « West Germany is econo-
mically the strongest country in Western Europe and is try-
ing to define a political role commensurate with its eco-
nomic power.
The German problem thus presents itself anew, what
role and place shall the successor states of imperial Ger-
many have in Europe? Both German states, in particular West
Germany, are engaged in the process of redefining their
place in Europe. This will not be an easy task. But the
post-war era has ended. New political alignments are oc-
curring as states wax and wane. Britain, in an unparalleled
manner, has gone from a great to a medium power in only a
quarter of a century. France, particularly under de Gaulle,
seems determined to be once again in the front ranks of
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nations.
Thus, shorn of the excesses of «,
-
«- «.
r
. T,Z\"" -
wi+h? p factor to contendt Can the Western allies - with +K w
the
6 Ea8t Eur°Peans and
^n Kussians - hp ,
-
suffxclently
xmaginative to devise struc-turea that will s»-H=f,, +u „atisfy the Germans in their quest for
^est for national unity must be conducted in such a way asto arouse their neighbors- fear and apprehension, Kis-
singer wrote "it is against all probability that a large
and dynamic oountry can he kept divided indefinitely in the
center of the continent that gave the concept of nationalism
to the world. M °
During Kissinger's tenure in office disagreements oc-
curred between the United States and West Germany regarding
several areas, West Germany and the EC, the offset costs
issue, energy and African troops in Europe. Concerning the
EC excessive American pressures upon the West Germans to
serve as advocates for American policies often placed Bonn
in a difficult position. The offset costs issue, energy,
and American troops in Europe were further complicated by
economic and political disagreements. Other problems caus-
ing tension between the two countries are the United States-
West German main battle tank, the shipment of NATO war ma-
terial from West German bases to aid Israel, the American
pressure upon West Germany to stimulate its economy, and the
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West Gerraan-Bra2ilian nuclear reactor treaty AmWest Germans have had df
encans and
disagreements in the past but in a
of rapid change> when neoessity compeie ^
sagreements may cause major di fficulties in the future.
» i. within this context that the scholarly writings ^
^sequent policies of Henry Kissinger should he of con-
siderable interest.
Kissinger did almost all of hi* w.u;xj. 01 s writing on Germany dur-ing the late fifties and early sixtio* ni es. During this period
the Berlin crisis and other aspects of the German problem
were of central concern to American policymakers. However
from the late sixties on American policymakers have, through
a combination of inertia and neglect, set the stage for po-
tentially serious disputes with the European allies. 9 The
state of America's relations with its European allies is
still central to the power and position of the United States
in a multipolar world. Neither America nor Europe, stand-
ing alone, can master the successive challenges of the last
quarter of the 20th century without sustained and consistent
consultation and cooperation. And of the foremost importance
is the relationship between the United States and West Ger-
many.
Kissinger has written that "Germany has held the key to
the stability of Europe for at least three centuries."10
During the period prior to 1871 when Germany was weak and
disunited, the other powers sought to perpetuate its
Ilk
divisions and prevent 5+ fw™ +• • •it from attaining national unity while
ensuring that no single Dow^r *i p e gained preponderance in Cen-
tral Europe.
Germany's history must De understood against this hack-
led Germany, after 1871. to identify security with BUffi _
cient strength to defend itself simultaneously against all
of its neighbors. However, this effort required mobilization
of resources and cultivation of nationalism on such a scale
that Germany's neighbors feared for their security. But
since Germany was situated in the heart of Europe. Bismarck
spoke of "the nightmare of hostile coalitions." However,
twice in the 20th century, the peace of Europe was shattered
by a unified Germany. Kissinger writes that "it was Ger-
many's tragedy that the effort to prevent these coalitions
made them inevitable. "H Thus "Germany has been either too
weak or too powerful for the peace of Europe."" ln other
words, Germany should be able to defend itself but not to
attack. It should be united, so that its frustrations do
not erupt into conflict and its divisions do not tempt
other countries. Nationalism should be more mature, not
jingoistic.
Kissinger is very perceptive when he writes of the
psychological problems facing the Germans. Every German
over fifty years of age has lived through three revolutions.
Four regimes have existed in this period and each has
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claimed to be morally antithetical to its orprt00 l Predecessor. In
addition, Germany has lost two world wars an*xa W d experienced
the consequences of two terrible inflation* Mj-niiat s. Moreover, not
only the older feneration *~g has suffered serious trauma. EachGerman over thirtv-five has wi+„y nv witnessed the horrors of the
Nazi period, World War II, ^ the snhsm ^
lapse of the oountry. Kissinger writes that "the Nazi ex-
perience has been so completely suppressed or sublimated
into a vague feeling of generalized guilt that it is no
longer a problem as such."13 But „ the rootlessness prQ _
duced by blotting out twelve years of history is relevant. -W
Thus, while great national prosperity has been achieved, it
is incongruous with the loss of national, political, and
territorial integrity. Consequently German leadership
groups often suffer from a lack of inner assurance, which
is often expressed in vociferous and legalistic disputes.
How then could a divided and rootless country, viewed
with suspicion and fear, avoid the excesses of either na-
tionalism or neutralism and yet become a member of the
Community of nations? It was West Germany's great post-war
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who understood the psychological
needs of his countrymen. Adenauer attempted to reintroduce
West Germany into the Community of nations, to give the
Federal Republic a stake in something larger than itself.
He sought to teach his people habits of self-reliance in
international politics. West Germany, exposed geographically
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and psychologically and politically vulnerable, could not,
by itself, pursue an active and vigorous foreign policy.
Adenauer sought to submerge narrow West German inter-
ests in a wider community. Of great importance to him were
the close ties with the United States and membership in the
EC. Of equally great importance was the Franco-German
Treaty of January, 1963. For the first time in centuries,
Germany had a friend in the West. This was a notable diplo-
matic achievement. But perhaps Adenauer's greatest achieve-
ment was to convey the impression that "conditions in the
Federal Republic were as firm and stable as his own pol-
icy. "15 But when the Berlin crisis transpired, including
the erection of the Berlin wall, it marked a crucial water-
shed in the Western Alliance for never before had the emer-
gence of serious differences among the allies been such a
real possibility.^ The allies and West Germany would have
to agree on new policies (such as detente), and simultane-
ously ensure the security of West Berlin and West Germany.
But if new policies are not agreed upon, the possibility of
a serious breach between the allies and West Germany cannot
be ruled out.
The Future of Germany
In both The Necessity for Choice (1961) and The
Troubled Partnerghi,a (1965) Kissinger wrote at length on the
"—
" *«* * ~ very critical of Araeri .
can policy towards Germany both during and after the^
crisis. The Kennedy administration apm ^^
negotiate with the Soviet Union and^ concessions
»any on both sides of the Atlantic sought stability in the
tion of the drive for national unitv t««5n„.,ensions appeared be-
tween Washington and Bonn.
An additional complicating factor was the emergent I
Franoo-Amerioan rivalry. With the signing of the Franco-
German Treaty of Collaboration on January M, 1963, tne
United States began an intensive process of wooing West
Germany. This was one motive behind the Multilateral Force
(M1F) proposal that was to be such a bone of contention
among the allies. To prevent Franco-German nuclear cooper-
ation, an agreement was signed between the United States
and West Germany on November 14, 1964 that "in effect made
the German armed forces dependent on the United States for
their military equipment. "1? Kissinger was highly critical
of these arrangements and of American fears that the Franco-
German rapprochment would lead to a new power grouping, a
"condition inherently impossible of fulfillment." 18
Furthermore, "American pressure and high-handed Franch
actions have placed the Federal Republic in an extremely
uncomfortable position. "19 Consequently West Germany runs
a serious risk of being isolated. Moreover, "the frequent
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-ear
changes in American policy on «*rv,+ .P x strategic doctrine, nucl.
control and the emphasis to be given to v «" various partners
must radicalize German political lif« ^ +p x x e, whatever the merit
of individual United States positions. "20
Germany occupies a kev olano ^ +wK y pi c e in the Western Alliance
Because of its seopcrtitiea! position, Prench abruptness ^
American short-sightedness should he avoided. The danger i,
that Germany will become ahsorhed in its own unfulfilled
national aspirations while it realizes the advantages con-
ferred upon it by its growing power and central location.
Kissinger also warns of the 17 million Germans under Soviet
control and expresses concern that in the competition be-
tween the two German states. West Germany's internal struc-
ture may not be equal to the strain placed upon it.
He is also worried about the development of a potential
conflict between the Federal Republic and its allies over
the division of Germany. Three factors are involved. (1)
NATO seeks to maintain the status quo. yet one of the most
important members seeks a change in the status quo, (2) none
of the NATO allies places a very high priority upon German
reunification, (3) Germany's past has left a legacy of mis-
trust that will create future obstacles. Both the Franco-
American rivalry and a relaxation of East-West tensions add
to the difficulties. Thus German leaders are often ambiva-
lent about detente. If progress on the German question is
blocked, the Alliance may soon have to choose between its
own Policy on German reunification or^
PuoXic Pursue thi8 goal independently> ^
-
«-* not become an obstacle if Germany is eVer tQ be
/"*
respected member of the interna-H™ t
-Lxixernational community.
Concerning the fate of the 17 miiiixn 17 million people in East
Germany. Kissinger takes a rather hard line
. He is aWare
or the complicated and explosive nature or this problem,
yet he is against enhanoing the status of East Germany
which he refers to as »a dangerous course."** Both German
states would compete for adherents all over the world, more-
over, any hope for future reunifioation would be deferred
indefinitely. Splits may ooour in the Western Alliance
over humanitarian versus political concerns. Additionally
the moral cost to the Soviets of maintaining their position
in East Germany would be lessened, and this would mean that
with the consolidation of the regime in East Germany reuni-
fication would be on PankoWs terms. In fact. Kissinger is
fearful if East Germany behaves with moderation after it is
recognized that "it will have major incentives to seek to
undermine the Federal Republic.^ East German nationalism
clashes with the Communist regime, and this precarious situ-
ation may prompt measures to attack or weaken the Federal
Republic. Thus the end result of West German concessions
to East Germany could well lead to an indefinite continua-
tion of two hostile states competing against each other
rather than progress toward unification. It is apparent
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-at Kis ger is Erhard .Schroeder
little steps" for he thinks that such poHcies ^^^^
dangerous results. "21*
A common German policv n-r +>,„ w
t , . A
P y °f the Western Allies is essen-ial not only t0 retain Geraiany ^ a wiuing^ ^
manent division of Germany into hostile. competing states
is mherently dangerous. ^ can ^ ^ ^ ^
alleviate this highly dangerous situation?
Kissinger envisages that a number of policies „„
available to the Western powers. Most importantly, the West
must show concern for and understanding of the anguish of a
divided country. Thus German reunification must be a cen-
tral common concern of the allies. The Federal Republic
should not be urged into bilateral dealings with the East.
The allies in turn must adopt a concrete program that en-
visages specific steps. The issue of German unification
cannot simply become an exercise in rhetoric.
Two areas of great concern to the allies are strategy
toward East Germany and the problem of Germany's frontiers.
Should the Western powers seek to increase contacts with
East Germany or should they isolate it? Kissinger recom-
mends the latter course for this "seems the most promising
and the one most consistent with a long-term policy on
German unification. "25 But the alIle8 ^ West Gernmy^
agree on the policy towards Eastern Europe. Kissinger in
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fact argues that a More active Wcot German policy would help
to isolate the GDR and promote its demoralization. Thus to
meliorate the Hallstein Doctrine and to lessen the East
Europeans- support for Soviet and East German pressures
against Berlin, a more active diplomacy by the Federal Re-
public in Eastern Europe would perhaps be conducive to a
final long-term settlement. But as specific plans for Ger-
man unification become necessary, they should not move
closer to the Soviet position as succeeding Western plans
have done.
The second area of concern is the Oder-Neisse line.
To Kissinger this is one of the human tragedies of our
time, and the reluctance of the Federal Republic to re-
nounce these territories is understandable. However, until
this was done through Brandt's
_Os±politik f the failure of
Bonn to renounce its claims to this area means that the
Soviets were provided with a convenient excuse for main-
taining their hold on East Germany. Consequently Soviet
hegemony and control of Eastern Europe is also reinforced.
Thus while it was not clear at precisely what point
Bonn would have to renounce its claims, still this had to
be done. For "it is essential to recognize that acceptance
by Germany of its eastern frontiers will have to be part of
any responsible program for unification. 1,26 But Germany's
desire for unification, the East European concern for
security, and Soviet concern that a united Germany will
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threaten its own security all have to h
«•< , ,
be rec°nciled in anvfinal Plan for Germany s future.
However. Ki ssinger is wary of any forraula ^
_
-
for
-it is improbable that any negoti ating formula 11
™ost reasonable program. Therefore. ^
6
German unity reside i n +w ^
lose their importance, the fear of" i any one state will di-
minish. Thus a united Western *w„ .'es Europe will become a magnetfor the countries of Eastern Europe. Here Kissinger casti-
gates Franco-America, rivalry as "the West, which has so
often been rent by internal struggles, stands in danger of
repeating its historic folly. "28 Genn£my^ ^^ ^
a balance wheel for this will complete the fragmentation of
the Western Alliance.
To prevent the Federal Republic from becoming a menace
to the West, it is vital to give it a stake in something
larger than itself. Two policies are vital for the future
of the Federal Republic. (1) recognition of the psycho-
logical and political dilemmas of a divided country and (2)
the ability to make the Federal Republic part of a larger
community. These "policies are interdependent; to pursue
one without the other is to defeat both. "29
123
In 1969 new administrations assume
sponsiMlities in wM,,w
governmental re-
x Washington and in Bonn. And fears also
~" ^ "*«
— -gleet its European^ es due to its preoccupation with Asia
.
United States was in a , •
Nixon Ki •
Pl°matiC CrlsiS
-
The
—
outn as AsU before addressing ^ ^ ^
with Western Europe.
«th the end of the post-war era. monetary, economic,
-d political problems in the Atlantic Alliance became ap-
parent. As Lyndon Johnson's presidential term drew to a
close. Americans became more involved in Vietnam and Euro-
peans in the construction of the EC. This was the period
when "Johnson often put heavy pressure on the European al-
lies, i.e.. the Federal Republic was ordered not to take up
contacts with Peking or to enter into further joint pros-
pects with France for the development of European military
equipment.
-30 Johnson, by his impetuous and indiscriminate
manner, had helped cause the downfall of Chancellor Ludwig
Erhard when the Chancellor was invited to Johnson's Texas
ranch in 1965
.
According to Lothar Rule "At the end of the
Johnson administration US-European relations were at an all-
time low. .-31 Thus, when the new administrations took power
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in Washington and Bonn - desoit* «,
C, > i
unifying effect of theCzechoslovak invasion in 1 968 - there were pounds for con-oem with respect to United States-West 0
„,. .
Ge™an relations.
The erection of the Berlin Wall «„ .
.
l U in August. l96l hadteen a catalyst in Bonn's thinking T +
, ,
+
.
" . It was apparent thatdetente and subsequent progress tow nP ard German unification
woia be the only acceptahle way to achieve West Germany's
nation, goals. During the sixtieg ^^ ^^
a new multipolar world i^oo ^ •^«-ua.i u ia, less dominated w +wT a
°y the superpowers,
began to emerge. The eastern policies of de Gaulle and
American involvement with Southeast Asia and its bilateral
Brandt's entourage. It is not surprising, then, that the
new government in Bonn decided to venture forth more boldly
into terrain that decisively marked West Germany's emergence
as an important political power. With the tacit support of
his allies, Brandt began a series of overtures to the East
that were to culminate in December. 1972 in the signing of
the Intra-German Accords. 32 In effect East Germany achieved
diplomatic recognition by the Western powers while the issue
of Berlin was resolved or at least greatly clarified by the
prior Four Power Agreement of September. 1971. In the space
of a few years, Americans and West Germans would begin to
develop a new sense of equality. 35
Thus Henry Kissinger was aware that, backed by their
enormous economic power, the West Germans were seeking to
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redefine their political rol e .3^ Ypt je as Josef Joffe writes
Secretary of State Kissinger was quick to suspect »
haste in the West German initiatives toward Bast-West de-
tente. "35 But for the tfest 0eManB ^^^^ ^
are of vital importance. This idea is emphasised hy West
German Chancellor Helmut Sctaidt in the London E^^,
"One of the necessities of the alliance as well as for us
Germans is to get along with the Eastern power. We don't
want to get back into the Cold War. There is nothing to be
gained for the Germans in a Cold War riiviri^" " » o vioed as our nation
is, divided as our capital of Berlin is, nothing to be
gained from a new Cold War period. A return to the Cold War
is still thinkable
i I hope it doesn't occur, but we have
not passed the point of no return as yet. "36*
However, the record of the Nixon-Kissinger team with
respect to West Germany is not entirely satisfactory even
though the two countries have always been aware that each
has needed the other. It is not too much to say that a
special relationship exists between them. Both have been
aware of West Germany's exposed position and while occasional
frictions have been apparent, no really serious breaches
have occurred. What really worries the West German leaders
is a certain lack of reliability, of consistency, that has
emanated from American foreign policy since the Johnson Ad-
ministration. As George Ball writes "Kissinger has not con-
sulted with and thus marred European-American relations
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since 1969.-37
z .tit* the united states - west *• -tain of Kissinger's policie8 caused ^
reparable, differences. What «i
+
ow + •wn alternative policies could hehave pursued? Havp hi ™i a •e s policies sought to place the rela-
tionship between the United states and West Germany within aframework that stresses mutual consultation and cooperation
on issues of common interest? In this perio<J Qf
political and social change, has the relationship between
the two countries been further clarified? Have new princi-
ples been articulated that provide for the security of West
Germany yet also seek to impart a new dimension to interna-
tional relations by imparting a greater concern for moral
and ethical actions?
West ftprp^ny nnd
-fr
h g Fg
In January, 1973. the EC welcomed three new members,
Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. The Summit meetings in 1969
at The Hague and in 1972 at Paris had endorsed the idea of
enlarging and consolidating the EC. This, of course, was
bound to involve the Bonn government more heavily in Com-
munity affairs and as it turned out also, to provide more
opportunity for friction between the enlarged Community and
the United States.
I have previously indicated some of the economic
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problems between the United q+ *u x a btates and tho vn M
,
.
a xne EC
» Non- tariffbarri6rS t0
^^-ationa! trade, agricultural trade
"
Community's nrefe^ +1 ! thep rential agreements with Mediterranean anaEuropean Free Trade Association (EFTA ) countries all were
sources of controversy.
„oweVer> eVgn though ^_
Ports to the EC showed a surplus. »the United States tried.
-«*». 1973. to induce the European Colmmity ^^
c es which would do the minimum damage to American commer-ce, industrial and agricultural interests, and the parti-
cular zeal of American officials in a++ « + •^ l attempting to obtain the
maxxmum support from their German allies for this objec-
"fcive (slc_)."38
West Germany, in accordance with the decisions reached
at the two European summits for the consolidation of the EC
was developing new ties with the Community. Thus the West
'
Germans were placed in a very difficult position by the
American demands. But the Americans, while willing to pay
a price for European integration, often appeared to be highly
ambiguous about resisting short-term economic pressures for
more intangible long-term political benefits. During the
Nixon-Kissinger years this attitude all too often character-
ized Washington's policies towards the EC. West Germany's
membership in the EC imposes upon American policymakers an
obligation to resist attempts to take advantage of the spe-
cial relationship. One commentator writes "the Administra-
tion sought to avoid the partnership implications of an
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Alliance policy, and to maintain
through tho •
Brussels and notx 5n e aegis of V/p<?+west Germany. But in I971 N « v
Kissinger were to demonstrat
^
a e on more than one occasion «, *America's military +< that
-rcial and ^^ * *erciax economic concessions from the West Germans.**On March 8, 1973, Martin Hillenbrand th a
bassaf, ftr +
o , e American Am-ssado to Bonn, hp?an v.* ~
'
ueg nis speech wi +h ~ -
^ . _
P n Wlt a remark about thespecial nature of the relationship between the United StWest Germany He then
djff.
ent
°n t0 dlscuss some of thedifferences between the Unit^n q+ +ed States ^d Western Europethat would have to be resolved in th. f« «,e forthcoming General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT ) anH t +^ATT; d International
Monetary Fund (IMF) conferences. It wa <=i s apparent that once3galn United Stat
- *» tempting to influence West
Germany. Was placing that ^ ^^ ^_
tion not only with reSpeot to the two forthcoming confer-
ences but also regarding the EC, which has a considerable
interest in these issues.
Later in the year the October war and subsequent energy
crisis submerged all other issues. By 1974 the Watergate
crisis, Nixon's resignation, and the accession of Gerald
Ford to the presidency also helped in creating circumstances
which militated against the continuation of the pressures
brought to bear upon West Germany by Nixon and Kissinger in
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1973. But. i, these events had not corapened ^
cate for African interests, at what point would he have
realized that he was traneer^i +>, nsgreosmg the line between legiti-
mate influence and pressures that approached coercion? Some
pressure and bargaining are inherent in any alliance rela.
tionship. But Kissinger's pressures upon West Germany in
1973 went beyond bargaining between two allies. Moreover,
this contradicted his previous warnings concerning West Ger-
many's psychological and political vulnerability. I„ terms
of the relationship between the two countries, excessive
demands and pressures upon Bonn that exceeded the normal
boundaries of alliance behavior are undesirable. More than
once Kissinger was guilty of transgressing those boundaries.
Moreover, there were no compelling reasons that justified
this particular course of action. In Western Europe no one
was probably more sympathetic to America's plight regarding
its balance of payments, the involvement in Vietnam, and
America's subsequent economic and political difficulties
than Bonn. While some of Brandt's initiatives no doubt ir-
ritated Kissinger, there was every reason to consult and co-
operate with the West Germans. West Germany had become more
secure psychologically and politically, particularly as a
result of the OstnolitiV. but West Germany's particular
situation must always be fully considered in any policy. As
Michel Tatu writes "improvement of relations with the East
c« have favorable consequences ^ just
_
Reputiic
- ~ —* with that Etate
should prevail over all n+v, ,other considerations. "^2
The cost of maintaining trooiw h** is ps has long caused diffi-
culties in United States-West r«™ *, , .German relations. Curt
Gasteyger has written that nhe Qffset ^^^^^^ ^
German-British payments sysUm^ ^
made multilateral. "'O Bv 1077 +m„ - v,ay 1973 this problem had reached more
serious proportions because of the economic problems be-
setting the American economy, since the dollar was de-
valued in February, 1973 , the Americans expected Bonn to
increase its contribution, however. Chancellor Schmidt re-
fused to comply. Pinally
, the Amer . cans ^ make ^
the difference.
But a more serious American demand was that Bonn meet
1005? of the cost of the troops instead of the 8<# as spe-
cified in the prior agreement in 1971-73. The West Germans
sought some support for a multilateralization of the offset
Payments. Britain's answer was negative for the British
considered that they were already supporting their troops
in West Germany.
Since both the American and West German budgets were
under serious strain in 1973. it should occasion no surprise
that bargaining was difficult. The end result, however, was
™°re or less predictable x
">ake most of the mn , *
W°Uld haVe *»UI n concessions
tho * «
neW dement signed ine Spring of 1974 Wa3 t l l
"id-1975. When Vh ^^ *°
Press conference in 1976 C h,„ ,1
tat , fc
Chancellor Schmidt, highly imi-ed by previous controversy on
that h»
S SUbj60t
' i^icatede considered the matter closed The Payment in Ger-
I.
6
" ^ " —
-
- - -liar and the
n SatiSfi6d
~ «»—~ CO "be obtained, m the future, however thi* „ Kiu , s problem could
cause even more difficultv tv,
inw +r
ThS Presence °f American troops
» West Germany benefits both the United States and Astern
Europe. Therefore, the manner in which this issue was
handled by Nixon and Kissinger was unfortunate. Gertainly.
the West Germans resented the pressures they were subjected
to. Would it not have been better to try to achieve a
greater degree of consultation and cooperation on such a
vatal matter? Moreover, the polemics surrounding this is-
sue were not helpful for public relations (an important con-
sideration in an alliance of democratic states) for they
confirmed the views of many Americans that the West Germans
(and the West Europeans) were taking advantage of American
generosity and were not contributing enough to defend their
own countries. To the West Germans American foreign policy
appeared increasingly inconsistent and nationalistic. They
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were worried that America's ability to work in concert with
and to cooperate with its allies might be seriousiy ef-
fected. Donatio pressures and the crisis in Southeast
Asia added an additional element „«•° i of unpredictability. Con-
secuently the economic crisis afflicting the Western allies
has shown that problems such as offset costs, unless ac-
companied by great tact and patience, can seriously damage
relations among the countries of the Atlantic Alliance.
Energy
United States-West European relations were particularly
difficult in 1973. Kissinger's "Year of Europe" speech in
April had, to many in Europe and particularly the French,
threatening aspects.^ The link between American military
support and the explicit demand for concessions on commer-
cial and economic matters was a matter of serious concern
in Europe. America's pursuit of detente with the Soviet
Union and China and its activities in Indo-China were cause
for additional concern. But, to prepare for Nixon's Fall
visit, the West Germans were prepared to work with the
other Europeans and reach agreement with the Americans on a
new "Atlantic Charter."
But events in the Middle East precluded further efforts
to mend United States-West European relations in 1973. The
October war and the subsequent oil embargo and the quad-
rupling of the price of oil were the occasion for a severe
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crisis in United States-\W rdues West German rela-H™„ k$
—fc.— -,h„,
... . ,„lM.
-
;
"
the shipment of war m . . ,
PreSS Covered
U1 Material from w0o+ n
asked th +U4
Germany and Bonn
these bases to resupply I srar0 .el had been ignored but, withthe proclamation of the ceasefire, the Bonne
'
xn government
thought that in vi GVV of its ti
, + .
lth the Ar^b states andit- heavy dcpen(icnce on^ Eastern^ ^^longer remain silent.
Both the African Ambassador to „egt ^
Hillenbrand, and Kissinger ^ ^
Bonn-s dilemma
. I„ response to the Bom ^
quest that the shiprae„t of „eapons cease. Hillenbrand is
reported to have stated "that the United States regarded
Vest Germany's sovereignty as United, and reserved the
right to take any action which it regarded as right and ne-
cessary in the interests of international security. -*?
Kissinger reportedly agreed with the substance of these
remarks.'* once again we witness that Vacillation that
Characterised both Euro-American relations and the relation-
ship between the United States and West Germany. On some
issues Kissinger would consult and cooperate with the West
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could not Kissing haVe been more
«* « on shortage upon West ^
- effects
o-er? As the economio reoesEio^
C
^ ^
Political
01
•
L ^ b5 showed, pervasiveeconomic strains can havo » « <
P
Ve a serl0Us effect on the West Gprmans political order. Furth ™
f ++
f ermore
,
few West Germans haveforgotten the trauma of the inflation „
1920. s *nH +k
llat and recession of the
^2 a d the subsequent effect on h
v * .
nec the political systemKissinger is well aware th«t aa democracy in West Germany hasits vulnerabilities. Whv tw .y hen did he not consider thisfact more fully in his policies? tw
my. tt
*
-^ There were alternatives.
The Umted States could have responded more ^
regards sharing its energy resources with the allies. The
^st Germans (and tne Europeans) understood America's dil-
emma as regards the Middle East. Would it not have been
better to attempt to enlistp mis European sympathy and coopera-
tion initially while quietly resolving disagreements?
Surely consultation and cooperation (in sharing energy re-
sources) would have been a better approach for resolving
the oil problem that so suddenly and unexpectedly confronted
the Western allies.
Perhaps American policymakers could attempt to antici-
pate problems and be more magnanimous. If this does not
occur, a really profound crisis in United States-West German
relations cannot be ruled out. Kissinger was not particu-
larly skillful in reassuring the West Germans about energy
supplies. He was rather inept in his initial efforts to
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garner support for the proposed IEA. The «, ,in Kissinger-Jobert
confrontations, in particular di* „
m =n * v
Seem t0 the "est Ger-a s, to be a very good way of securingy support. Nixon'sincreasing involved in the Watergate crisis hi, •
tion +h„ •
, s resigna-, the accession of Gerairt p / ,h ald Ford (who did not appear to
ccn one his predecessor's taste for confrontation politics)
to the presidency, and the general improvement Qf econoraic
conditions lessened the intensity of the energy crisis. At
Present, under current circumstances, the West German go-
vernment has little choice hut to accede to American pres-
sure. However, careless and self-centered actions could
eventually erode the political and moral claims to leader-
ship of the United States. cM it i,o tax , oan it be assumed that in future
circumstances, when competition for raw materials may be
-ore intense. West Germany will always be ready to com-
promise its foreign policy objectives for the benefit of the
United States?
American Troops in F»rrr
Political actions should never be interpreted in too
mechanical a manner. The intangible element can be de-
cisive in determining the success or failure of policies.
Witness the intangible effects of Kissinger's policies upon
the West Germans. The vacillation, confusion, and self-
centered nature of many of Kissinger's policies have, to
the West Germans, severely damaged American political and
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™°ral claims to leadership. This 1. wh
-, j
S a new vision n-r + u
American troops am k^+v, 3 Gy,"b01
°
f America>s
•«-**-to the defense of Europe and the mcan<- of . ,
it T+ f tx. lmPlcmentinKIt is, therefore, cause for concern «.
. ,
that members of theAmerican Congress should year after ,Vear call for larre
unilateral reductions in the strength of Am ,
^rope. In March Km s ^1973 Senator Mansfield, who has peren-
nially directed these resolutions, induced the Democratic
members of the Senate -t-^ «to pass overwhelmingly a resolution
demanding that American ground troops in Euro* h „
, e . J
^ x ^ ope be reduced
* 5<* an eighteen months. 50 „0Wever the administration
managed to negate the effect of the resolution. I„ mevent, these vacillations indicated that domestic support
for American troops in Europe w^ B«» v.as often ambiguous, that much
of the public and many members of Congress did not under-
stand the vital role that American troops played in main-
taining the balance of power in Europe. It was precisely
this lack of consistent allied support for Germany in the
1920-s that contributed so much to the insecurities leading
to the demise of the Weimar Republic. Moreover, with talks
on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)
, that began
in Vienna in 1973. it was important that arms reductions
uld be the result of consultations and not of unilateral
wo
measures.
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However, the administration ^
involved for WPR+ r™ , dangers
" ^ ParWcUl
- in the unilateralreduction of n c + . x<utr°°PS in Eur°P- The necessity for a
r
appr°ach
* «•—
-
- unjrt00d y
r T admlniStrati°" «** - recently pledged to „.c ease America's conventional capabilities in Europe
.
When a common allied ^+y,„+strategy ls agreed upon ^
mented, the rpqultQ v •
.
es i s can be impressive. The rncst construc-
tive initiative by Nixon and Kissinger in Eur™ , •"S " rope culminated
the September. 1971 Four Power Bfirlin Agreement
for the first time the Four powers (the United States, the
Soviet Union, Britain xnr\ \3
'
^ Fran«) accepted legal obliga-
tions concerning Berlin 51 n-r „i„s im. 0f almost equal importance was
the subsequent Intra-German Treatv nJ y of December, 1972 whereby
political relations between the two German states were
normalized. These two treaties, despite evident imper-
fections, represent a major advance for the peace and se-
curity of Europe. In the context of America's bilateral
dealings with the Soviet Union and West Germany's
QsimOiMX, the allies demonstrated an impressive capacity
for successfully negotiating agreements that should lessen
the chances of future conflict over Berlin and engage both
German states in a more constructive relationship. Both
Nixon and Kissinger deserve partial credit for these
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achieves. Unfortunately from 1Q6?
tive spirit that marked these tre «
-eas of United States-We
" ^^ * °^
x w st German relations.
However, beginning in 197/1 n e1
S+ + „
l0W Movement in UnitedStates-West German relation* ™
tinued t '
l s commenced and relations con-mue o improVe
. This do
i ^ that Previous t>rob-
-ms h been resolved
. Econoraic dimcuities
;i: v
ntensity
^ presidents Fora
-*—
-
1tempted to show heater understanding for West Cermany. ButP. e in ^ the jQint states _west^
ious m the future.
In a period of rapidly increasing oosts for military
equipment, the logistio structure of NATO has seemed a pro-
ving area for reform, m any alliance standardi 2ation of
logistic structures has represented an ideal rather than a
realxty. But as Europe becomes increasingly identified with
the EC, trans-national industrial firms and cooperative
agreements in the field of defense might become more prob-
able. Such examples as the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA)
involving West Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain should
have considerable potential. The Europeans, who contribute
the vast majority of NATO's troops, are interested in pro-
viding the most efficient and adequate conventional defense
140
-nee
osS1 ble. This wiu not be possiUe imiess transnatiQnai
nduet^ an, defense cooperation becomes^_
Though Western Europe's arms industries have revived si,
the end of the war. the disagreements over the politic*
direction of the EC and disputes with the United States
(powerful lobbies in the United States do not wish to lose
lucrative markets to European firms) have meant that NATO
has not been able to develop an efficient logistics struc-
ture.
During the late 1960's it became apparent that NATO
would need a new main battle tank for the l980's. The
United States-West German main battle tank, jointly pro-
duced, could be an important step in the standardization of
NATO military equipment. A common gun and engine would
be used for the American XM-1 and the West German Leopard.
The Americans would use the West German 120 millimeter gun
while the German Tank would be powered by the American tur-
bine engine. A common logistics structure and standardiza-
tion of weapons in NATO are synonymous.
However, initially, pressures mounted from the Pentagon
for a auAd_ era omt the Americans would buy the West German
gun if the West Germans purchase the American Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS). A Congressional report
cited "a curious but nonetheless pervasive relationship be-
tween the Leopard-DM-1 agreement and the purchase of
"52AWACS. " West Germany now has no intention of purchasing
awacs an, the problem8 pertaining ^
Have basically been ,
tan,
- Purchase the West German ^ J'
^tent
the African commitment t0 Jr / ~ *
lopisti. „ standardization of
^
e0On0mi
°
1
~"—
•
i« United states-WestGorman relations, win the need to placate Am • .
p„t a .
PJ-aca erica's power-« Cestic interests prevail over the need to^
»a tKe west Europeans in acMeving^ transnationaiAT°
cooperation with resneot. +v t
Th ,
requirements for defense^e United States has long advocated West EuM„
.
ea
" o ropean unity buthas often been aabiguoue or eVcn hostile^ ^
tunxty arose for Western Europe to achieve further develop-
ment of its own defense industries.
Summary
The relations between the United States and Western
Europe generally and with West Germany in particular are
emerging from a period of tutelage to one of equality. The
new relationship i s necessarily afflicted with growing
pains. However, as in the case of France when de Gaulle
was President, more lasting rifts can occur that threaten
the ability of the nations in the Atlantic world to work
together harmoniously.
This problem has not yet arisen in the case of West
Germany. With some exceptions the United States-West
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,Hat the West Germans should reoognize ^^
that exist with respect to reunification. 55 The Tre
clarifying the status of Berlin and the Intra-German accords
Poant to both the constraints upon and the possibilities for
"the allies.
With respect to United States-West German bilateral re-
lations, it is vital that the Africans appreciate the dif-
ficulties faced by West Germany. It is a divided country
that while firmly anchored in the West must also be un-
usually sensitive about its relationship with the East. In
the future, the relative importance of some aspects of the
two countries- bilateral ties might become less important as
West Germany becomes more fully integrated into the EC. How-
ever, there will always be certain considerations that are
unique to the relationship between the United States and
West Germany, since only the United States can secure West
Germany's defense and security. And without West Germany.
NATO and American positions in Western Europe would be
gravely imperiled.
Given the "diplomacy of emergency" of the Vietnam War,
administration's mixture of close (or + ii at least adequate)
consultation on a few Issup*, r+* *i ues (the Berlin Accords, SALT) and
unilateral policies and a lack off<«a (even contempt for) con-
sultation and cooperation on most otw ijiiust ther issues. The uni-latere devaluation of the dollar in 19?1 (complemented feythe "Gonnally methoa«) ana Kissingers Native lack of con-
cern for African policies that greatly increased infla-
tionary tendencies are two examples that serve to illustrate
this point.
*o the West Germans (and the West Europeans) Nixon's
and Kissinger's policies appeared as a continuation of the
policies of the Johnson administration. American diplomacy
was almost exclusively concerned with Vietnam, the Soviet
Union, and China. Thus (with some already noted exceptions)
Bonn, in particular, worried about the consistency and re-
liability of American foreign policy. Did Kissinger seek
to ensure American primacy at the expense, if necessary, of
West Germany and the West Europeans? Yet, from 1975 Kis-
singer returned to a more conciliatory, more cooperative
policy. But it was this vacillation, this uncertainty about
American motives that, since the Johnson years, have begun
to place serious strains upon the Atlantic Alliance and the
relationship with West Germany. Too often to West Germany,
the West Europeans and the Japanese, Kissinger's policies
were characterized hy a, assertive nationalise and acCom-
Panying unilateral
.aneuvers and shock tactics, all designed
to ensure American primacy.
The policy of "setting one nation off against another"
was complemented by Nixon's and Kissinger's disdain for in-
stitutions such as the EC. But there is an important con-
nection between West Germany's political and economic sta-
bility and the development of the EC. That is why the wis-
dom of Nixon's and Kissinger's policy toward the EC can be
questioned. Kissinger has written that "arrangements in
Germany have been the key to the stability of Europe for at
least three centuries. "56 He has repeatedly stressed that
"the long-term hope for German unity therefore resides in
the unity of Europe."57 But Nixon . s ^ Kissinger , s Qften
negative and parochial policy towards the EC has not been
propitious for the development of that larger entity that
West Germany must identify itself with in the West. Yet,
Kissinger wrote that "the future of the Federal Republic de-
pends on two related policies by the Westi (1) recognition
of the psychological and political dilemmas of a divided
country and (2) the ability to make the Federal Republic
part of a larger community."-58 But in actual practice, he
modified these ideas. His policies (with the exception of
the Four Power Agreement on Berlin and allied support for
the Intra-German Accords) lacked consistency of purpose and
were often poorly implemented. The divergence between the
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^lateral maneuvers, ofshock tactics, does nn + 1
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r0 °m for vital com-ponent of democratic (and particularly im • ,^^cuiarl American) foreign
Policies, Realism. The relationship between domestic
values and foreign Poli cy i s crUcial to ^
cess of foreign policy in a democracy. Here was KWs andKissinger's weakest point, for their overall policies to-
ward West Germany (and the West F,,™„6 6S Eur°Peans and the Japanese)
axled to draw upon that great reservoir of American (and
its allies) idealism that has been so crucial to the close
Postwar relationship on both sides of the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. In an interesting article James Chace
"faults Kissinger for a gravely flawed foreign policy par-
ticularly with respect to its long-term consequences. "59
In the future, those who bear responsibility for Amer-
ica^ West German and Western European policies will have to
be far more discerning with respect to the immediate and
long-term consequences of their policies. It is apparent
that Kissinger's vacillation between the desire to ensure
American primacy and the need for mutual cooperation on a
basis of approximate equality has precluded the emergence of
new moral and political guidelines to govern the relation-
ship between the United States and West Germany. In a per-
iod of pervasive political and social change, there are
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CHAPTER VI
BILATERAL RELATIONS i FRANCE
The SphoT ar
In any discussion of France and Franco
-American rela-
tions, the policies of Charles de Gaulle should be clearly
understood, for today the Gaullist legacy sets serious
constraints upon the conduct and goals of French policy.
From his assumption of power in 1958, Charles de Gaulle
implemented a number of policies that were opposed to Amer-
ican foreign policy objectives. In 1958 the politically
weak, unstable Fourth Republic gave way to the Fifth Re-
public of de Gaulle. France has. once again, become an
important political and economic power whose influence is
felt far beyond the boundaries of Europe. But de Gaulle's
views on Atlantic partnership and European unity have been
in conflict with American conceptions. The result has been
a bitter reaction, particularly among Americans, who have
considered their formulas as the only workable solution. 1
In 1963 and 1967 de Gaulle vetoed the admission of Britain
to the EC. In 1966 he withdrew France from participation
in the military structure of the Atlantic Alliance. He
sought to improve relations with the East and these major
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policies were supported by other moves to in,^crease Frenchinfluence in Europe and the world.
However, for those angered by de Gaulle's policies
the passage of time appeared to be the only solution to the
Gaullist phenomenon. Yet +v« nl was the Gaullist phenomenon
-rely an aberration or did it symbolize - broader
for French and European self-assertation? Despite his
abrasive tactics and imperious manner, would the national-
istic spirit that de Gaulle represented really decline or
become more amenable with his demise? Were there funda-
mental problems in Franco
-American and United States-West
European relations that needed to be rethought? De Gaulle,
like Caesar, has come and gone, but his legacy lives on and
must be studied and understood if the nations of the Atlan-
tic basin are to overcome their present difficulties.
France.
It is not surprising that Kissinger was greatly con-
cerned with de Gaulle and France. He has written that
"European-American relations will never again be the same
as they were before de Gaulle's press conference of Janu-
ary 14, 1963. which excluded Britain from the Common Market
and marked a watershed in European-American relations." 2
To understand France today it is necessary to understand
de Gaulle, his thoughts and dreams for France. De Gaulle's
successors, Georges Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, have
modified or abandoned some of de Gaulleul e's more extreme coi-tions but the GauUist legacy COn-M„y co tinu" to influence France
«- French conceptions of its role in the world 3
^singer gives due recognition to the fact that deOaulle has introduced »a fundamental^ ^ ^^States
- European dialogue."'* But this is in"UB l
» some re-
spects, fortuitous. For +hDt e emergence of a specifically
European point of view has now been brought into the open
where it can be dealt with in a more positive manner.
Kissinger, judging from his scholarly work, has sym-
pathy and understanding for the French challenge to the
American grand design. He states that (a society's)
"co-
hesiveness reflects a sense of shared historical experience
and the conviction that it represents a more or less unique
set of values. An Alliance cannot be vital unless it con-
forms, at least to some extent, to the image which the
states composing it have of themselves. "5 Kissinger further
demonstrates his awareness of how French History influences
its current policies for he points out how "few countries
have known the travail which France has suffered since it
lost most of its young generation in World War I."° since
World War I shocks and bitter defeat have been the fate of
France. Insecurities concerning Germany and its potential
threat were exacerbated by the refusal of Britain and the
United States fully to support France. The terrible col-
lapse of 1940 was followed by eventual victory - by the arms
of others. Yet even wl+v, j •ith the demise of the Nazi threat
France still had to fight two *l decades of bitter colonial
wars that ended in defeat the collapse Qf ^
Fourth Republic. Into this void stepped ^
De Gaulle was determined to he his country's savior
He understood the deep malaise and frustration that en-
gulfed France, particularly in the later years of the
Fourth Republic. De Gaulle o-p+u , after the collapse of Prance
-n who cast their lot with the allies. For de Gaulle was
determined to restore the soul of France, to restore France
to greatness. Thus he would
"reestablish the identity and
the integrity of France. "? Kissinger writes that, while
Roosevelt and Churchill concentrated on the tangible goal
of military victory, de Gaulle's goal was less tangible,
indeed "the conflict between the pragmatic and the intan-
gible that started during the war has continued to this
day. "8 While the United States has a stable government.
France has not. Therefore, the means to attain a goal have
become as important as the goal itself. De Gaulle sought
to ensure that policies also contributed to France's sense
of identity. Thus, Kissinger wrote "though de Gaulle often
acts as if opposition to United States policy were a goal
in itself, his deeper objective is pedagogicali to teach
his people and perhaps his continent attitudes of inde-
pendence and self-reliance."? This brings us to the point
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"ger-s views on d3 1U 3 «-s on international
relations.
Oe Gaulle placed the nation-state in the center of Hi
****** of intentional relations.
„is nationalis
- " ^ traditi °n "— *— - achlgreatness, a special place for France int , the world which
would reflect the uniqueness of France But a n «xd/ic . ation musthave a PurPose. For de Qaulle> ^ ^
is not si raplv a reflection of a nation's physical strengthtut also of its moral Purpose.
For the nation muqt Svi„ts ex s in an extremely dangerous
n-ilieu. international life is like a jungle, it is a never
recurring battle. For de Gaulle the objective of peace is
to be obtained by a more stable equilibrium. This equiu.
brium is never permanent, it must always be adjusted in con-
stant struggles. Peace is a balance of forces that often,
however, can be disturbed by tensions that arise from the
dynamics of the system. De Gaulle thought that internal
instability „as the distinguishing feature of Communist
states. There was a constant need to divert attention in
the direction of foreign adventures. Thus de Gaulle re-
sisted attempts by the Soviet Union to exploit the weak-
nesses of the West.
Given the instability, the oppressiveness of the Soviet
system, and the unnatural proximity of Soviet power to the
heart of Europe, a more stable equilibrium must be sought.
r
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af.«»- his faith in the Atlantio Aiiiance wh
"Pon the identity of Europe and th ,e unique qualities ofFrance. He thought that if a nation i« +rl ls to serve in the" "* » «•*— southing to itself and he
convinoed that its opinions matter to others.
Here are the origins of de Gaulle's disagreeing withthe United statea
. Kissinger notes that ^ ^his sensitivity to the tribulations of Prance. was loolcing
into the distant future when the Americans may no longer he
interested in or ahle to defend Europe because of their in-
volved in other continents. De Gaulle wished to achieve
some measure of control over the destiny of Prance and his
oontinent. But the United States was concerned with solv-
ing immediate problems. However, as a statesman, de Gaulle
must prepare himself for the best - and the worst - pos-
sible future contingencies. Moreover, de Gaulle's concept
of the nation-state and American ideas of its obsolescence
were bound to clash. For de Gaulle a united Europe must be
responsible for its own destiny, it must emphasize its own
unique place in the world. But. unlike the American pre-
ference for federal institutions, he persisted in viewing
the unity of Europe as depending upon the vitality of the
nation-state. For only the states can act legitimately and
responsibly. Kissinger makes the important point that if
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~* - — Europe. he had chosen
-ke decisions based on a unanimous vote of all members.
only political leadership acceptable to thp » <yi. Dj.e e mam currents ofEuropean opinion could possibly dominate Europe
Kissinger also indicates that while advocating European
unity, Americans have often recoiled from some of its conse-
quences. In military matters, the united States has pre-
ferred to deal bilaterally with its European allies or
through integrated commands where it can dominate the Euro-
peans. However, for de Gaulle, the question of defense lay
at the very heart of his concept of autonomy. No great power
can be a lobbyist for another power's views. Nor can a great
power forever be under the tutelage of another great power,
however benevolent it may be. De Gaulle resisted the idea
of organic defense links between the United States and in-
dividual European countries. The defense of individual
states or Europe itself cannot be exclusively tied to Ameri-
can weapons or American conceptions. Consequently, de Gaulle
opposed not the Atlantic Alliance but the concept of inte-
gration upon which it is based. No great state can leave
decisions about its destiny to another state however
friendly. Integration leads to an abdication of responsi-
bility and a sense of impotence which would not only de-
moralize France's foreign policy and drain the Alliance of
its strength, but Prance and Europe would have to accept
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American tutelage forever.
When considering de Gaullee S conc epts, it is not sur-Prising that he thought it *, ,
.
m°re iraP°^nt to integratethe French army into PWr, v , ^grFrench society than into NATO. 10 Thisis also why he insisted upon th« *P° e development of France's
own nuclear strike force. For de Gaulle realized tt ,+v 4. he impactthat a force would have upon French d1„i±> r diplomacy, and upon
French political prestige n-p „P . Of course, to the Americans.
with their concern over a centralized command and control
structure, the French nuclear force was an object of serious
disagreement. It is therefore not difficult to see why theUnited States, as the leader of the Western Alliance, and
France became embroiled in a number of serious disputes,
some of which continue to this day.
The Uni ted Statpg »„h Frn"rr
The role of the nation-state, the precise form of Euro-
pean integration, and the French nuclear force have all
caused considerable difficulties in Franco-American rela-
tions. But as Kissinger points out. these very real and
difficult problems between the two countries were exacer-
bated by de Gaulle's abrupt tactics and his imperious style.
During the Nixon-Kissinger years Alastair Buchan wrote
"that just as Gaullism was a factor in encouraging American
unilateralism, so American Gaullism fosters Japanese na-
tionalism and so on. "11 De Gaulle proceeded by a series of
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Xaita» which have left no room for the feelings of
other statesmen. Too often he acted as if the inherent val-
idity of his positions would overcome all opposition.
„is
policies were often contradictory, if not hostile, to those
of the United States.
By his style and the polarization of discussion, de
Gaulle proceeded to arouse American self-righteousness.
Both America and de Gaulle have wanted a strong Europe, but
de Gaulle's tactics often detracted from the substance of
his concepts and embroiled him with America. Kissinger
thinks that, while history will demonstrate that de Gaulle's
concepts, as distinct from his style, were greater than his
critics, still a statesman must work with the available ma-
terial. The dispute over the "American" or the "French"
concept of European integration and Atlantic relationships
might have drawn attention to these problems. But instead
the debate over these two concepts has seriously delayed
progress in Europe and thus Kissinger warns that "they may
bring on what each side professes to fear most; a divided
suspicious Europe absorbed once again in working out its
ancient rivalries."12 Consequently the result for all could
be a tragedy whose scope would go far beyond the relation-
ship between the United States and France.
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Fro, 1958 to 1969 the foreign policies of de Gaulle
were often a source of unease and discord to his neighbors
and the United States. The foreign policy of France may he
divided into three periods in the Gaullist erai 1) from
1958 to 1962 de Gaulle generally cooperated in European and
trans-Atlantic forums and sought to extricate France from
Algeria, 2) from 1962 to 1968 de Gaulle, freed from the al-
batross of the Algerian war by the Evian Accords of 1962,
attempted to assert French independence and other objectives
that stressed France's position as the leader of the Six,
its increasing opposition to the hegemony of the United
States, and the policy of detente with the East; 3) from
1968 to 1969 the events of May-June and the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in August, place limits upon the capacity of
France to play a major role on the world stage operating
under Gaullist premises,
Kissinger wrote that when dealing with France "out-
raged pride is not a good guide to policy making." 13 Others
have voiced concern over the fruitless and regressive course
that France attempted to follow in the de Gaulle years.
This period has too often been marked by bitter conflict be-
tween these two old allies. De Gaulle has been characterized
as an anachronism and his policies as regressive and repre-
sentative of the excesses of nationalism. Such policies, it
was thought, could only lead to a tragic ending.
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To understand France fuUy today> u ^ ^ ^
comprehend hoth the specif conditions in France that 6ave
sustance to the Gaullist movement and the links of Gaulli
with the reviving nationalism that occurred in Weste
Europe and. in particular. France during the early sixties.
The increased stress on nationalism, was not confined to
France. During the Nixon-Kissinger years African foreign
policy would often be charactered by the same tactics of
surprise and abrupt maneuvers. De Gaulle, of course, gave
to the broader movement of nationalism his own particular
imprint. But with the resolution of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, detente began to be the major objective of each
superpower. Unfortunately, this coincided with the end of
the period of post-war reconstruction in Western Europe,
when the relationship between the United States and Western
Europe
- and in particular, France - would need to be re-
adjusted to reflect the changing conditions of the early
sixties. Thus the French pursuit of grandeur from 1958 to
1969 produced great bitterness and confusion. Consequently,
a closer examination of the major themes of Gaullist policy
in the previously mentioned periods is necessary.
Europe and Denolnni 7.att ffl
The problem with Alliances is that they do not often
readily adapt to changing conditions. The coalition of
states that defeated Napoleon and formed the concert of
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Europe had ceased to function hy 1822. The coalition of
states that defeated Nazi Gennany broke up rather rapidly
following the end of World War II.
But during the first period of Gaullist rule, the
Berlin Problem and the Cuban Missile Crisis reinforced the
cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.^ Moreover, de Gaulle
was faced with a terrible and prolonged war in Algeria that
had caused the downfall of the Fourth Republic and - after
de Gaulle assumed power in 1958 - three serious revolts led
by French Generals against the authority of the French state.
Consequently, de Gaulle, aware of France's serious
weakness, initiated cautious policies. He cooperated with
the EC when that organization became a reality in 1958.
Subsequent cooperation on the part of France with the EC was
considerable. *5 De Gaulle did not believe in the federal
approach but preferred confederation based on the nations
of Europe. He nevertheless recognized that in the fledgling
days of the EC, cooperation was important and necessary.
Thus, from 1959 exports and trade between the members of the
EC increased rapidly. 16 And de Gaulle was well aware of the
increased benefits of economic growth for France. But by
1961, when the other members of the EC sought to advance
plans leading to the further integration of the Six (and per-
haps other states as well), the French were rather insistent
that the Fouchet Plan - which urged the confederal approach -
be considered as the basis for further discussion. The
in
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c nce^ the further integration Qf ^ ^^
support for supranational institutions Wh(>r, -
the Fn 4r,+ +u
rance PlunsedEC into the very serious crisis of 19«5 , Walter^
stem and his associates in the EC fw.« «Co^ssion were to regretthe fact that thev trior! ™, u a.n y ied to push too far and too fast
this direction to please de Gaulle. However, until l9 6l w
1962
-
and thereafter in some respects - France did cooper-
ate with the EC even though the Fouchet Plan of l96l had
suggested that there would be limits to +wLx 1^ that cooperation.
With respect to decolonization. by the signing of the
Evian Accords of March. I962. France ended the Algerian War
on somewhat favorable terms. But its experience in two
colonial wars had embittered many Frenchmen over the lack of
allied
- particularly American - aid and sympathy during
France's trials. While the United States did aid France in
reoccupying Indo-China and during the subsequent war against
the Vietminh. France's humiliation and relative isolation in
195* were resented. The Suez Crisis in 1956 also confirmed
to many Frenchmen that on certain issues allied sympathy and
cooperation were not necessarily synonymous with the inter-
ests of France.
The four long, bitter, and frustrating years of the
Algerian War further underlined - to Frenchmen - the often
selective nature of allied relationships when French
crests were at staKe. Thus
, at .^ when
construction
„as nearing completion, nationalism reviving
- «* threat from the Bast diminishing there Were thosein France who were rather ambivalent about the benefits of
allied cooperation. This ambivalence was particularly
pognant when cooperation with the United States was under
discussion. Had the United State, firmly and unequivocally
supported France in its two Colonial wars? Why did the
United States aid the British nuclear program and not the
French? To a formerly great and proud nation, humbled by
many recent trials, a reviving sense of its own identity
and mission was a rounder that France too had an important
role to play in the world.
Acting on the basis of a philosophy of history that saw
nations struggling to preserve a stable equilibrium, de
Gaulle rapidly exploited the opportunities presented by the
changing conditions of the sixties. From 1963 to 1968 in
Europe and the world, de Gaulle sought to pursue French in-
terests on a global scale.
In Europe de Gaulle probably realized, after the Five
refused to accept the Fouchet Plan, that his conception of
European integration would not be accepted by the other mem-
bers of the EC. Yet, aware of the political and economic
benefits that France derived from the EC (until the EC
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Commission forced his hand in I960 h" 1 b5) he S0US^ to ensure apolicy of cooperation. 17
De Gaulle was well aware that wi +h +v,cute n x t the advent of de-
tente there were many peoDlp in t?>™ „ tv p e m France and in Europe who
would be responsive to a greater assertion of their inter.
ests as the Cold War receeded. A number of steps, however,
would have to be undertaken if France was to emerge ^ ^
leader of Europe gua Europe. In Europe de Gaulle would have
to limit the influence of the rising West German political
and economic power. He would have to assess the outlook of
Britain. He would have to separate specific French and
European objectives from undue American influence while en-
suring that American military protection would still main-
tain the balance of power in Europe. Finally. France would
have to loosen the grip of both superpowers on their re-
spective parts of Europe so that Europe, under French leader-
ship, while not militarily equal to the superpowers, could
still by astute diplomacy attain its objectives. 18
In his quest for French grandeur, de Gaulle carried on
a complex and multi-faceted diplomacy. I shall begin with
Europe
.
In January, 1963 de Gaulle accomplished two objectives,
he denied Britain entry into the EC and concluded a Franco-
German Treaty. Probably he was never enthusiastic about
British entry into the EC because of the strength of Bri-
tain's ties with the United States. Yet if Britain was not
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so intent upon Staining its strategic nuclear ties with
the United States and showed some interest in de Gaulle's
vision or an independent Europe, de Gaulle might possibly
have relented. But at the Nassau Conference in December,
1962. Britain hulled itself before the Americans and pro-
claimed the sanctity of its trans-Atlantic ties. If there
had been any doubt in de Gaulle's mind before Nassau, there
was none after it. Britain would not be allowed in the EC. 1?
On January U de Gaulle announced that Britain could not
enter the EC. One week later the Franco-German Treaty was
signed. Again de Gaulle sought the moral, political, and
economic leadership of Europe and was anxious to heal the
ancient rift between France and Germany so as to channel
Bonn's growing political and economic strength into appro-
priate directions within the Gaullist framework. 20
De Gaulle's vision of a Europe basically free from the
embrace of the superpowers was a vision shared by some but
regarded as a myth by others. Belgium and the Netherlands
desired Britain's inclusion in the EC. West Germany was
not about to channel its strength and energy in the approved
Gaullist direction. And the EC Commission under President
Walter Hallstein was determined to advance the cause of
European integration within a federal framework.
The events leading up to the EC Crisis of 1965 and the
Crisis itself have been discussed elsewhere. 21 The result
of the Crisis was a stalemate. The Commission abandoned its
IB quo
planE for thfi integratiQn Qf Europ^ ^
realized that he C0Uld neither impose ^^ ^ ^
others „or Qestroy the EC. After the ^burg Accords ofJanuary, 1966 both sides am-«>^ +greed to return to the statu!
ante and mark time until conditions changed.
Concurrently with his attempts to lead Europe in the
desired direction, de Gaulle hegan a concerted attack upon
the United States and its positions in Europe and the world.
After the Cuban Missile Crisis he viewed the United States
as the single greatest power in the world and acted accord-
ingly.
„
e thought that to maintain the proper equilibrium,
he should occasionally support the Soviet Union against the
hegemonic power. France soon appeared to many Americans as
anti
-American and as opposing America's designs for Europe
and the world.
From 1963 to 19 68 Franco-American relations sank to a
low point. For America's often heavy-handed paternalism
and its ambiguous, indeed often hostile, behavior in
France's great colonial wars - not to mention Suez - left
many sensitive and proud Frenchmen responsive to the broad
thrust of de Gaulle's policies even if they disagreed with
his tactics. This was true not only in France but in Europe
as well. Too often American leaders and analysts acted as
if de Gaulle himself was the exclusive cause of the malaise
in Franco
-American relations. Once de Gaulle retired, they
reasoned, his tragic attempt to thwart American designs
168
would be ended and things wonlrt > +
, .
g
"
retUrn t0 n»«al. This be-lief, however, was a serious oversimplification . 22
Trance is a great European nation with a long and proud^ "W—— to understand the relpon-
where was this seen more clearly than in the case of the
_
Britain's privileged position regarding American aid to
^S nuclear program had long been resented in France ^
Moreover, given the symbolic and real importance of nuclear
weapons in world politics, could it have been such a sur-
prise when de Gaulle announced that France too would become
a nuclear power? The Americans responded with the Multi-
lateral Force proposal (MLF) and rapid condemnation of
France's fledgling nuclear forced Would the restructuring
of the Atlantic Alliance to allow for more European self-
assertion Easfiiily have influenced de Gaulle at least to
stay in the military alliance even if France reduced its
military commitment to NATO?
But Kennedy and his successor, intent on the command
and control of nuclear weapons, wanted to centralize in the
White House control of the firing of the weapons that would
determine the fate of Europe. De Gaulle, who criticized
America's leadership in Europe, its involvement in Southeast
Asia and indeed appeared hostile to American designs every-
where, was in no mood to compromise. In the Spring of 1966
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he abruptly orderea ^ NATO military Cities out ofFrance ana oeclarea that henceforth Prance would>
reining a .ncnher of the Atlantic Alliance> cease ^ take
Part in NATO raiUtary activities. 25 ThUs France^
neatly increase its freedQm q£^ ^^ ^ ^
policies while thp TTm' c+ a.e United States, to maintain the balance
of power in Europe, would be obligated if nuuj.j.gaxea, necessary, to
defend France against the U.S.S.R.
While attacking American positions everywhere, de
Gaulle initiated his policy of detente, entente, and co-
operation with the East. He visited Poland and Rumania in
1967 and 1968 and tried to influence his hosts to assert
their independence from Russian control. He visited Moscow
in June of 1966 and thus initiated a series of agreements
and dialogs with the Soviet Union that were to continue
until
- and after
- the Czechoslovak invasion in I968. 26
In this manner de Gaulle sought to influence the direction
of Soviet policy in Europe and to allow for the development
of a new coalition of nations led by France.
grandeur or RptrOR t?
In May-June I968 a student uprising began in Paris and
was accompanied by a series of strikes that symbolized the
nature of serious domestic problems threatening the sta-
bility and objectives of the Gaullist regime. In August the
Warsaw Pact nations invaded Czechoslovakia as that state
sought to attain a greater aeasure of domestic and interna-
tional autonomy. In April. 19 69 de Gaulle resigned as the
President of France when he failed to achieve a majority on
a matter of domestic reform.
Did these events prove that the Gaullist design was
flawed? To some extent they did. Frenchmen were not so
willing to pursue French grandeur and the ^ at
the expense of domestic needs. Internationally the Soviet
Union was apparently unwilling to allow more than a very
limited degree of autonomy in Eastern Europe, and relations
with the United States were at a low point. Yet de Gaulle,
whose conceptions were superior to his tactics, had struck
a responsive chord in France and Europe in his quest for
greater self-assertion. So the jubilation of d e Gaulle's
critics at his retirement was somewhat misplaced. On nu-
merous occasions Kissinger has spoken of the need for "new
centers of initiative" in world politics. Yet the post-war
generation of American leaders - with few exceptions - has
had difficulty in adjusting to the concept of a multipolar
world. In the early sixties multipolarity began to emerge.
By the seventies the post-war era had ended but the emer-
gence of a new order was difficult to discern. 27
With respect to Western Europe and France, in parti-
cular, American statesmen from Eisenhower to Kissinger seem
to have experienced considerable difficulty in accepting
European self-assertion. De Gaulle must bear his share of
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the blame ror the serious divisions in both^ ^ ^ ^
and the accompanying malaise in p^.^^
But African statesmen, with a marked conceptual oeficiency
and often inept in their persona! diplomacy, must also hear
a major share of the blame. No one can say with certainty
that if either or both sides had heen more restrained and
less arrogant the problems presented by de Gaulle would have
had a different concluqlnn v~+ ^x sio . Yet perhaps the important thing
is that both sides learn from their failures. American
hegemony in the Atlantic Alliance must be modified to allow
for greater European self-assertion. The French pursuit of
grandeur is unobtainable without unacceptable sacrifice.
Both sides must ensure, drawing upon lessons learned from
this period, that their common endeavors take precedence
over that which divides them.
grance Aftpr n c r.^-ij*
s
The distinguishing characteristic of the statesman i
the endurance of his work. De Gaulle's successors, Georges
Pompidou and Valery Giscard d'Estaing, have had ample oc-
casion to reflect on the limitations imposed upon their
actions by the Gaullist legacy. In fact, de Gaulle left
his successors with the difficult job of adhering to Gaul-
list precepts, albeit in a modified form. Many of de
Gaulle's concepts were valid, others were questionable.
His tactics were open to serious question. In more general
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*—
. it can be said that We aduiation Qf
was a ious n.W in a period when tranMonai coQp
tion i„ fflany^ iB iraperative>28
most serious
charge against de Gaulle is +h a + *t t he encouraged those in
France and Europe who sought to block furtwDj.ocK lurther supranational
integration.
Undoubtedly, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman were too
optimistic in their plans for the development of the EC
But will future historians confirm the fact that, while con-
ditions in Europe in the sixties and seventies were favor-
able for some advances in integration much more could have
been achieved without de Gaulle?*? De Gaulle^ a^
blow to the cause of European integration. Nor was this the
only cause to suffer from the excesses of nationalism that
have in the past been the cause of so much conflict.
Europ e,
Certain Gaullist precepts have been discarded, others
still persist. Britain, after de Gaulle twice refused
entry, was finally admitted to the EC in January, 1973
(with Denmark and Ireland). But cooperation between France
and the eight is often difficult to achieve. 30 Pompidou
(who resigned in 197^ due to illness) and his successor
Giscard, of the Independent Republicans, have found that
they must always be aware of the constraints placed upon
them by the Gaullist legacy. Cooperation in the EC is
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cautious, ana i„ concert^
T'.>. the attaimoent * °" ^ *rt
1980-s. proclairaed at the
^ ««— «*» hy
x n Parls confe
sees as distant and «fficult to
19?2
'
acnieve as ever.
integration no longer arm*
Hesitation over how be^t to
i-elt
- and the interna-H ™„ n
repercussions of Gaullism can-
e uiixcea btates reeardlooo ^-r +ug GSS
° f the manner in which in-creased cooperation i s sought q + nn . Stanley Hoffmann writesi
never have consultation, claritv *
'
rarity, candor and coordination(as distinct from mere ex r>n*+ r + •^j-e post facto information^
ln
' ; been moreimportant. "31
France has not returned to NATO's military structure
but the excesses of the "all-horizon defense" strategy.
Probated in 1 967
.
have been dispensed^ ^ ^
fense strategy now envisages cooperation with NATO - if
Paris decides that it is necessary - i„ the event of ,
Soviet attack, m the Mediterranean>^ ^ .^.^ ^
Czechoslovakia. French air and naval forces have quietly
resumed cooperation with NATO forces in surveillance of
Soviet activities.
17k
French defense planners no in,
- «» *^ Z1T envisa6e independent
~— C0OPerate w
^-
re e
°h77 -
agencies Th fi t
tensive aid frora NATO
J
— ^ ^^ itself ^
-
more modest dimensions^ The^ ^ -
currea as a re^ui + +v
seouent
"
°
f
"
ay"JUne 1968
'
«»q economic cri<H« .m* *vsis, ^ the reduced emphas . s
and Discard have placed upon the force d P f
+.m, v ^ iraEP£. Regret-tably. however. the Gaullist legacy has prevented
cooperation from developing hetween France and Britain in
strategic nuclear weapons. 33
Finally some funds, partly derived fr0m the reduced
'-ding for the^ „ £xass&> ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^
fense budget to strengthen French conventional forces. But
security policies are synonymous with state sovereignty andin thxs area French cooperation is highly circumscribed by
the Gaullist legacy.
Economjr Policy
From 1965 to 1968 de Gaulle strongly attacked the dol-
lar as the medium of international exchange. The events of
May-June 1968 and the subsequent economic crisis changed
this policy. De Gaulle's successors have sought to ensure
a certain degree of French cooperation in monetary matters.
France was a member of the "European float" until it was
recently forced to leave. But. in general. France has
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basically been cooperative 4 n r>
policy .
EUr0P6an Md W°rld
-netary
Pompidou and ciscard have quietly abandoned raany of
ae Gaulle poUcies in economic matters. vet with the
o.uadrupUne of the price of oU in 1973
. difference3^
emerged hetween France and the other industrial states with
respect to Kissing proposed Internationa! Energy Agency
UEA;. This will be dealt wi +v, i„th in more detail later on but
initially, very serious disagreements occurred between
Michel Jobert, the French Foreign Minister, and Kissinger
Subsequently, these differences were, at least, partly re-
solved but the Jobert-Kissinger confrontations do illus-
trate that in economic and monetary policies, the Gaullist
legacy continues to influence French policy.
Eilatprpl Relations t Fr pryTft
The S tatepmpT^
The United st^o and Frpn„ p
The improvement of relations with Europe and France did
not, for the United States, have a very high priority.
Since the late sixties the Europeans, absorbed in the con-
struction of the EC and dismayed over American policy in
Vietnam, had also given a lower priority to the relationship
with the United States. Yet Kissinger, who had criticized
the high-handedness and arrogance of past administrations,
also had to contend with a serious deterioration in America's
economic position. All these problems were sometimes
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exacerbated by Kissinger's tendency to ia ignore or fail fullvto understand economic issues j™ .k
.
S
*
James Cha<=e «rites that
-singer, in his preoccupation with 'high- politic8
, ^Xow. pontics Monetary reform, scientific developments.env.ro,™ deterioration, resource supply and demand)
suffer from nPxri ^+eglect. And the centralization of foreign
policy decisions in the White House, at time.
.
e> x s, overburdened
Kissinger as minor problems were not dealt with until they
reached crisis proportions and by then a solution was not
readily apparent.
Moreover, given the changing conditions that affect the
Atlantic nations, it is apparent that the Gaullist legacy
could well cause considerable difficulties for any new
American administration. Kissinger has written that "Ameri-
cans showed too great a preference for hegemony, de Gaulle's
charge was not unjustified. -35 What would ^ new Nixon_
Kissinger team do with respect to Franco-American relations?
How would Kissinger deal with de Gaulle's contention that
Americans preferred hegemony to mutual cooperation on a
basis of equality? In a period of profound political and
Philosophical change, would he articulate and implement new
principles that would serve as a more suitable framework for
Franco-American relations? In addition to the problems be-
tween the two countries concerning European and global is-
sues, there were other differences that developed because of
each country's theoretical perspective. Americans tended to
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work for short-term solutions in th10 e pragmatic traditionConsequently, the changing circurastances of th
'
ties wer-* i ,
e early six-re largely unanticipated rt this Was due ^
conceptual flaw* > M a~ • certains xn Amerxcan foreign pollcy
. ThiE> Qf
course, is partly why the United States w1;e oecame so seriouslv" Vi6tnam^ ^^- -—ing CoLWar ana the xnorease of political multipolarity made the
outcome of events in Vietnam leES important^ ^ ^
strictly regional basis. Conversely, de Caulle-s policies
were predicated upon theoro+^„iP n etxcal assumptions that envisaged
changes that would occur far beyond his lifetime.
I" 1969 the administration was involved in a major di-
plomatic crisis in Vietnam that had domestic and interna-
txonal repercussions and required a major share of its time
and effort. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the
subsequent use of American air and naval power on a massive
scale struck a certain note of irony in Paris. Both in
Indo-China and Algeria, with France on the brink of defeat,
Washington refused further military aid and argued for the'
necessity of negotiations. From I969 the situation was re-
versed, but Nixon and Kissinger paid little heed to Pompidou's
advice to limit the use of military force and seriously en-
gage in negotiations with the Viet Cong and Hanoi. Instead
they employed air and naval power to an even greater extent
(while slowly withdrawing combat troops) concurrently with
their program of VietnamUatxon. It was only when Nixon and
1?8
Kissinger thought that the situate
.
tuation was more favorable thatthey began serious negotiations.
in March or l969 President^^^tempt to achieve a rpormnin + •
EurOT3
^conciliation with de Gaulle and obtainropean support for his policv of *A+ + ,P 1Cy d^tente with the SovietUnion. After the events of Mav-Jun* «. *01 y e, the Czechoslovak in-
vas.cn, ana Bonn's flexing oS its econonic^ ^ ^^pute to force revaluation of the^ de Caulle ^in a mood to reciprocate. But the following month de Gaulle
resigned. However. Ms successor. Pompidou, returnee the
Nixon visit one year later and reaffirm France's friend-
ship with the United States.
As I have indicated de Gaulle's successors have re-
duced Gaullist pretensions regarding glohal policy. How-
ever. Europe has become far more important for Prench policy
under de Gaulle's successors than it was for de Gaulle him-
self.
The Atlantic Ani^ 0 ^ FuHmc
en
With respect to NATO and Europe, some problems betwe
the United States and France were solved rather rapidly,
others required more time, still others were not resolved at
all.
Both the Berlin problem and the proposed Conferenc
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were dealt with
rather successfully. Both Washington and Paris wished to
e on
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Moreover, the French were also concerned with seething
else, the emergence of a West European Defense entity
Pompidou sought diplomatic movement^ the^
the military aspect of the CSCE. might well lead to the
emergence of a West European defense entity which would
probably be dominated by West Germany. And this entity
could jeopardize relations with the Soviet Union, and worse
yet. perhaps encourage an American military withdrawal or
reduction of its forces that would unduly favor the Soviet
Union.
Kissinger should have realized that the French were
worried about the effects an American defeat in Vietnam
would have upon Europe. The French have never forgotten
the defeat of the Anglo-American French security treaty in
the Senate in 1919. Would an assertive Congress once again
force a reduction in the American presence in Western Europe
and thus leave France to cope alone with the Soviet Union?
Moreover, despite the many ties between the two countries,
as West Germany's economic and political power has increased
in recent years, a certain sense of unease, of uncertainty,
has manifested itself in France concerning possible changes
in West German policy. As Kissinger has repeatedly stated
history is always a factor to be considered. Yet he did not
assure the French that their particular fears and concerns
were fully shared and understood by the United States.
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ZTT was a question of time> « «-o resdve the tension between ^
for hegemony and the need for con.nH +i
v , .
sultation and cooperation,
Kissinger did no better than his oft cHt^ *
. +ui
S
°r rl^cized predecessorsm this respect.
However, even though at the listeria! meeting of theCSCE at Helsinki,
"Europeans sensed a background of prior
prxvate understanding hetween Washington and Moscow- ac-
'
cording to one commentator. 3? still both ^ ^
the French have overcome their initial fears and hesita-
tions and now view the continuing CSCE and HBFR Conferences
as a valuable means of improving East-West relations. While
the French remain wary of the issue of a separate West
European defense entity, European cooperation amongst them-
selves and with the United States has been adequate. More-
over, the previous concerns expressed by the French have not
materialized. Yet both of these conferences have been under-
way for only a few years. Accordingly, no major issues have
yet arisen to cause differences between the United States
and France.
With respect to monetary matters, Kissinger kept his
word concerning consultation until August, 1971. After the
monetary crisis of November. 1968, French attacks against
the dollar had ceased. But the new economic and monetary
policy that waB initiated unilaterally in 1971 did cause
resentment and confusion in Paris. In White Hoiir» Y^r?
Kissinger expressed his conop™8 ncem over the effects of +kB°VeS
°
n <« Europe) as he lvrote '
S
.°
th6Se
lateral decisions of August ^ „ ^
'
««'
"
feet. Allied roh •
"r d6Sired e'"l6 C° e
— Has been strained but notAt this remove it is difficult for ne to
+h„ u 0 assess whetherthe brutal unilateralism coming E„
-— «, » : ~
,h*—
-
relations unnecessary vmany years to corae> or whether
*ar ly
left us no other option. 08 Iet d £ ^
*
^.
i x ai Q Nixon andKissinger have only two choices? Giv „ «.
... .
10637 l en sympathy that
xist d in london and Bonn for America's pli ght (in addi.tion to the importance of smoothly functioning monetary ar-
rangements for all concerned) can it r- n .; o x really he maintained
that
-
even if there were differences over the specific ar-
rangements
- there were no other alternative policies?
Consequently the monetary crises of Wl and 1973
caused Pompidou to reaffirm, though in a defensive manner.
French criticism of the world monetary system and uni-
lateral American moves. Moreover, the quadrupling of the
price of oil weakened the narrow basis of France's favorable
balance of trade. 39 „0WeVer> as ^ ^ ^
East shows, the dispute over Kissinger's proposed Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) made monetary issues less im-
portant.
On Berlin and the CSCE and MBFR talks, the United States
did manage to work in concert with its allies, including
s" on
can
sas-
HtUe
.uestion that Kissinger . s unilateral
greatly complicate* things for the French. „ consultati
and cooperation are not ndhe^nx a ered to more systematically,
the Americans and the French avoid a serious, even a di
trous. breach? Monetary and economic matters, moreover,
caused considerably more controversy.*0 Particularly vehe-
ment were the Kissinger-Jobert exchanges concerning Kis-
singer's proposed IEA. The French were also highly re-
sentful of Kissinger's contradictory terms stated in his
April. 1973 speech that European economic interests should
be subordinated within a common Atlantic framework.*1 Kis-
singer, an astute observer of Western Europe's psychological
vulnerabilities, might have anticipated that any references
(however implicit) to Western European (and French) mili-
tary weaknesses were unwise. And to infer that Western
Europe should defer to American preferences because of this
weakness overlooks two important considerations. That the
Nixon-Kissinger administration itself could be in error and
that a nation such as France cannot be induced to cooperate
by reminders of its weaknesses. As Stanley Hoffmann writes
"by bringing down the international monetary system of the
post-war era and by exporting inflation, but in different
proportions, to its allies, Washington has made the European
exercise in monetary unification and coordination of eco-
nomic policies more difficult, and underlined the dependence
con-
of the European economies on th« *m ,we American market. Kis-
singer has fully exploited these trends.^ The , ,tion of these circumstances by Kis ,
*~
cern in P « »
singer caused serious
i8 :
for the united states to ~
—
-
alance of payments and to also heavily invest abr0ad>i he failure of the Uni+o* <3+ *n u ted States to rectify these diffi-
culties has caused considerable exast.e^+4 • „6 peration in France.
For these economic issues a™ r,„ nre no longer of secondary inter-
est hut are matters that can seriously affect Franco-
American relations. Kissinger's often abrupt tactics and
lack of a coherent strategy were reflected in his uncer-
tainty over whether to try to assure continued American
pri-nacy or to consult and cooperate to a greater extent with
the French. Kissinger has written that "the act of choice -
is the ultimate test of statesmanship."^ ThU3 Nixon . B ^
Kissinger's uncertainty over policies toward France (and
Europe) reflect the partial breakdown of America's consensus
concerning the position and importance of France (and Eu-
rope) in American foreign policy.
However difficult the controversy was between Kissinger
and Jobert concerning the IEA, the real differences between
the United States and France were over NATO and the EC.
With respect to NATO Pompidou and Giscard have both re-
fused to return to the Alliance. As previously indicated,
de Gaulle's successors have, in certain areas, improved
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MOre°Ver
'
KiSSinSer * S
—* - after the 0ctQb:;war threatened to involve NATO because of the use of itsfaculties, in the Middle Eastern conflict on - for the
French
-
the wrong side. The pro-Arab policies of Fraree
will be discussed later. What is Important to realize is
that Kissinger's actions have made the French all the
.ore
anxious to avoid any substantial identification with NATO
Many Europeans have always been fearful that, if the United
States became heavily i„volve<J in Asia> a^^^
between its Asian and European commitments. The rapid rise
of the pro-Israeli lobby and its fervent support of Israel
have also meant that it has been extremely difficult for
American presidents to be more even-handed in the Middle
East. By his actions and pronouncements during and after
the October war. Kissinger gave the French every reason to
remain at a good distance from NATO.
Furthermore, with respect to NATO's strategy and
tactics, French leaders saw no more willingness in the
Nixon-Kissinger administration to plan joint strategy than
in any other American administration. Zbigniew Brzezinski
writes that "the basic conceptual framework of Nixon's
foreign policy involves an essentially traditional balance-
f-power approach but one that is Bismarckian which is based
n movement and flexibility, surprising both friends and
enemies alike. The shallowness of this approach as a
o
o
of taxing with taerW
. miea shouid
i::;
rue
°
f
-——— War x the 1970 .
n
; a
-of pervasive change.
ai«i«a* to mMn the baIance of power in eu
deed America's failure in +M « ~i *nis respect aftpr* +h« -pa j.ixer the first world
should be a sobering reminder^ ^balance of power will not continue as a result of divine
dispensation out win necessitate considerable wi sdora
, con-
sistency of purpose, and restraint on the part of all con-
cerned.
„
as Kissinger consistently followed such policies
toward France r.t without at least tacit French support,
the United States will not be able to
.aintain the balance
of power in Europe in the future. The relationship between
France and NATO is involved and subject to constraints.
The existence of a large and well-organized Communist party
that consistently attracts ZOf, of the French electorate has
always been a complicating factor in French attitudes towards
NATO. But the problem of the Euro-Communists role in the
French government (and elsewhere in Europe) was not always
well-handled by Kissinger. John Stoessinger writes "His
(Kissinger's) pursuit of overall stability led him to re-
sist the expansion of Communist influence in Western Europe.
His usual feeling for nuance did not extend to the European
situation. So single-minded, in fact, did his pursuit of
stability become that a British editor, in late 1975, com-
pared Kissinger to John Foster Dulles. 'There has been
nothing so vehement since Dulles' tin,.. «.<
remarked « •
lme '
,
this Englishman
- . K.ssxnger has proposed a new domino theory, theItalian Communists would enter +h o
+ „
6 R°me Government, leadingto Communists sharing power in P. „
, „ ,
France 33 well as Portugal
and Spa.n, provoking a withdrawal of ^rican^ ^Europe, and the oollapse of the North Atlantio Treaty
0rgani 2ation...45 Consequently, in the long-run. it will
not he possihle to maintain the halanoe of power in Europe
without a more positive commitment by France towards NATO
Serious differences also remain with respect to the
da Xr^a. Both Pompidou and Giscard affirmed the
desirability of a French nuclear force. yet there is no
indication that Kissinger was prepared to aid France as the
United States aided Britain for so many years under the
provisions of the MacMahon Act. American nuclear coopera-
tion with France would be counter to the American policy of
nuclear non-proliferation and appear to be a reward to
France for its unilateral efforts. Moreover, what effect
would American nuclear aid have upon the West Germans? What
would be done about the fact that France's nuclear weapons
are not assigned and coordinated with those of NATO? With
respect to NATO and the lore* da frappe, certain constraints
exist between both countries and - particularly when con-
sidering Kissinger's actions - there does not appear to be
any way to resolve these differences.
Differences related to the EC also strongly affect
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Franco-American rations. Pompidou has^^ ^
Portance upon defining and identifying the Ec ^
The EC would concentrate on developing financial. indus-
trial, agricultural and monetary policies. Thus the French
would no longer emphasize strategic and foreign policy mat-
ters. As noted (in the section on the EC). Nixon and Kis-
singer assailed the EC and Kissinger's implicit connection
of economic and military issues in discussions between the
unxted States and the West Europeans has meant that the EC
has had considerable pressure placed upon it in its most
vulnerable areas. According to Stanley Hoffmann the United
States would be well-advised to "abandon its attempts to
Play on intra-European divisions, or its effort to dissolve
the EEC common-trade and agricultural policies or its
claim to a permanent
.drpTLde^regard, on policies affecting
U.S. interests. This statement could equally apply to
U.S. policies towards France. This does not mean that the
United States should not defend its interests, but it does
mean that the often confusing, unilateral policies of the
Nixon-Kissinger administration could have been more re-
strained. The emergence of a "European Europe" should not
be constantly perceived as a threat by Washington. More-
over, in terms of the relationship between domestic
structures and foreign policy, Kissinger's policies did
little to educate public opinion in either America or
France as regards the Increased importance of consultation
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«- cooperation between the two countrieg> fiy
(or denigrating) French expressions ^ ngtionaiism J*
- bound to occur in & ..^^^ ^
automatically preclude ^ ^
hereby
not b „ ,
"operative venture,), Kissinger did
-t r.dge (ana sometimes made worse) the serious rift inpublic opinion that has developed between the Americans
the French as part of the Gauilist legacy.
^S-Qi^Sriaie and The Mlrtdi, v^±
In 1954 George Kennan had warned that "in many in-
stances our raw material supply hangs on slender threads
and ones over which we have no power of control or even of
redress. And I worry lest some day drastic interruptions
of this supply should lead to painful crises and tensions."*?
In 1973 Kennan- s warning „as to become a reality.
Differences between the United States and France over
the oil crisis and Middle Eastern policy reveal how im-
portant these two issues have become in Franco-American re-
lations. For de Gaulle and his successors, the Suez inci-
dent confirmed that France must move away from a policy of
supporting Israel. In 196? a serious clash occurred be-
tween the United States and France over Middle Eastern po-
licy. De Gaulle viewed with alarm the increased involvement
of each superpower on opposing sides. This could only lead
to a reduction of the influence of countries like France or,
more serious still, extend the competitive aspects of
es con-
ause
superpower politics to the Kiddle East Fi +h
* E t er way Franr
zz\voee innuence - rtii:
itr
uence in m area that w
- —vital to dance's (and Europe's) economic security
of its vast oil reserves. De GaulU +v," b ulle thus was not onlv
aware of the stance of oil hut was
.so trying to ma*eKranco-Aleerian relations
.^ ^ ^
precluded French support of Israel.
The October war. in 1973
. ^ the ensueing ^ ^indicated the depth of differing American and French^
ceptions concerning the oil crisis and the Kiddle East
French suspicion and anger had reached a high point in the
Kassinger-Johert confrontations which occurred at the energy
conference of February, 1974.^ According to ^ London
EMnamiai "Mr. Kissinger's apparent quarrel with Europe this
year has, in fact, been a fight with France, designed to
defeat the French attempt to shape European policy in a way
that excludes the United States.'^ Thus, real and serious
differences existed between the two antagonists. Kissinger
was inclined toward forcing a confrontation between the
industrialized nations and OPEC while the French preferred
to quietly discuss issues with OPEC. But in the de Gaulle
years, when many Americans reacted with rage and frustra-
tion to many of de Gaulle's policies, Kissinger was one of
the first to counsel prudence and restraint for "rage is
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t gnore or had difficulty follQwing Ms previous
Diplomacy iE ^ ^ more than a science ^ ^ ^_
Preach a goal can be as important as ^ goai^
despite these disagreements with the French, the IEA was tobecome a reality. Arrangements to deal with future short-
ages, to develop new sources of energy and to deal with the
financial problems arising from the crisis were agreed upon,
however, the French refused to join the IEA.
Kissinger's often excessive pressures upon the Europeans
and the French to conform to American positions has meant
that "the chance to use the energy crisis as a means of
strengthening the Community has been lost. first by the
Europeans, but abetted by American indifference. "5°
Under Presidents Pompidou and Giscard. France has
sought to keep the Middle East out of the exclusive sphere
of the superpowers and to increase French influence in the
Mediterranean and Africa. It is. of course, questionable
whether France has the capacity to influence events in these
areas decisively. But whatever the degree of French influ-
ence in these areas, it would appear to be an asset, cer-
tainly not a negligible quality. It is curious that Ameri-
can statesmen (and no few scholars) should have so many
doubts about or be willing to dismiss entirely French ef-
forts. In the first place, particularly after Vietnam,
questions can be raised concerning the ability of the
ore-
Unite, States to pursue consistent policies that deal ira-
aginitively ana sensitively with the peopies of the Kedi-
terranean and Africa «„inca. The Americans simply cannot deal
wi-ly and deal well with all of the areas problems. M
over, after France's past trials and tribulations, would it
not be wise to allow, even encourage, the French (and the
other states of Western Europe) to assume a more active rol,
in areas that they consider to be of interest. The French
(and West Europeans) could thereby enhance their self-
confidence and moral self-assurance as it became increas-
ingly apparent that in this rapidly changing world they too
had important contributions to make to their own and man-
kind's betterment.
With respect to French efforts in the Middle East, how-
ever, Kissinger, both before and after the October war. dis-
played complete indifference and indeed hostility. While
the French proclaimed their loyalty to the Atlantic Alli-
ance in 1973. they also criticized the cooperation of the
United States and the Soviet Union in halting the October
war as weakening the credibility of America's commitment to
the security of Europe. 51 Kissinger's sympathy and coopera-
tion with France after the October war might not have pro-
duced beneficial results. But did Kissinger not always
argue that "if we face the fact that the interests of Europe
and the United States are not identical everywhere, it may
be possible to agree on a permissible range of divergence?" 52
193
His diplomacy was too calculating and callous. His initia-
tives were designed to force France and the Europeans to ac-
cept American positions. In effect, he insisted on a pre-
dominant role for the United States with little or no regard
for the views of the French. But it was France's (and
Europe's) economic security that was at stake. Moreover,
the result of Kissinger's policies was predictable, he lost
credit diplomatically with the Europeans for what was oc-
curring in fact, i.e., the United States was slowly becoming
more evenhanded in the Middle East by supporting Egypt. Yet
considerable damage had been done that perhaps by foresight
and a more accommodating diplomatic style, could have been
avoided.
Unfortunately, as J. Robert Schaetzel states "for the
first time in postwar history, an American administration
had dealt with Europe precisely as it would a hostile
state."53 The objectives and the style of Kissinger's di-
plomacy from 1973 to the summer of 197^ were questionable.
Thereafter alarm in Europe at America's anger, the departure
of Pompidou and Jobert and later Nixon further eased ten-
sions. And the new American President, Gerald Ford, to his
credit, did not share his predecessor's propensity for con-
frontation politics. While, in some respects, Kissinger's
influence on foreign policy was enhanced after Nixon's re-
gnation, the delicate domestic position of the new admin-
stration - and Ford's desire to avoid confrontations -
si
i
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meant that more emphasis was „placed upon Summit meeting a
conferences, such as the Puerto Rican Conf
„ i
n erence in 107/;resolve problems between the United Stat * •
allies.
68 ^ its Ewopean
Cooperation between the United st« + « * «
.
.
T a ates and France wouldnave been difficult ~v > ""J-anicu to achieve when de Gaulle was *
wi +^ r> • , y President.With Pompidou and definitely with Giscard th.
~
.
d , e opportunitiesfor cooperation increased vP+ ^ w .. Yet, for Nixon and Kissinger
cooperation with Prance had never a very high priority,demand Braudel, the great Prench historian, has observed
that the centuries long contest between Spai„ md Turkey fQr
-stery of the Mediterranean occurred at the time when the
locus of political and economic power was moving from the
Mediterranean to the nations that bordered the Atlantic,
thereby ensuring that for both Spain and Turkey, the strug-
gle was increasingly less important. In many respects. Kis-
singer's prolonged efforts in Vietnam were also of diminish-
ing importance to American objectives while other problems
needed attention.
Basically, the future course of relations between the
United States and France will depend upon the policies of
the United States. In monetary and financial matters, in
NATO and Europe, the United States will have to acknowledge
French and European interests. The United States can no
195
e
^
,
iVUeged P°Siti0n
^—— nor be
:
:
on str
——c KiSBi :
States centpM iv, ^ united
how „ ti
Phil°^oaI issue of
I
na l°nS C°OPerate
-
W
-^n urges
. structure whichmakes separate action, physicallv i« ,
.
n y impossible by assigning
;
partner a—
-
-
—
PariE ini:sat a consensus is meaningful only ,f^
"
°T'
US
^ Kissinger hadthe opportunity to attempt to reach som.y w n e agreements with
France if only to set a precedent for f n «P C a blowing administra-
tions. Instead, we finri -f->.o +
.
imd that, according to Stanley Hoff-
mann, "in the Nixon-Kissinger oolirv + v, •* "ger p cy, tension exists between
the wish for self-restraint ana an aggressive pursuit or the
national interest, between the wish to let the West Europeans
build their own entity and the inclination to keep Europe
(and Japan) closely tied to the U.S. as permanent allies in
a basically tripolar contest, between the objective of pre-
serving NATO and the tendency to consider the emergent Euro-
pean Community as an economic rival. "55
The present period is one of profound political and
Philosophical change, when the post-war order is disinte-
grating while the framework of the newly emerging order can
only be dimly perceived. Kissinger understood the pervasive
nature of these changes when he recognized that while the
world is still bipolar militarily, it is becoming multipolar
politically. Moreover, simultaneously with thes
.
J x Ln cn e genpml
Z PT9 ' were alao han ^
ource of frustration tor the united states
. The
-side in the failure of bothMe ^^
^ening political ana philosophical perspectives. Surelythen, the early 19?0 .. provided circumstanoes ^^
Political ana philosophical felines coula have heen ar-
ticulated ana implemented. Franco-American relations once
again coula have heen a raodel illustrating the benefits of
a new arrangement that stressed coalition ana cooperation,
yet also allowea for aisagreeraents.
However, this dia not transpire. Insteaa Kissinger
oscillated between attempts to ensure American primacy and
the necessity to consult and cooperate. Few. if any. Ameri-
can statesmen have been so knowleageable concerning France
ana Europe. Yet his recora as regaras Franco
-American re-
lations falls far short of greatness. His aiplomatic pri-
orities lay elsewhere. In many instances this is apparent
in his policies. But what will be the viewpoint of future
analysts? Dia Kissinger miss a crucial chance to reaefine
America's relations with France ana Western Europe? Would
he have sought to ao this if he had remained in office
longer? Was it really necessary (and wise) for Nixon and
Kissinger to have been so preoccupied with the Vietnam War
and adversarial relations that other areas (particularly
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France and Western Europe) ^ *; suffered from neglect? As pP+pr
„„„..,«.
,h. „„„„ ih< mwi
political, economic, financial and milit*™ *3110 unitary order for the
t - are belng eaten away Mt ^ h^ oataiygt
r
r0S1°n
^
in the P^-Phicax vacuum in the Weatdiagnosed by Kissinger U years ag0 ^^ ^
Kissinger's policies did not prevent (and at times
helped cause) a widening +v.n of the gap between America and
France (and Western Europe).
„, did not r ^
order for Franco
-American (and Alliance relations) while his
shock tactics and oscillation between unilateralism and co-
operation confused and estranged public opinion. Yet for
the democratic states on both sides of the Atlantic, public
support of their policies is crucial. If Western values are
to be maintained in a revolutionary world, cooperation among
the Western nations is not just desirable, it is vital.
The French and the West Europeans are no longer amen-
able to American pressures. 5? A major task of the present
administration in Washington will be to begin restructuring
relations between the United States and France (and Europe)
so that partnership, while allowing for differences, may be-
come more of a reality and less of an ideal and. therefore,
more accurately reflect the imperatives of a new age.
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CHAPTER vil
BILATERAL RELATIONS
, BRITAIN
The Sftfr^inT;
Since the end of World War a Britain has^
e,ma
;
^ 3 county, f0rmerly a global
r\
r
iuence the
°°
urse
°
f
- * *
«
^ °7inent-8i-d— Historically few countrifis ^
exper.enced so rapid a demise in their international in-
fluence. In less than a quartpr nre of a century Britain has
declined from a world to a medium power whose lmportance 4
.
basically confined to a regional context. There are .any
reasons for this change in Britain's position, however
wars often accelerate changes that are already underway, m
this manner World War II marked the rise of the two. extra-
European superpowers to world domination while the multi-
polar Euro-centered world order ended.
Consequently, three choices confronted Britain, to
continue as they had in the past with alliances that were
prompted by circumstances, to become closely associated with
the continent, or to become the junior partner of the United
States. To a formerly great power these have been difficult
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choices. Thu<? s+ . ^
since W5 h v 3tateBmen1945 a e appeared to lack a
en higUy ^ ^ where w^
ritai, In the fifties Britain could
leadership of Eurn-no r>^ Ui ope. Because of the Drpc-H^
i+fl . .
P estige accrued from
Structure
. the sitUation
_ such^ „during
Britain could have had the leadership of^ ^
asking.»l But the British preferred to reBain aloof from
Europe, for their relationship to the Continent has been
described as "extraordinarily ambivalent. "2 When they
changed their minds in the sixties, it was too late. And
in the seventies, once again. Britain is uncertain about
the choice between the European Community and going its own
way. As to the Americans little of substance remains of
their bilateral relationship with Britain. Except in peri-
ods of acute crisis, when the nature of the challenge was
unambiguous. Britain and the United States have often dis-
agreed. The United States was less than enthusiastic about
the ^imposition of Britain's Colonial empire at the end of
World War II. Consequently Britain's statesmen have made a
serious mistake in attributing far too much importance to
the special relationship with the United States after World
War II. Americans do not work easily with equals in inter-
national relations. They are often unaware of or insensi-
tive to nuance, to the more subtle aspects of international
20k
Politics. Given the best int*n + <
continuation of an un b "
^
-
the
am iguous challenge (two assumptionsthat cannot he expected to prevail indefinitely)
, isdoubtful that a superpower could - for a con ^
" work smoothly with a iu ,
siderable Period
^--y W1 tn j nior partnor uP e . However despite
serious disagreements, there still * m <l11 remain elements of aunique relationship.
Today Britain stands at a watershed in its history.
1* cast as.de its historical ambivalence towards Europejoin the Europeans in an effort to promote their col-lective influence in the world through the EC? Or will it
continue its present uncertain course, ns ambivalence concern-ing the EC with the knowledge that the once vaunted special
relationship with the United States grows more and more
meaningless?
Kissinger wrote more extensively on West Germany and
France, Britain occupied a place of lesser importance. In
the future it cannot be said that Britain-s contribution
alone will be decisive for the eventual success of the West
Europeans to achieve greater influence in a world of ever-
greater political plurality. But is it possible that the
influence of Western Europe on issues that affect its pre-
sent and future can be increased or even maintained without
the contribution of Britain? This is extremely doubtful.
If the Western Europeans are to regain the major responsi-
bility for their destiny, it will have to be with the active
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support of Britain. In many areas Britain is the leading
scientific and technology power in Europe. And its po-
litical system is exceptionally stable. Can the unity of
the West, forged in the past by
. common perception of
danger develop a new sense of purpose from shared aspira-
tions73 Britain's hostility or indifference to the West
Europeans' quest may prove an insurmountable obstacle.
Kissinger's major concern was to examine Britain's spe-
cial relationship with the United States and Anglo-American
policy preceding the Nassau Conference. However, his analy-
sis is also of considerable importance for the relationship
between the United States and Western Europe during the
crucial period from the Nassau Conference (December 1 962 ) to
de Gaulle's Press Conference of January 1*. 1963. During
this period, Britain's protracted and difficult negotiations
for entry into the EC were approaching a climax. De Gaulle's
veto of Britain's entry into the EC at his Press Conference
on January 14 signaled the emergence of differing conceptions
between France and the United States concerning the structure
and policies of a united Europe.
But the memory of Britain's past proved far too strong
for it to, without misgivings, promote European unity. Bri-
tain had always sought to prevent the emergence of a power-
ful and United Europe. Therefore, to abandon its American
ana Commonwealth connections wouid ^ much ^ a
w1« tradition. Unfortunately, the major exertions duringthe war had not only exhausted the British, hut they were
unable to decide which option to pursue, the relationship
with the Commonwealth, the United States, or with Europe
Kissinger states that Britain is not really involved in
a search for identity hut rather that Britain's identity i s
'•incompatible with an unreserved entry into Europe."* In-
deed. Britain's views on the organization of Europe as ex-
pressed by Churchill, for example, have not been very dif-
ferent from the views espoused by de Gaulle. Both have in-
sisted that sovereignty represents the highest value.5 Yet
Britain's views have been couched in more temperate language
and were without the theoretical emphasis placed upon the
links between cooperative endeavors and national identity.
Moreover, one cannot deny that Britain's strategic and emo-
tional ties have been more pronounced regarding its trans-
Atlantic relationships. Finally, Britain was also a world
power and not just a European power.
But what exactly is the special relationship between
Britain and the United States? A common language and cul-
tural ties have reinforced the more informal aspects. How-
ever, the British have often, particularly in the sixties,
overestimated their importance. British diplomacy has been
quite skillful in giving the impression that American for-
eign policy is strongly influenced, if not guided, by
20?
Britain. Foraal tt inforaal ^
- he British never made a practice ^ ^
•
American policies as de Gaulle did.
As indicated by Ki ssinger in the ^
f7!
l6SS effSCtiVe
-
° f
wartime
e fort faded. As its power ^
icans thought that Britain was claiming influence that itspower did not warrant since it was om,r tpW nly a European power and
should seek to satisfv it<?x iy s objectives m Europe. Britain
should, of course, join the EC.
Two events were of critical instance in signifying the
decline of Britain's influence with the United States, The
Suez Crisis and the Skybolt missile cancellation. Suez
showed that Britain could not act without the concurrence of
the United States while the Skybolt missile cancellation re-
vealed the lack of British military autonomy. Both wounds
were to some extent self-inflicted but "in both instances,
brutal and unfeeling American actions aggravated an already
difficult situation." 6
But while these events signaled the decline of the spe-
cial relationship, a number of serious misconceptions re-
mained in both countries concerning the Anglo-American rela-
tionship. Britain exaggerated its influence in the United
States while the Americans may have overestimated the ease
with which Britain could change its policies. Thus, "it be-
came an axiom of United States policy that Britain's entry
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into a supranational Europe would be a guarantee of Atlantic
Partnership. -7 „0Wever
, the consequenoe£j ^
suiting from Britain's entry into the EC could not occur be-
cause of de Gaulle's veto tv>* a™ ~<x . The Americans were outraged over
this turn of events. Would Britain have led a Europe that
acceded to American interests? Or would the result have
been "that Europe would henceforth have conducted de Gaulle's
policies with British methods." 8
By 1962 the only aspect of the special relationship that
had any substance was in the nuclear field. In 1957 Britain
began the development of a missile called the Blue Streak
which, due to extraordinary expenses, had to be abandoned in
February, i960 in favor of a missile under development in the
United States called Skybolt. From i960 on there was an in-
tense debate in Britain between the Conservatives, who de-
fended the purchase of the Skybolt missile, and Labor, who
questioned the wisdom of depending on a missile made by an-
other country that was not yet even fully operational. The
Conservatives also sought to show the importance of the
British deterrent to the Americans, but Labor strongly at-
tacked this position. According to Kissinger, what was at
stake by 1962 was a matter of life or death for the Con-
servative government f was Britain independent with respect
to nuclear weapons? It was in this atmosphere that sud-
denly, in December 1962, the Americans produced an uproar by
cancelling Skybolt. A hastily convened conference was held
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at Nassau between Prime Kiniater ^
Kennedy.
The Nassau Agreement was a complex and ambiguous docu-
»ent forged during the most intimate period of the "special
relationship- which attempted to provide Britain with a
strategic nuclear force that was. however, basically to be
used only in conjunction with NATO * s objectives. As Kis-
singer writes,
-it tried to reconcile integration with in-
dependence, the American belief in the need for an indivi-
sible nuclear strategy with the British desire for auto-
nomy. "9 This attempt tQ reconcile the irreconcilable faUe<j>
Reaction in Europe ranged from cool to hostile. There were
so many ambiguities, so much that was contradictory or ill-
defined in the Agreement that it was small wonder that de
Gaulle viewed it with suspicion. Even the Labor party
thought that the Agreement "proved the validity of their
previous contention that British nuclear independence was a
sham."10 If Labor had these views, if many Americans thought
that Britain's nuclear forces still were not integrated into
NATO, can it be any wonder that de Gaulle resolutely re-
jected the Agreement? Yet the real tragedy of the Nassau
Agreement was its poor timing. Britain's delicate and dif-
ficult negotiations to enter the EC were at a decisive point
and, by thus reaffirming the primacy of its strategic trans-
Atlantic ties, serious doubts were raised concerning Britain's
intentions in Europe.
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*»ng to J0in the EC
, received further confirmatiQn
the stance of Britain . s nucuar ties ^^States. Moreover, the Agreement reinforced de Gaulle . s con_
e
!
10,1
«* h- 1*- own defense. How couldintegration, he asXed. be reconciled with independent dis-
position, „ot only the substance of the Agreement>
aiaea France not at all for the French had neither sub-lines nor warheads, hut the way in which the Agreement was
negotiated created many problems. Moreover. Paris received
a copy of the Agreement only after it w ^u- ix had been released to
the press.
Thus, while the Agreement was probably not the sole
reason for de Gaulle's rejection of Britain's bid to enter
the EC, still it was a contributory cause and raised anew
the question of whether one member of a Unitea Europe should
have an exclusive relationship with the United States on so
vital a subject as nuclear weapons.
Kissinger states that, "in retrospect, the failure of
Britain to consult with France and its other European allies
before committing itself to the Nassau Agreement seems a
crucial missed opportunity. "11 It seems certain that even
if the EC negotiations had failed, Britain still would have
been in a less disadvantageous position if it had consulted
with its European allies prior to the Nassau Agreement. But
on January 1*, 1963, de Gaulle vetoes Britain's admission to
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the EC and rejected the^^ ^
date "marks an important watershed in Atlantic relation, J*
Several problems assumed a more serious aspeot after de
'
Gaulle's press conference of January 14. 1963.
The belief that there would be an +•"J.a D automatic progression
fro, economic to political integration was open to serious
question. Politics involved questions of values and policy
and a consensus was henceforth much more difficult to obtain
Also, the idea of an Atlantic partnership between the United
States and a United Europe, including Britain, was now in
need of serious reexamination. It was Kissinger who wrote,
"it is clear that conflicting approaches to Atlantic rela-
tionships were confronting each other. m13
The situation was further complicated by the alignments
that occurred on different issues. On economic issues, West
Germany and the Netherlands tended to side with Britain
while in the field of strategy, West Germany favored the
United States. Moreover, European opposition to de Gaulle
did not automatically mean support of the United States.
Many Europeans, including left-wing groups, while objecting
to de Gaulle's imperious style, did not necessarily object
to Third Force policies or believe in a long-term asso-
ciation with the United States.
The press conference of January 14, 1963 opened a period
of frantic diplomatic activity in which, according to Kis-
singer, the "United States strove hard to vindicate its
Previous conception an. France^ p^ ^
States, ^ Europe> Kissinger pointed ^
started out as a dispute about the interna! structure of
HuroPe and its role runs the risk of
ehifting the balance within Europe in unexpected direc-
tions. "15
ThOtiSiSiH —
During the period of Kissinger's tenure in office
(1969-1976). no major problems arose between the United
States and Britain in contrast to the situation that exist-
ed with respect to West Germany and France. The West Ger-
mans were engaged in the promotion of Ostpolitik and the
development of a political role commensurate with their
economic power. At the same time they remained conscious of
the need for an active WestpoHtik and harmonious relations
with the United States. The French, while modifying the
more extreme aspects of the Gaullist legacy, still sought
to enhance their importance in Europe, in particular, and in
the Middle East and Africa.
Yet Britain has not been engaged in any enterprise of
this scope and magnitude. Some may disagree, citing Bri-
tain's admission into the EC in 1973. But Britain has made
no decisive contribution. Moreover, both the United States
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lum
success
con-
-a the West Europeans haVfi agreed on ^ ^British admission into the EC. While the 1975 referend,
indicated that Britain win remain in the EC, the
of the referendum does not ensure a positive British
tribution. Many people in Britain, particularly in the
Labor party's left-wing, are still v, ^6. implacably hostile to the
EC.
Britain's influence and importance in international re-
lations continued to decline during the Kissinger years.
Old social fissures and even class warfare combined with an
obsolete industrial plant have meant that there has been a
very real decline in Britain's interest in the outside
world. Moreover, serious nationalist movements in the Bri-
tish Isles have made the fragmentation of Britain no longer
unthinkable. 16 The development of the welfare state has
also contributed to British indifference towards the outside
world. The more parochial aspects of the welfare state have
been reinforced and enhanced by Britain's loss of empire and
the decline of its international influence. North Sea oil
has meant that, unlike France, Britain has had no serious
disagreements with the United States over Middle Eastern
policy. But will the bonanza from the North Sea further
exacerbate Britain's internal divisions if claims for this
largesse mount too rapidly? After paying off its large
foreign debt, will the surplus funds be used to modernize
obsolete sectors of British industry and reduce taxation or
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wil! various groups make exorbitant claims to satisfy their
Parochial demands and thus disregard Britain's needs as a
whole. I, Britain's internal problem3 ^ ^
resolved, can anyone expeot that it will be able t£) ^ &
Positive contribution to the EC and the problem pertaining
to Western Europe? Today Britain stands at a decisive point
in its modern history. It can continue on its present course
of doubt and hesitation, particularly with respect to the EC
while being wracked by ever greater domestic problems whose
intensity will preclude any major British contribution be-
yond its shores. Or an imaginative and innovative British
government can attempt to resolve Britain's social and
economic problems in concert with the other members of the
EC, thus inspiring the British with confidence to make a
major contribution to the international problems that beset
Western Europe. Which course will Britain adopt? That is
the question that still remains unanswered. I shall examine
three areas that are of decisive importance to Britain in
the present context. Britain and the ECj the relations be-
tween Britain, France, and West Germany! and the relationship
between the United States and Britain. What policies did
Kissinger follow regarding these areas? What modifications
if any, occurred in his views? Kissinger was an astute ob-
server of Britain's psychological and political vulnerabili-
ties. He recognized that the Suez crisis and the Skybolt
affair had been serious blows to Britain's pride and
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self-confidence in action to imposing Very
straints upon Britain's political options. Therefore, in aPeriod of profound politioal ana social o hange
. with Britain
suffering a serious domestic malaise. Kissinger's polioies
could have aimed at providing new guidelines for the Anglo-
American relationship. At the same time one should expect
American policies that would attempt, insofar as this is
possible, to enhance or augment Britain's confidence so that
Britain can make worthwhile contributions to the world.
Britain and thf f. roTlpar, r.r^^i+y
Once the British thought that they could choose between
the Commonwealth, the United States, and Europe. The choice
no longer exists. The Commonwealth is but a symbol of an
imperial past that recedes ever further into history. The
special relationship with the United States, once the pride
of Britain, is in reality an empty shell. Britain has only
one place left; Europe. F. S. Northedge writes that "the
effectiveness of British foreign policy would be increased
if that policy were framed in a community context. nl7 There
are two areas in particular in which Britain would benefit
from a greater involvement both in the EC and with the
Western European statesi in economics and defense.
Britain's serious economic problem have greatly di-minished its capacity to conduct a resolute , •
« v. foreign policy.British methods of industrial m
. . .
management are archaic. Theindustrial plant is badly i„ need of m„„ •o- m modernization. With
respect to technology. Haymond Vernon writes,
"the tech-
-
still grappling with a sense of technological infer-
iority that is deeply disconcerting. "18 Agri culture. now
that preferential arrangements with the Commonwealth coun-
tries are becoming a thing of the past, is certain to cause
Problems because of rising prices. The British desire for
lower prices will he contested in France W«+ r"' "anee, est Germany, and
Italy. All of these problems were further exacerbated
during the seventies by a very high level of inflation that,
by 1976, according to OECD statistics, was 15 percent. 20
Labor relations po Se a difficult problem. The failure of
the unions to take measures to discipline "wildcat strikers",
whether they had a just grievance or not. has time and again'
seriously disrupted British public life. There must be an
equitable balance between business and labor in the modern
state. When either business or labor become too powerful,
a society's interests as a whole suffer.
Consequently, even with its persistent economic prob-
lems, the possibility exists that Britain's membership in
21?
were en-
the EC will l ead to benefits nenef similar to those thatJoyed in the economic field bv th , «
*
"el y e original Six after thsigning of the Treaty of Rom « , ?! *c i,y °i H e in 19^7 21 -
«t an example. he coul(J ^
of consultation and cooperation in solvin.
But as I h
g economic problemso have indicated previous m;
.
P eviously, Nixon and Kissinger'shandling of economic policv ton „«•+^uiJ- Ly l-OO Often SOUxrh-f 4-^c soug t to secure ad-
vantages for the United States, if neceSEary> ^
of the KC. Kissinger might have made more of ^ elfJZ
curh ( after 1971) the ^^ ^ ^
this problem was beyond his control, his unilateral methods
combined with other adverse economic policies meant that the
EC was going to have a much more difficult time with mone-
tary and financial problems and economic growth.^ Thus
Partly because of these difficulties the EC presented a
'
somewhat disorderly economic model for Britain. Kissinger's
unilateral economic policies also encouraged those in Bri-
tain who believed in similar approaches. Behind the ambi-
guities of his rhetoric and policies was a lack of a co-
herent and consistent policy as regards Britain and the EC.
Membership in the EC could prove of immense value to the
British economy. Should the economy fail to change in the
areas previously mentioned. Britain's ability to make its
influence felt in even a regional context will be seriously
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circumscribpfi ^v,,,., v
—— - - ;;;
—
-
r
-
portant long-term benefits that „
the Bore ^
the Briti„h
aC °rUe t0 the ass economy is Euccessmiy ^ ^ ^
If Western Euro-Dp i q +niU^e 13 provide moqt n-r +k
.
.
sx or the means forit. conventional defense, a major British contribution willhe necessary. The West Europeans already provide 90 perC ent
of NATO ground forces, 80 Derc^nt «<• +u »
»
ou p e of the Naval forces, and
75 Percent of the air forces. 23 HoWeyer( ^ & ^Ucy speech, Nixon talked of the need for greater European
defense contributions clawing that the United States de-
votes a much higher sharp nf i+og ie n e o its economic product to de-
fense than the Europeans. 221
A vital task for Britain will be to ensure that the EC
remains firmly committed to the Atlantic Alliance. With
the diminished threat from the East, the rise in the cost of
defense, and the pressures upon Western economies, many West
Europeans favor reducing defense expenditures and commit-
ments to the point where Western Europe's security could be
seriously threatened. Such trends are already evident in
Denmark and the Netherlands. Moreover, French policy is
sometimes too indifferent to the EC and the Atlantic Alli-
ance. According to the London Economist "So far Mr. Kis-
singer has not told Britain flatly that it is more use to
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tish membership is the best wav of h , ,
trox Freneh ambition,^ " ^ * ~*
Concerning Britain-s defense budget, Andrew Shonfield
remarks, "that (1) i -p *s,„+v
maa e - of
°UtS
" ^ def°nse budset ««
-de any signifies, that is - these will involve
.fundamental change in British policy about the defense of
the Continent, (2) tha «s h^-p ~lS d6fenSe c°™tment is concurrent with
Britain's political membership in the EC, (3) the crucial
relationship with West Germany wouia also suffer. (4) one
ccula plausibly argue that from the point of view of the
U.S.. the maintenance of an enlargea EC (with Britain in-
side) is a major objective of policy in the secona half of
the 1970-..-* I have alreaay aiscussea the basically ne-
gative attitudes that Kissinger expressea toward the EC.
Obviously his views toward the EC have undergone serious
modification and in this respect his policy towards Britain
was based on satisfying more ephemeral considerations of
immediate interest than in the (long-term) necessity of en-
suring British participation in the EC. In addition one
must stress the interdependence of the EC and NATO. Britain
and the major states of Europe could ensure stable, long-
range economic growth by cooperating in the EC through com-
mon monetary, industrial, and social policies. Thus only if
the West Europeans, under the aegis of the EC, can attain
economic growth over the long-term can they provide the
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means to ensure their securitv im. •y. Kissinger displayed littleor no recognition of the l«+ ainterdependence between the EC and
cooperate in each organisation. Without sound economic
growth and progressive social policies that do not fully
engage Britain how. over the long-term, can the West Euro-
peans assume greater responsibilities for their own defense?
The future of Britain's nuclear strike force is also
important. Will the British eventually cooperate with
France (and will both be aided by West ^
Port) in a small West European nuclear entity that, through
NATO, was linked to the United States, yet had a certain
degree of autonomy (Is a small European nuclear force in-
evitable or even necessary)? As regards nuclear weapons.
Andrew Pierre has written "with Britain in Europe, the spe-
cial Anglo-American nuclear relationship has become, in some
ways, an anachronism. - 2? The issue of American aid to Bri-
tain's nuclear program is no longer a source of serious con-
tention with the French. But this is due chiefly to the
fact that the French have succeeded in their endeavor to
build a small but efficient nuclear force with little or no
help from the Americans. It remains to be seen what effects
a second SALT agreement will have upon Western Europe's po-
tential nuclear forces. Kissinger has, however, done
reasonably well in both informing and respecting the Euro-
peans' fears and concerns over this issue.
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«— is no guarantee that Britain . s
can be resolved even if it f „
P
But m* i y
C°mmitted
^0 the EC.Britaxn-s membership ^ ^ £c couid ^ ^
nnuence upon its relations with France and West
V
CrUClaI
"
nCtUre in
the relati
etween these three major states wU, have an important
,nuence on the course of events. Furthermore, these stat
should also have a positive relationship with the United
States. For the survival of Western values in a revolu-
tionary world presupposes trans-Atlantic political and eco-
nomic cooperation.
It is apparent that Britain, France, and West Germany
Will, in various ways, preserve some freedom of maneuver,
while they slowly attempt to strengthen and enlarge the
scope of the EC. Yet hesitations and doubts ensure that
the EC will have a highly circumscribed role in the future.
Relations with the United States also pose a question marie.
Will the Americans really support the EC as it slowly con-
solidates its position and thus threatens to (or actually
does) harm American economic interests?
Consequently. London. Paris, and Bonn must conduct
their affairs with due regard for their own triangular re-
lationship and with respect to the United States. This
means that a very complex diplomatic situation exists with
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respect to most issues and +M« )
. „
S 1S eVen more apparent in theseventies when a combination of economic en
t
,
, ergy, and poli-ical problems add to the difficulties.
^ere is no queStion that dipZomatic transactions be-tween and with Britain, France, and West Cermany in the
seventies can be very time-consumin5 and non-productive.
When Kissinger did most of his writing on Western Europe
the situation was not nearly so complex and intractable
Yet even if the adverse diplomatic situation of the United
States in the early seventies and the difficult situation
of the West Europeans was certain to reduce the opportunities
for trans-Atlantic cooperation, was this a sufficient ex-
planation for some of Kissinger's policies?
Some conceptions of the Atlantic world emphasized the
nation-state, others the supra-national aspects of organi-
zations such as the EC. As pertains to these opposing con-
ceptions, did Kissinger's policies mitigate the differences
between the British and the French, for example? As a
scholar, he was emphatic that eventually Western Europe
must obtain the highest levels of consultation and coopera-
tion not only between its largest states but also with the
United States. On numerous occasions he refers to the
schisms or divisive tendencies in the West that precluded
or wrecked Western unity to the detriment of all. While
recognizing that differences could occur. Kissinger knew
that the West must avoid internal schisms if western values
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are to be maintained in a rPVnin-n
he fe.l +* +
evolutionary world. ^ then didG Ge th^atened by the prospects of a Euro. ,
wv,
pean Europe?Why was he insistent upon Maintaining
^erican h
.
Americ egemony whenit ca^ne to d.p^atic-strategie matters? In this way^
singer assure, that British (.ore interdependence with the
*nted States) and Prenoh (advocates of a European Europe)
conoeptions pertaining to Europe wouid remain unhridgeahie.
But did his failure in this respect not h iP help perpetuate the
very same divisions in the West that he had originally
warned against?
Consequently, while some aspects of the Gaullist legacy
have been modified, Britain and France still find it diffi-
cult to cooperate in many respects. Britain is a member of
the EC but uncertainties persist as to the direction that
the EC should take; less dependence on the U.S. and more
self-assertion or more stress on trans
-Atlantic ties and
cooperation with the United States.
Consider economic issues. Due to West Germany's
"economic miracle", serious disparities already complicate
its relations with states in less-favorable economic situ-
ations. West Germany has basically sought to cooperate in
a trans-Atlantic forum as has Britain to solve economic is-
sues. But Kissinger's unilateral measures have politically
undercut Bonn and London when they advocated cooperation.
The French, once again, refused to go along with the Bri-
tish and West Germans for they thought that the Europeans
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strive for more economic self .assertion
_
the French disagreement on <6 x Kissinger's IEA pmri i +o
-"-^ ana its avowedPoHoy of confrontation with OPEC. The French preferred ^
work cuietly with the Arabs and OPEC. Thus on raany economicissues (an, energy) the Orleans advocated
the French another, while Britain and West Germany ^
"here in between and for the most part heipless to bridge the
^P. Again. by his tactics ana an often inconsistent long-
terra vision. Kissinger aid not always demonstrate that he
appreciated the difficult nature of relations between Bri-
tain. France, and West Germany. Yet relations between Bri-
tain (France, and West Germany) are further complicated by
the necessity for cooperation with the United States.
The United R+otes and R.ulin
In a period of pervasive change when men look to the
old and the familiar with longing and view the new and the
uncertain with apprehension, an opportunity exists for the
articulation and implementation of a new framework for po-
litical and social life. Anglo-American relations were in
need of a new vision. While special ties would always ex-
ist due to affinities of language, race, and culture, what
effects, for example, would Britain's increasing involve-
ment in the EC have upon its relationship with the United
States? As Britain continued to identify itself with Eu-
rope, how would this affect its nuclear relationship with
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the United States? Did Kissirwr^ **nger address himself to these
problems? What did he contribute, +ribute towards the restructuring
of Anglo-American relations?
Andrew Shonfield has a good understanding of the prob-
lems concerning the United States and Britain. These prob-
lems are (l) British economic nationalism and its attendant
economic problems will need to be contained as a potential
source of discord in the international system, (2) Britain-
international policies
- and possibly its relationship with
West Germany
- could be adversely affected if the West Ger-
mans were to replace Britain as the chief partner of the
United States in Europe, (3) if there is a resurgence of
German nationalist feeling, the situation will be easier to
handle if at least one other important European power is
committed to NATO and the defense of West Germany, (4) the
chances of Britain continuing as a leading and effective
member of the Western Alliance will probably depend chiefly
on the vitality of Britain's connections with Europe. 28
How did Nixon and Kissinger deal with these problems?
The American record, with respect to economic nationalism,
can hardly have been encouraging to Britain. From 1971 on,
Kissinger did not set a very good example. In the summer
of 1971 Nixon and Kissinger commenced to undertake, without
consulting the Allies or giving them advance notice, a wide-
spread change in the manner in which the world conducted its
monetary and financial affairs. The United States ended
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the convertibility of doll ars to gold thus national cur.
rencles were no longer PegCed to specific^ piuctu _
ating currencies make international^
^ nee the EC is by far the^^ tradingH *ould have the more dimcult probiems> ^
shoes" were unpleasant surprises to America . s^
British „ the West Europeans were shocK ed and angered
.
andlater somewhat pu z ,l ed over this unilateral abrogation of
arrangements that had been agreed unon bv .n ...^ P° °y all parties in 1944
Was Kissinger corapelled to aot in this manner? The Europeans'
while often annoyed at Washington's failure to curb certain
abuses in its international economic policy, were by no means
unsympathetic to Washington- s plight, m London and Bonn,
in particular, a policy of patent compromise, of attempting
to arrive at a consensus on such a vital issue, woul d per-
haps, have led to agreement, even if not as rapidly as some
woulo wish. Nor di d the general economic situation justify
the measures that Kissinger employee). A world of interde-
pendent economic powers (particularly the United States.
Western Europe, and Japan) would seem to require increaseO
consultation and cooperation rather than secretive, uni-
lateral moves. As Stanley Hoffmann writes "there is a grow-
ing need for pooled sovereignty, shared powers and effective
international institutions in all the realms.
"
2 9 The Euro-
peans and the Japanese are as interested as the Americans in
a smoothly functioning monetary system. Moreover, was not
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the resentment caused by Kissing. „
+v „.
ssinger s measures more costlythan the results he achlm,^ „ ," nieved so rapidly?
Of course, economic issues were further ,
the "oil crisis" but „
""-Plicated by
n l regarding both his tactics and
of purpose. Kissinger has ^
gardlng Shonfield-s second point
, ^ ^
tain by West Germany as America's chief partner in Europe
the dispute with West Germany over American policy in the
Middle East and the shipment of war material to Israel from
NATO bases in West Germany, energy poiicy
, troops
Europe, U.S. policy toWards ^ ^ ^ ^
economic issues all ensure that it is unlikely that West Ger
rcany will replace Britain as America , s^ ^ ^
rope. The Americans and the West Germans are trying to de-
velop a relationship that will reflect equality ^
allow for disagreements. 30 Yet this new relationship is
not meant to displace or threaten Britain's relationship
with the United States. Concerning the dangers of a revived
German nationalism. Kissinger has often been a bad example.
Moreover, his indifference or even hostile policies toward
the EC guaranteed that, if a resurgence of German national-
ism does occur, it will be more difficult to handle. With
respect to the necessity - the vital necessity - of Bri-
tain's European connections, Kissinger also set a very bad
example. His advocacy of unilateralism, his denigration of
not only the EC but the OECD and other multilateral
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institutions nave encouraged those in Britain ^^
the EC.
Thus, unlike West Germany ana France, there were no
important direct bilateral disputes between the United
States and Britain. Kissinger's failures with respect to
Brxtain were of a more indirect kind - his aggressive uni-
lateralism, the failure adequately to consult, his denigra-
tion of the EC and the other multilateral institutions
(excepting NATO), and his determined advocacy of American
primacy not only increased the very real possibility of
fragmentation within Western Europe but also would - if
this fragmentation occurs - seriously damage the very fabric
of trans-Atlantic cooperation. It is difficult to see how.
in these circumstances. Britain could make a positive con-
tribution to overcoming the transnational problems that
afflict the nations of the North Atlantic basin.
Summary
In his writings on Britain Kissinger displayed sympathy
and understanding for Britain's plight. He was highly
critical of the insensitivity of American foreign policy,
particularly in the years before and after the Nassau Con-
ference. The preparation for the Conference itself and the
final agreement were all displeasing to Kissinger. He fore-
saw that, after the Conference prompted de Gaulle to reject
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bid to enter the EC, two competing concepts of
Atlantic partnership had emerged and that clashes between
these concepts could have the most serious cons equences for
Britain and Western Europe. But, despite these views
Kissinger's actual policies did not mitigate let alone re-
solve the breach between Britain and France. Britain's
hesitation and doubt concerning the EC reflect disagreements
among Western Europe's three major states over the policl
and objectives a united Western Europe would pursue. Whil,
Kissinger's rhetoric acknowledged the necessity for the
United States to accept short-term problems with the EC to
justify long-term benefits, all too often his unilateral
policies were designed to ensure American primacy. Thus
Kissinger's actions aided unilateralists in Britain, France
and West Germany.
In the seventies as pertains to Britain's relations
with the EC, its relations with France and West Germany, and
the relationship with the United States, there exists grounds
for concern. In these areas Kissinger's policies added to
the difficulties. A great statesman is one who has a vision
and transmits this vision to his people. Bismarck had such
a vision, so did de Gaulle, and though their tactics varied
their objectives were never in doubt; to place Germany and
France in the front ranks of nations. One cannot say the
same regarding Kissinger's vision concerning Britain and
Europe.
230
In a speech in London in December, 1 973 Kifi ,
"but 1p+ no i
f5t lsslnger said,Wi let us also remember that even the h +
ffiaftM
best consultative2*1m sub— - -on vision and share;603151
*
°"~t
«-— network of intangible
tlanu ^ especially ^^.^^
«t take care lest
, in defining £uropean ^
gallstic a manner, wp ino Q n,v, -u v.e e lose what has made our Alliance
unique
i that in the deene^t O o„c rP6S Sense Eur°P« and America do notthink of each other as foreign entities conducting tradi-
tional diplomacy, hut as members of a larger Canity en-
gaged, sometimes painfully but ultimately always coopera-
tively in a common enterprise."^1
The relationship between the United States and Britain
and the Western Europeans should be restructured to allow
the development of real partnership, to redefine relations
between a super-power and a number of medium and small
powers. To accomplish this task will be no easy matter.
It will require statesmanship of a very high order that
demonstrates consistency of purpose and moral acceptability.
In neither of these measures did Kissinger succeed regarding
Britain and Europe. He did not articulate and implement new
guidelines that would better serve the Anglo-American rela-
tionship in a period of pervasive change. Instead his po-
licies caused doubt, hesitation, and uncertainty, concerning
the relationship between the two countries. In many respects
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he appeared uncaring or oblivious to Britain's psychological
and political pli ght as the British ^ ^ ^^factory role in an often confusing ana harsh world
. Con.
sidering the brilliant and incisive nature of his scholarly
work. Kissinger's performance „as indeed a disappointing one
as regards Britain. But while Britain's railitary and eco-
nomic prestige have declined. Britain's political and moral
Prestige command widespread respect in the world, for who can
envision the alleviation of raany of the problems ^^
both Western Europe and mankind without a major contribution
by Britain? But Kissinger is no longer preoccupied with
Britain and Europe, as a statesman, his major efforts were
directed elsewhere.
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CHAPTER VIli
THE RECORD OF A SCHOLAR-STATESMAN
The relationship between the United q +c u x a States and WesternEurope is rapidly chan<rf„„ n
"a
ging. Common peroeptions and policiconcerns, the threat of Soviet power can no longer L
r
on either side
°
f the Atiantic
-
m
— -oiu.
^onary ehan.es in the world can cause differing peroeptiong
and responses. „ is a world where^ ^
curity raay be ^ reactions ^^^
not elioit oommon accords. Consequently the challenge for
the West is to accept diversity within a framework of
partnership. Kissinger frequently pointed to the dangers
of debilitating divisions in the West, asserting that in
order for Western values to survive in a revolutionary
world, the West would have to overcome its divisive schisms
and
-show the way to a new international order. -1 Thus
shared powers and responsibilities would be encouraged as
well as an increase in the power and authority of multi-
lateral and international institutions.
The failure to overcome these difficulties could have
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grave consequences as Peter Jay writes -Wh +^ at new order does
the United States offer the world? a„„ u7 And what great prin-
ciple or principles define legitimacy and guide American
involvement? Nineteen seventy-nine was the third year of
the Carter administration's effort to supply some answers
to the questions identified by Kissinger in 19 68 but there-
after almost wholly ignored in the Kissinger years." 2
Yet, what were the main characteristics of Nixon's and
Kissinger's foreign policy? Pierre Hassner writes "Henry
Kissinger sometimes uses a rhetoric of cooperative bi-
polarity, sometimes the rhetoric of a multipolar balance of
power, sometimes the rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter and of
free world unity reminiscent of the 19^0's and the 1950's,
sometimes the rhetoric of global interdependence and world
community. "3 He then writes "the goal of the Nixon-Kis-
singer administration was to keep as much of a central role
for the United States in world affairs as possible under new
conditions that require skilled diplomacy and bargaining." 4
Concerning the methods of Nixon's and Kissinger's for-
eign policy, Raymond Aron asks, "how is Nixon's policy dif-
ferent from his predecessors? First in the philosophy of
interstate relations and second in the situation itself,
hence a diplomacy which openly obeys the rules or customs of
Realoolitik or of power politics tries to build a world of
one partner-adversary (the USSR) and several partners, al-
lies or adversaries within the various subsystems."^ Given
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the unsavory views associated with tealviliMK among large
sections of the public in the United States and Western Eu-
rope, was it wise (or merely expedient) to follow such po-
licies?
However, there can be little doubt that from 1 969 to
1975. American foreign policy was characterized by a new
approach which specifically attempted to preserve a central
Place for the United States in the world. With the resigna-
tion of President Nixon in August, 1974, most of the pre-
viously noted aspects of E^gJLitiji became less apparent.
There were several reasons for this. The futility of Real-
BSlilik strategies with respect to Western Europe and Japan
were apparent. President Ford, though obviously influenced
by Kissinger, did not seem to be so enamoured of Realoolitik
as his predecessor. Finally, the new administration was in
delicate domestic circumstances, and international events,
too, discouraged Realnolitik .
Yet, the question remains, why did Nixon and Kissinger
practice their brand of Realnolitik ? Would the absence of
the Vietnam war have made any real difference in the conduct
of their diplomacy?
When the new administration assessed the situation in
1969, events seemed to require, as a top priority, the with-
drawal of the United States from Vietnam without being hu-
miliated, while ensuring the status quo. Concurrently a
strong diplomatic effort was launched to influence Hanoi's
supporters, the Soviet Union and China were to pressure
Hanoi to agree to maintain the division of Vietnam, and tolink the resolution of America
'
r „s dilemma m Vietnam with
progress on other bilato^oieral issues between the United States
and the Soviet Union and China.
Michael Brenner has noted that in the Nixon-Kissing
foreign policy view, the Soviet Union ^^ ^ ^
satisfied powers, ( 2 ) both these countries seek to nurture
the impression that the flow of history and the balance of
forces in the world is shifting in their favor, (3) hence
they try to expand their range of influence, (4) thus they
are prepared to make the maximum use of military force as
an instrument of coercion, intimidation and symbol of status
while exhibiting great restraint in its use (except in areas
such as Eastern Europe). "6 Brenner then places these views
on adversarial relations within the overall context of
Nixon's and Kissinger's world view for (l) "the world is
moving from a condition of bipolarity toward one of multi-
polarity (Japan, Western Europe and China will exercise
greater independence) hence diplomatic flexibility and op-
portunity for maneuver is one outcome and (2) despite the
qualification of bipolarity in these centrifugal develop-
ments, the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China (increasingly) will pre-
dominate and constitute one another's chief concern." 7
Nixon and Kissinger also greatly mistrusted or were
contemptuous of the State Department, Congress, and the
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bureaucracy while relying on a very small staff to carry out
their policies. Consequently, they became more isolated
domestically and their foreign policy (except for adver-
saries) often reflected an even greater degree of E^ppliii*.
In order to thoroughly understand Nixon's and Kissinger's
foreign policy and to discuss Kissinger's philosophy of
history, an overview of Kissinger's global statesmanship
would be useful.
Petftntpi The Soviet. Union pnH rnjt^
From 1969 perhaps Kissinger's chief priority was to
deepen and broaden detente with the Soviet Union and China.
Considering his interest in arms control and concern for the
nuclear arras race, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union
was the keystone for Nixon's and Kissinger's policies. In-
deed Lincoln Bloomfield "gives Nixon praise for the develop-
ment of a relationship with the Soviet Union (SALT, in-
creased trade relations, major outer space and scientific
cooperation)." 8 He then "praises Nixon-Kissinger Realpolitik
for going a good distance toward deideologizing our vitally
important state-to-state relations with the Soviets and
China."?
Moreover, as James P. Sewell writes, "few observers
would deny the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations have changed pro-
foundly in the last eight years. And some modification of
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the rest of the international constellation has resulted.
For this transformation, Kissinger is largely responsible. "^
But the question renins, does too great an emphasis upon
adversarial relations in a rapidly changing and dangerous
world not also pose dangers? Alastair Buchan is concerned
about this for "it is my own fear, which I think is shared
by both Europeans and Americans, that if the Vladivostok
Agreements cannot be translated into firm restraints on in-
novations and, indeed, into reductions of Soviet and Ameri-
can strategic weapons systems, the process of mutual deter-
rence may become so complex that it will become increasingly
accident-prone, difficult to comprehend or operate, and may
perpetuate an antagonism whose political motivation may
otherwise be ebbing."11 There is no question that Nixon and
Kissinger by enlarging upon the scope of detente and greatly
increasing the number of agreements with the Soviet Union
have indeed changed the character of relations between the
two superpowers.
But Buchan raises the question of balance with respect
to adversaries and allies, for he "recommends coalition (with
allies) and concert (with USSR) to be defined and emphasized
and give substance to concert in an increasingly fragmented,
disorderly and dangerous world. w1^
Will future events confirm the wisdom of the Nixon-
Kissinger views? Will the deepening of detente between the
two adversaries lead to arms control and then arms reduction?
240
Or will too much emphasis upon detente arouse too many un-
obtainable expectations? If neglect of America's alliance
relationships causes too many problems. America's political
and military commitment to the security of Western Europe
might be seriously eroded.
With respect to China. Nixon and Kissinger deserve high
praise for bringing to an end a situation that might have
proved increasingly dangerous. Diplomatic relations do not
guarantee peaceful relations between states. But the con-
tinued lack of contacts between the United States and China,
particularly in a crisis, might contribute to serious mis-
understandings between the two countries. Nixon was parti-
cularly anxious to bring China into world politics,^ how-
ever, certain actions undertaken during this period, from
the extraordinary concern for the impact of international
events on American domestic opinion to the failure to inform
the Japanese, were regrettable. These actions (except for
the failure to inform Tokyo of a change in America's China
policy) are not really important when compared to the utter
necessity of ending the twenty-year freeze on relations be-
tween the United States and China. Except for the mainte-
nance of China's territorial integrity, however, the United
States and China have few common interests.
Detente characterizes a mixed cooperative/adversarial
relationship with both the Soviet Union and China. But both
these countries, and in particular the Soviet Union, tend to
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em-
secure
view detente from a rather narrow perspective, the necessity
to avoid nuclear war, achieve arms control measures, and
Perhaps, cooperation on a few other issues. However, most
Americans have a much broader concept of detente which
bodies the previously mentioned areas and a desire to
acceptable Soviet behavior in the Third World, for example.
There is a difference in theoretical perspective herei the
American belief that international conflict (which may in-
volve coercion and the threat or the actual use of force)
is an aberration and unacceptable while to the Russians (and
Chinese), international conflict in its many manifestations
(not precluding the occasional use of force) is an accept-
able way to obtain their objectives.
Nixon and Kissinger attempted to influence Soviet policy
in one area in a desired direction by implying that progress
in another area was contingent upon acceptable Soviet be-
havior. But each administration must carefully establish the
limits of detente and in various circumstances.
Finally, in terms of his policies toward the Soviet Union
and China, Kissinger demonstrated consistency of purpose and
a concern for moral principles. It is probably only a
slight exaggeration to say that Kissinger believed that the
prospects for a third world war would depend on how the
United States managed its relationship with the Soviet Union.
Moreover, he had read de Tocqueville and wondered i could a
democratic state such as the United States maintain a
242
consistent, resolute policy towards the Soviet Union (ana
later China) that allows for both agreement on issues suoh
as SALT, and for disagreements, i.e.. Soviet policy in
Africa?
The Hunlear Bal^ r
cies
Kissinger's concern over Soviet (and Chinese) poli,
was complemented by his intense interest in strategic nu-
clear weapons. The arms race and arms control were of the
most serious concern. During his tenure in office much of
his attention was devoted to strategic nuclear weapons. The
first SALT agreement of May 1972 and the follow-up Vladi-
vostok Agreement of November 1974 were the first attempts
to place ceilings upon the strategic nuclear weapons pos-
sessed by each superpower. The agreements also represented
the American acceptance of nuclear parity with the Soviet
Union.
It is not my intent to analyze these agreements, but
there can be little doubt that both represent important
accomplishments. If mankind is ever to resolve the diffi-
cult and frightening problems raised by nuclear weapons,
both sides must be prepared to engage in a lengthy process
of negotiation. Nuclear parity must be the basis for
agreements that first set ceilings, then begin the actual
task of reducing the nuclear stockpiles of the superpowers.
Of course, other countries possessing nuclear weapons must
2^3
r nu-
eventually adhere to ^ ^ ^^^ ^
clear stockpiles. This win be a long. time-consuming pro-
cess. But Nixon ana Kissinger. building on their
sors- achievements, made the oontrol of the nuclear arms
race a keystone of their foreign policy. They also main-
tained the nuclear balance, which must be done concurrently
with attempts to limit, then eventually reduce nuclear wea-
pons stockpiles.
If in the next decade or two nuclear ceilings are firmly
set and nuclear stockpiles reduced, Nixon and Kissinger will
receive due credit for their vital contributions. But to
accomplish these two objectives, to maintain the nuclear
balance, and contend with the problem of proliferation will
be difficult. Moreover, how will tactical nuclear weapons
and conventional weapons be included in this process? And
can all of these issues be resolved within a framework that
places primary importance upon relations with adversaries
and secondary importance upon relations with allies? A be-
ginning has been made but it is still tentative, still
fragile, still very much subject to the destructive vicis-
situdes of politics.
However, Kissinger's policies with respect to the nu-
clear arms race were consistent with his ideas as a scholar.
The agreements in 1972 and 197^ presupposed a flexible di-
plomacy that also had consistency of purpose. Moreover,
Kissinger had always thought that in "the nuclear age, peace
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is a fundamental moral imperative."1^
While, in a personal sense, the Arab-Israeli dispute
was important for Kissinger, he has written very little on
the subject. However, during the October War in 1973, the
political and economic daggers became readily apparent. Not
only was the threat of superpower confrontation very real,
but the subsequent oil embargo and the quadrupling of the
price of oil posed a grave and unforeseen threat to the
world's political and economic order.
Kissinger's record with respect to the Middle East has
both negative and positive aspects. The outbreak of war in
October was. despite the buildup of serious tension, unex-
pected. Even if greater attention by Nixon and Kissinger
to the area's problems did not preclude the resumption of
conflict, at least the administration could have dealt with
the crisis, once it arrived, in a more systematic manner.
While war contains many imponderables, the ad Mc. manner in
which Nixon and Kissinger dealt with the repercussions of
the war on Western Europe (and Japan) was less than commend-
able. With respect to economic security it was evident that
in the event of an oil embargo Western Europe and Japan would
be placed in very vulnerable positions. Apparently Nixon and
Kissinger thought that it was not worthwhile to follow a
contingency plan, or if they had planned in advance, one can
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see very little evidence of this in-cm the way in which they
respond to Western Europe's ana Span's need fop^
supplies of oil. Consequently, the West Europeans were
Plaoeo in a difficult position by the African de.and for
support in their hour of need tv,« r-. The Europeans, and in parti-
cular the French, have not agreed with America's support
and arming of Israel, and yet they and NATO were expected
openly to support the American position in the Middle East.
With respect to energy, Kissinger also made a number of
miscalculations. He had always warned that threats to Amer-
ican security might not always be in an
-unambiguous form."
But when the oil embargo and subsequent quadrupling of the
price of oil occurred, Kissinger was as unprepared as every-
one else. Regrettably the parsimonious attitude of the ad-
ministration regarding the sharing of oil with its allies in
Western Europe and Japan was complemented by Kissinger's con-
frontation politics with Jobert over the founding of the IEA
and his rather abrasive behavior concerning the entire issue
of energy.
On the positive side Kissinger has to be given credit
for taking advantage of circumstances (Sadat's expelling the
Russians in 1972) and initiating a more even-handed American
policy in the Middle East, particularly after the October War.
He gave the Egyptians considerable economic aid; moreover,
his "shuttle diplomacy", after the war, stabilized the situ-
ation at least temporarily. The process of arriving at a
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just and lasting peace in the area proved to be more dif-
ficult than expected. In retrospect, it was too soon to
achieve an overall settlement. Even in l9 8l a comprehensive
settlement is not around the corner. But a general settle-
ment should be arrived at soon while specific details will
have to be resolved within this general framework. Nixon
and Kissinger have tried to ensure that American diplomacy
is more even-handed in the Middle East. The United States
can no longer unconditionally support just one country but
must be able to put pressure on or offer inducements to
Israel or Egypt (along with the other Arab states and the
Palestine Liberation Organization) as the situation demands.
Japan
Bruce Mazlish states that "all in all, Kissinger (like
Nixon) had no respect for the Japanese. At Harvard Kis-
singer was almost exclusively interested in Europe, past,
present, and future, and had little or no interest in Asia.
As a statesman, his relative indifference towards Japan con-
tinued and this was no secret in Tokyo where Kissinger was
mistrusted and disliked for his actions, particularly after
the surprise change in America's China policy in the summer
of 1971.
For a scholar particularly interested in philosophy of
history, Kissinger showed an acute ignorance of the impor-
tance of Japan in East Asia. The unilateral devaluations of
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the doUar in 19?1 ^ 19?3 surprisea ^ shQcked
" UnilatWal
— *— * China policyin ^he summer of 1971 Wa~ an ^ r „^-l w s even greater affront. Many
Japanese have not, prior to 1Q71 . .P 197I, agreed with America's
Chin, policy. But i„ deference to ^
leaders have eschewed almost all contact with China. How-
ever, there are few Japanese who would defend the wisdora of
tins policy, m making such an abrupt and unannounced change
x»
.America's China policy. Kissinger ignored the domestic
impact upon the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and interna-
tionally made it seem as though Japanese interests, on this
vital matter, were of little or no consequence to Washington.
Thus Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was subsequently eased out
of power and replaced by Kakuei Tanaka. who established di-
plomatic relations with China in September of I972.
But the damage had been done, and the Japanese never
trusted Kissinger again. The Japanese-American relationship
is vital for both countries and involves political, secur-
ity, and economic ties. If Japanese doubts were greatly to
increase because they no longer thought they could rely on
American military support and protection, can Japan's ex-
tensive rearming be precluded? Furthermore, there are
asymmetries between the two countries that are compounded by
cultural differences. The relationship with Japan must be
visualized in terms of a greater measure of partnership than
has previously been the case. The danger is that unilateral
2kS
policies such as Kissinger's om,^^ng s could eventually drain the
Japanese-American relationship of all substance.
Kissinger wrote with interest on the plight of the de-
veloping countries, however, this interest was not well re-
fleeted in his nolicip*? 16 op LlcleSt James Sewell writes; "in
practice, if not in precept, the Kissinger order relegated
the other foreign relations of the U.S. to subordinate
status. The past 8 years have brought contacts with na-
tions of Latin America. Asia, and Africa to a state of
greater friction than even the Johnson administration had
managed to achieve. «17
For Nixon and Kissinger regional disputes such as the
Indo-Pakistan War in 1971 had excessive importance with
respect to superpower relations. According to Bruce
Mazlish, "Kissinger is simply not attuned to the new world
of revolutionary political, social and economic developments
and aspirations. His long-range historical and strategic
understanding have been faulty. Mi8 One may not entirely
agree with these conclusions. But while Kissinger may have
further broadened America's ties with countries such as Iran
and, more temporarily, Pakistan, his interest in improving
the condition of the people of the Third World was never
really reflected in his policies. Certainly Kissinger was
aware of the political and moral dilemmas that the United
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States faced with respect to the Third World. However, it
is possible that he did not have the necessary time to de-
vote to this problem. Faced by so many real and potential
crises, it is understandable that statesmen in the seventies
simply cannot do everything. Nixon's and Kissinger's global
vision, for whatever reason, did not consider the Third
World countries to be of very great importance.
The Emerprpnnp of Economic Irrups
Both at Harvard and during his tenure in office, Kis-
singer did not have very much interest in or knowledge of
economics. From I969 to 1976, the American economy moved
from a position of hegemony to a position as first among
equals in the world. Needless to say the relative decline
of America's economic position during this period was often
accompanied by considerable strains that were also borne in
large measure by America's allies. For example, America's
failure to rectify its balance of payments deficit meant
that inflation was passed on to America's trading partners.
Moreover, as the dollar, still the world's trading cur-
rency, declined in value, the international economic system
was further weakened.
Theoretically and practically, Kissinger was unprepared
for these strains which were, of course, compounded by the
Vietnam war. Nixon and Kissinger must be given quite low
marks for the manner in which they handled the general
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situation. Unilateralism and the aggressive pursuit of the
national interest seemed to be. in most oases, the guiding
themes of their policies.
Wilfred Kohl writes, "the results of the August 13-U,
1971. Camp David meeting (to terminate converting dollars
to gold and the 10* import surcharge) was to inject suspi-
cion and tension such as had not existed for years in At-
lantic relations and from which we have still not re-
covered. m19 From monetary affairs to the halting of soya
exports and the energy crises, the record of Nixon and Kis-
singer with respect to economic issues is a very poor one.
Their attempts to link economic concessions from the West
Europeans (and Japan) with American political and military
commitments was highly resented in Europe and Japan. Once
again, as in the thirties when the United States failed to
grasp the necessity for exercising world economic leader-
ship, real leadership appeared to be lacking. There did not
seem to be any consistent policy. A mixture of contra-
dictory policies were followed that at times sounded the
litany of cooperation and at other times reflected the uni-
lateral pursuit of self-interest. Kissinger, in a recent
article, has stated that the restructuring of economic rela-
tionships is one of the most important challenges facing the
United States during the remainder of this century. 20 It is
regrettable that he did so little in this respect for it is
apparent that in the seventies, the focus will shift to
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economic needs wi tM^« +^hin the noncommunist world and these needs
will have to be met multilateral! v QO +umaxera ly as the unilateral role of
the United States declines. 21
The relationship between morality and foreign policy is
complicated and often ambiguous. For Americans the degree
of morality in foreign policy has been the occasion for con-
siderable conflict. Idealists and realists have argued and
disagreed for decades over this complex relationship. My
concern here is not to analyze every aspect of Kissinger's
policies regarding their moral content. Rather I am con-
cerned with the moral legacy Nixon and Kissinger left the
American people. To what extent, for example, should the
United States support dictatorships that ignore or actively
oppress their citizens' rights and liberties?
Michael Brenner writes that, "the most distinctive dif-
ference between the Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon periods is the
diminution of ideological zeal for the need for an American
liberal mission to assist activity (though tailored to cir-
cumstances) in the nurturing of democratic societies." 22
This development was almost inevitable as the world becomes
more multicultural. American foreign policy has inflicted
great damage upon other societies when it has insisted that
they live up to or achieve the standards of a democratic
society such as the United States. Regarding the "liberal
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mission" or the United States, a better balance should be
struck than in the past. The desirability of civilized
virtues is apparent and ye t the outright imposition of one
people's views upon another must be avoided.
Kissinger has stated that in the nuclear age "peace is
a fundamental moral imperative."^ Moreover, he maintains
that "the ultimate test of morality in foreign policy is not
only the values we proclaim but what we are willing and able
to implement. "2^ Thus Kissinger is indeed responsive to the
moral obligations of the state in the 1970' s. But he re-
cognizes that circumstances may compel action by the states-
man that may transgress moral principles. For not only must
a statesman ensure the security of the state but he must
also reckon with the consequences for the entire system if
a key state loses its stability.
Consequently, these statements on moral purpose do not
conflict with the Nixon-Kissinger power-realist approach
even though their approach may, at times, be indifferent to
the Third World and the handling of Alliance relationships.
Of course, the historic relevance of the balance-of-power
approach to world politics in the seventies can be ques-
tioned. 2^
Anthony Hartley has noted that, "relations with allies
are one of the most difficult problems for the Nixon-
Kissinger foreign policy, it is contrary to moral neutral-
ity and the need to maneuver diplomatically." 2^ Moreover,
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Hartley Eays that> ..Kissinger . s ^^^^ moved ^_
ther towards moral neutrality." 27
Yet tension has developed between the tenets of the
N.xon-Kissinger world view and the importance of morality
in their policies. This tension Wag never ^
policies with respect to detente and the removal of the
threat of general and nuclear war reflected a high degree of
moral purpose. Yet many of their other actions showed a
lack of moral principle.™ However, if the SALT negotia-
tions are successful in reducing the peril of nuclear war.
then Nixon and Kissinger will he praised for their concern
for the greatest moral issue of the era. the necessity to
avoid nuclear war.
But aside from their concern with this issue what
moral legacy have Nixon and Kissinger left for the short-
term? Here the record is much more ambiguous and, perhaps,
negative in some respects. Unilateralism and the aggres-
sive pursuit of the national interest are dangerous pre-
cedents. Yet it depends on how far these policies are car-
ried and under what circumstances. Undeniably the crisis
over Vietnam was of the most serious order and centraliza-
tion of decision-making in the White House was probably in-
evitable. Indeed, since the Continental Congress directed
the Revolutionary War, every conflict has resulted in a
concentration of power in the executive branch for the dur-
ation of the crisis. Furthermore, while one may disagree
lese
es
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with many aspects of Nixon's and Kissinger's policy in Viet-
nam, a definitive evaluation of their policies is still not
possible. Even now, let alone in the 1970's, it is a sup-
position that is still unproven that the North Vietnam,
would have been amenable to different American polici,
(that stressed less bombing of North Vietnam, for example).
Perhaps Hanoi would have come to terms sooner, perhaps not.
Yet, while one can, of course, question Kissinger's tactics
in Vietnam, he is entirely correct in appreciating that the
United States could not suffer a complete humiliation in
Vietnam. What effects would a debacle have had upon America
domestically and its international obligations? Of course
in the end Saigon fell and the United States did not escape
humiliation. But would those who urged a complete American
withdrawal in the late 1960's and early 1970's have ensured
the complete humiliation of the United States without suf-
ficient regard for the domestic and international conse-
quences? The question that will engage historians in the
future is » was there a middle way? Did Kissinger remain in
Vietnam too long? Would most of his critics have departed
too rapidly with little or no regard for the consequences?
However, Nixon and Kissinger failed to overcome or re-
solve the tension between their balance-of-power approach to
world politics which involves secrecy* bargaining, and the
need to maneuver with the need to consult and to engage in
cooperative ventures. Paul Seabury has written that, "in
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more recent ti.es our most effective action in international
politics has invariably occurred only when the United States
acted in close concert with many others. If this is true,
future American action abroad should be grounded in broad
'
coalitions. This need for multilateral legitimation is not
without risk. Yet the test of future American policy will
be our success in encouraging indigenous coalitions to keep
the peace and assure their own defense.
"
2? Finally, their
alleged involvement in Chile (through the CIA), their friend-
ships with dictators such as the Shah of Iran, and their
acquiescence in the slaughter of Bengalis by the Pakistanis,
all seemed to indicate a curious moral lassitude.
In the seventies there is a growing (though not new) de-
sire to seek to limit, and certainly not to condone, the use
of force in international relations. This is particularly
true as regards a superpower, such as the United States, and
a smaller, weaker country. But this moral and philosophical
revulsion against the use of military force in international
relations is still ambivalent and inchoate in many respects.
Witness the presence of Cuban troops in sub-Saharan Africa
which elicits little if any protest from Third World Coun-
tries.
With respect to the avoidance of nuclear war, Kis-
singer's policies were consistent with his previously elu-
cidated political and moral views. However, in pursuit of
this objective, was he inclined to deal too quietly with
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atrocities such as occurred in Bangiadesh? Kis si„ger . s re-
cord concerning morality in foreign policy has elements of
-biguity but then perhaps that reflects the real nature of
politics which onlv rarplv +±y e y permits sharply defined moral
positions.
Kissinger PMJlaasBhy of m«±nTY
It is apparent when considering Kissinger's work as a
scholar on Western Europe and his subsequent policies that a
considerable divergence exists. Of course to know is not
necessarily to do. Some divergence, some modifications in
Kissinger's policies were bound to occur. However, as I
have indicated, in some respects the difference between the
ideas of the scholar and the policies of the statesman was
striking. What can account for this difference?
Kissinger's primary objectives were focused upon the
avoidance of nuclear war. Consequently the relationship
with the Soviet Union had absolute priority over all other
concerns. His concerns with the decline of the Western
Alliance and the emergence of new centers of power were
secondary considerations. Kissinger's was basically a con-
servative philosophy of history in that while recognizing
the revolutionary nature of the present period, he placed
the highest importance upon Soviet-American relations.
Despite his criticisms of both Metternich^0 and Bismarck^1
,
Kissinger's philosophy of history was similar to both these
25?
statesmen in terms of his preoccupation with stability. A
further characteristic all three statesmen had was their
belief in the essentially fragile nature of their state's
political order. Yet, was this really true of the United
States? Thus Kissinger's concern with stability - apparent
in his work as a scholar - became a virtual preoccupation,
often to the exclusion of other problems, when he was a
statesman.
Basically Kissinger envisaged a world in which two
great states had the primary responsibility for world peace.
Thus the highest value was placed upon the stability of
bath, the United States and the Soviet Union. If domestic
or international problems were severely to effect the sta-
bility of either state, the result could, in the nuclear age,
perhaps make a global conflict inevitable. This is (one
reason) why in the 1950 's Kissinger was so opposed to Com-
munism. For Communism necessitates a revolution that, in
the nuclear age, may be the prelude to disaster. Conse-
quently, Kissinger greatly feared that the adverse repercus-
sions of the Vietnam war might imperil America's ability to
maintain the nuclear balance.
The other states would assume tasks and responsibili-
ties that were commensurate with their capabilities. Kis-
singer worried, however, that the West Europeans and Japanese
were becoming too dependent on the United States, so he
sought to prod these countries into assuming increased
258
responsibilities. He has written that "for the future the
most profound challenge to American policy will be phil-
osophical, to develop some concept of order in a world
which is bipolar militarily but multipolar politically. "32
Consequently Kissinger envisaged a hierarchical world
in which the primary responsibility for world peace would
rest with the two greatest powers while lesser states would
assume responsibility for secondary, but still important,
issues. Stanley Hoffmann writes, "insofar as there was a
new policy in behalf of the old goals, it amounted to a
multiple demotion of the alliances, which resulted partly
from the new ordering of priorities. The top of the agenda
was now occupied by the search for the 'stable structure'
and the new triangular relationship. "33 j would differ y;ith
Hoffmann only to the extent that I believe that Kissinger
placed somewhat more emphasis upon the Soviet Union and
somewhat less upon China. But these are not decisive con-
siderations. As Hoffmann writes, "the triangular relation-
ship was seen as more than central to international poli-
tics i it was thought commanding. "3^
There are, of course, great risks in Kissinger's
vision for, as Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the German
Federal Republic, states, "let me say once again that
leadership from the U.S. - financial, commercial, monetary,
political - is sorely needed. But the lack of an American
response following the fivefold increase in oil prices, and
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the inability even to live im tn +v,Up 0 the Promises and obliga-
tions which had been undertaken.
.. .have contributed sig-
nificantly to the threat of a world depression. '** Thus
one can question whether, in this multifaceted and complex
world, an approach that places too much emphasis on adver-
sarial relations and too little on relations with allies
is, in the long-run, really adequate. Moreover, what
priority would other outstanding global issues receive, few
of which can be resolved by only the superpowers or the
West?
However, when Kissinger joined the Nixon administration
in 1969 he had a long association with many of the nations'
political and military elite. Far more than most academics,
he had gained considerable knowledge from those who had ex-
ercised power. Therefore, he was, prior to his tenure in
office, more knowledgeable concerning the complexities in-
herent in both the academic world and the world of practical
experience. He was also aware of the need to modify his per-
spectives. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, diplomacy, (with
the potential for the occasional use of force) an awareness
of tragedy, and the political and moral necessity for peace
in the nuclear age are enduring attributes of his per-
spectives on international relations. Yet, Kissinger be-
lieves quite strongly in the ability of mankind to influence
its destiny in the Twentieth Century. Concerning the dis-
agreements of the West with the rifts in the Communist world,
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he writes.
"free from the shackles „f .
ZT lneV— «- -ions of the West _great service by demonstrating that wh* +whatever meaning historyhas is derived from the convictions =nrfCTl ^ Purpose of the gen-eration which shapes it. "36 6
Moreover, as Stephen Graubard writes, "to Kissinger
statesmanship was a Twentieth Century possibility. The
statesman's talents were mainly psychological, he had to
estimate the objectives of societies different from his own
he had to be able to judge correctly the real relationship
of forces, he had to possess a vision and know how to trans-
late that vision into reality. "37 Therefore( ^ ^^
a statesman. Kissinger was prepared as few others for that
Despite his occasional Spenglerian remarks Kissinger's
Philosophy of history was not rooted in the conviction that
vast social and political forces would, regardless of man-
kinds' efforts, overwhelm all efforts to control them. On
the contrary great men could, if possessed of an adequate
vision, shape their world and exert some degree of control
over social and political forces. Kissinger, then, had a
rather activist philosophy of history that assumed that man-
kind was capable of determining its own fate provided that
its leaders possessed adequate intellectual convictions and
the courage to act upon those convictions. While he was no
believer in the eventual arrival of the millennium, he did
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believe that a reasonably just world, free of the .» j-j-ee 01 xn scourcp of
war. oould be attained if mankind wag
, _
d3 equal to the many ob-
stacles that must be overcome.
By 1969 international changes clearly signaled the be-ginning of the den,ise of the post war era. Econonic issues
nad become a major source of contention in the trans-Atlantio
relationship. As a result of these
to international cooperation was on the increase in Western
Europe and the United States. International cooperation was
politically difficult i -p *y Q nicult, if not impossible, to achieve on some
issues and this general situation was exacerbated by the oil
crisis of 1973
.
But, as Klaus Knorr states, "international
conflicts do not turn more now on economic issues than in
the 1920.
s
or 1930- s, also interstate conflicts over economic
issues are not necessarily conflicts over economic values
(i.e. France and the U.S.). "38
In Western Europe disagreements continued between na-
tionalists and those who hoped that the EC could transcend
the differences between the states and make Brussels the
focus for the new Europe. But from the late sixties a seri-
ous malaise, a sense of drift had settled over Western Eu-
rope. There was hesitation and doubt over how Europe's
problems could best be resolved, as George Kennan writes,
"the West Europeans are worried not so much about external
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power and pressure but to internal w« uweakness - to the lack of
vigor in ones own civilization. "39
Thus it would see, proper at this Juncture to briefly
summarize the record of Henry Kissinger in a difficult and
very challenging decade. His major accompli shunts include,
-
the improvement of detente, progress in the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), re-
ducing the danger of nuclear war between the
two superpowers-still the primary problem of
each superpower and the foremost danger that
threatens mankind?
- establishment of contacts with China that broke
a twenty-year hiatus in relations between the
two countries?
- the increased involvement of the United States
in the Middle East on both sides and America's
emergence as the single most influential power
in the area;
- the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam
without causing irreparable domestic and in-
ternational losses.
The other side of the ledger shows rather significant
defects
i
- the excessively delayed withdrawal of American
forces from Vietnam, which did considerable
damage to the institution of the Presidency
and caused a domestic crisis of the most
serious order-whose full consequences are
still not completely clarified-diverting
attention from other, even more serious
concerns of foreign policy such as the
Middle East;
-
the excessively fluctuating relationships
with Western Europe, particularly the Euro-
pean Community, which generally had a nega-
tive impact on both sides of the Atlantic
and seriously damaged the concept and fabric
of trans-Atlantic partnership?
the inept conduct with respect to Japan;
a key country in an area of utmost concern
to the United States;
excessive concern for adversaries in con-
trast to the relative indifference toward
America's allies;
the signal failure to alert and educate the
American public to the threats posed by a
broad range of environmental issues (in
particular, energy) in world politics;
the failure to educate the American public
concerning the international problems faced
by the United States and to transmit to the
public adequate guides for the future conduct
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of the United States in world politics.
This is a list of impressive accompli shments and important
failures. Will future assessInents dWeU as^ ^ ^
failures as Kissinger's contemporaries have done? Or will
Kissinger's failures recede into the background. as Church-
Hi's often mistaken strategies of World War II receded in
the light of his accomplishments? Ultimately, this remains
the task of future generations, who will De in a position
to judge more accurately the consequences of accomplishments
and omissions that, from our perspective, appear blurred or
fragmented. However, given recognized limitations, the con-
temporary analyst is also obligated to make judgments. What
can be said of the record of Henry Kissinger and the rela-
tionship between the realm of the scholar and the realm of
the statesman.
As the Soviet threat - though still potent - has become
more ambiguous, as other problems (such as energy) have
emerged, and the Western European states have gained poli-
tical stability and confidence, common responses to these
problems have become more difficult. Moreover American
foreign policy has undergone a change as John Campbell
writes, "military and intelligence officials are heavily
represented on nearly every committee, symbolizing an im-
portant shift that has gradually occurred in American per-
ceptions of the outside world i national security, a con-
ception of permanent crisis, has displaced foreign policy,
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a more generalized no-H™ «-r +vtion of the more peaceful and only
,
casionally violent ebbs and flows ofu IJ- international politi
and national interests.
Kissinger was well aware of the constraints domestic
structures impose upon the foreign policies of democracies *
Yet perhaps his gravest error in transatlantic relations was
his failure to educate and engage public opinion. His uni-
lateral policies, ignoring or denigrating multilateral in-
stitutions, abrupt power plays and his pursuit of American
primacy did not arouse the enthusiasm or encourage the com-
mitment of the public, on either side of the Atlantic, to-
wards the goal of infusing the Atlantic Alliance with a new
sense of purpose, a renewed commitment to develop a new
principle or principles to govern their relations.
The concerns of the Western Europeans are discussed by
Fritz Stern, "It is not only Helmut Schmidt who is outraged
by what - in his milder moments - he calls America's abdica-
tion of fiscal leadership or responsibility. The United
States, once the pillar of the postwar economic order, is
now viewed as its disrupter, pursuing policies inimical to
itself and to its allies." 2*2
Yet in White House Years » Kissinger reiterated his pre-
viously stated views that (particularly as regards Western
Europe and Japan) "A world of more centers of decision, I
believed, was fully compatible with our interests as well as
our ideals. H ^3 Given the tumultuous events of the late
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I960 s and early l970 . s md the increaged self.absorption ^
the West Europeans in defining and clarifying their own re-
lationships Kissinger, of course, cannot he blamed for all
of the problems of the Atlantic Alliance Y.t * +. ,J-La
« *e , by the 1970's
relations with Amerim' R *a ica s most important allies were enter-
ing a state of crisis. Alastair Buchan has written,
-j do
not believe that the European-American (or the Japanese-
American) relationship contains the seed of inevitable de-
mise but I do believe that, by a series of careless actions
on all sides, both relationships could become so hollow that
it would only take an incident to make them seem no longer
worth sustaining. «<* m addition, both Nixon and Kissinger
mistrusted and disliked working with cumbersome, inefficient
bureaucracies and their representatives. Close relations
with Western Europe (and Japan) would mean a great deal of
this type of contact. Moreover Nixon and Kissinger both had
a predilection for the "great statesman" (their mutual ad-
miration for de Gaulle) of an essentially conservative cast.
Given their love of the "grand stage" and their own essen-
tially conservative philosophy, is it really credible that,
as a statesman, Kissinger would have tolerated a serious di-
lution of his power? For the reasons previously cited, dur-
ing the period from 1969 to 1975, alternative policies were
precluded by the desire to maintain American primacy.
The Nixon-Kissinger legacy with respect to Western Eu-
rope and Japan should be a major concern of the present
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administration. The possible fragmentation and weakening of
Western Europe and Japan could have the most adverse effects
on world politics for, to quote Alastair Buchan, "it has been
the West that has been the cradle of political ideas, in-
cluding Marxism, and seems likely to remain so. However
great the power of Russia, however fine and fair the civili-
zation of China or of India, however just the claims of the
developing countries, if the springs of political improvisa-
tion in the West dry up, then the new agenda of world poli-
tics will be a barren one."^
However, Kissinger's policies toward the Soviet Union
and China were consistent and displayed a recognition of the
highest moral imperative of the nuclear age. He also hoped
to encourage greater East-West cooperation which in turn
might help to promote a greater measure of international
cooperation in a badly fragmented world. For each statesman
must have a vision and act to implement that vision. And it
is in the nature of politics that sharply defined moral po-
sitions rarely indicate precisely what measures are neces-
sary to rectify the situation. All agree on the necessity
to prevent nuclear war but few agree on precisely how this
can be accomplished.
What, then, can be said of Henry Kissinger? In one of
the best analyses to appear thus far, Stanley Hoffmann com-
ments upon Kissinger's resilience and flexibility "in East-
West relations, he reshaped his theory and consequently
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restored the priority of Alliance relation,
.
s, as was shown bythe various moves toward -H^+tighter economic cooperation (at
summits or at OECD), by closer mili-hy litary coordination with
^apan. by a new emphasis on ^ ^ ^^identity and collaboratio„ with other nations who share ^
values."" This CQincides ^ obseryations throughQut
this paper that from 1969 to 1971 and from l975 to 19?6
Kissinger sought a more cooperative relationship with Amer-
ica's allies (or at least the policies of fc^lBelilik were
not quite so apparent). But Hoffmann is. though sometimes
ambivalent, basically critical of the Kissinger legacy for
"whereas Metternich's foreign policy was dictated by his
concern for Austria's vulnerability. Kissinger was a prac-
titioner of the primacy of foreign policy. But one can say
of him what he said of Castlereagh. his own country de-
feated him. His policy has turned out to be simultaneously
too complex in execution for the domestic forces whose sup-
port he needed, and too simple in design for the present-day
world, despite its being far more subtle than the earlier
simplicities of containment. "^7
There is considerable merit in Hoffmann's statement.
V/ill history's verdict be more favorable than Hoffmann's?
Perhaps, perhaps not. Nixon and Kissinger did seriously mis-
judge the domestic repercussions of their foreign policy.
In the end the path led from Vietnam to Watergate! and the
loss of the Presidency for Richard Nixon. Moreover, by
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emphasizing extensive military operating „aeratio s and complex diplo-
matic maneuvers, thev fanri <
d - . + ,
^ ^d thelr P^ecessors) policies haveefinitely exacerbated forces who,. *si se final outcome cannot bepredicted (the revolutionary chances thn+n g at occurred in Amer-lean society during the late 196o . s were ^^ ^ ^
were greatly intensified due to Nixon's and Kissinger's po-
licies in Vietnam). The insistence Qf ^ ^
challenging (and even defying) presidential prerogatiyes ^
foreign policy, the disenchantment of the intellectuals and
the public with rational processes and the denegration of
the life of the mind, and the resurgence of parochialism in
the United States that extends over the entire country and
embraces every group including, most seriously, the intel-
lectuals. The final outcome of these trends, reflected in
Europe as well, shall probably have a major influence in de-
termining the emerging structure of world politics.
The attendant demoralization and confusion afflicting
intellectuals is most serious. The methods that both
Presidents Johnson and Nixon used to resolve their diplo-
matic dilemmas (and their failure adequately to explain and
educate the public concerning their policies) have decimated
and confused the intellectuals and the public alike as con-
cerns both the present and future directions of American
foreign policy. S. Frederick Starr, secretary of the Kennan
Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, has called for "greatly
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increased attention to fnr^i ™ i0 foreign-language study at the pre-
university level. w« ^+y He noted that the proportion of Amer-
ican secondary-school students sturivWi dying a modern foreign
language in the mid-1970
's - *hm,+ i <±y(v about 16 percent - was no
greater than in the 1890-s. According to Richard Brod. di-
rector of foreign language programs at the Modern Language
Association,
"Nationwide. Ru^ian i, ve
'
ssia is becoming an exotic lan-
guage and that shouldn't be allowed to happen." ^9 At a
time when politically and economically the United States is
becoming more interdependent with and dependent upon the
rest of the world, these figures indicate an alarming de-
gree of parochialism.
However, it will not be easy to determine the legacy
of Henry Kissinger, the statesman. Undeniably Kissinger
faced serious obstacles, both in the domestic situation and
the international realm; however, his tactics and his
strategy were, in certain respects, questionable. His
gravest error was his preoccupation with Vietnam. He ex-
aggerated or placed too much emphasis upon possible catas-
trophe in Vietnam and the linkage with America's ability to
maintain the nuclear balance. This is not to say that his
critics were entirely correct, but to a greater extent than
should have been the case, the war in Vietnam dominated
Kissinger's concerns to the detriment of developing dangers
in the Middle East and the erosion of relations with Western
Europe and Japan? the general neglect of the Third World and
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his failure to impart to •P the public a greater understanding
of the challenges America must face in the conduct of its
foreign policy. In other areas Kissinger has earned a
greater measure of success, however, a long-term perspective
is necessary to finally determine his place in history.
What, then, can be said of the relationship between the
scholar and the statesman. The scholar searches for final
solutions, however, the statesman knows that few solutions
are final. As Harrison Salisbury writes "The academic mind
is trained at problem-solving, at presenting finite solu-
tions to finite problems. Politics is the art of the in-
definite. Its best practitioners know that no real-life
problem can be neatly or permanently solved on squared
paper. They understand that all questions - war. peace
foreign policy, domestic policy - are in the end constitu-
ency problems, issues of give and take, of fudgy language
and accommodation. "50 There are additional differ_
ences between the two, for as Kissinger has written, "the
most difficult, indeed tragic, aspect of foreign policy is
how to deal with the problem of conjecture. When the scope
for action is greatest, knowledge on which to base such ac-
tion is small or ambiguous. When knowledge becomes avail-
able, the ability to affect events is usually at a minimum. "-51
Moreover, the demise of the post-war era has compounded the
problems of the statesman for "the conjectural element of
foreign policy - the need to gear actions to an assessment
2?2
er
le-
on
that cannot be proven true when it is made - i« «j-b a - s never more
crucial than in a revolutionary period. Then, the old ord
is obviously disintegrating while the shape of its repl
Tnent is highly uncertain. Everything depends, therefore,
some conception of the future. But varying domestic struc-
tures can easily produce different assessments of the sig-
nificance of existing trends and. more importantly, clashing
criteria for resolving these differences. This is the di-
lemma of our time. "52 „ is the^ ^ ^
objective reality and subjective interpretation, that dif-
ferentiate the world of the scholar from the world of the
statesman.
Thus the connection between the world of the scholar
(the realm of ideas) and the world of the statesman (the
realm of practical solutions), the theme of this paper, is
best characterized by the term interdependence. The rela-
tionship between the world of the scholar and that of the
statesman is basically analogous to the relationship be-
tween intellect and intelligence. As Richard Hofstadter
writes "Intellect, on the other hand, is the critical,
creative, and contemplative side of mind. Whereas intelli-
gence seeks to grasp, manipulate, re-order, adjust, intel-
lect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes,
imagines. Intelligence will seize the immediate meaning in
a situation and evaluate it. Intellect evaluates evalua-
tions, and looks for the meanings of situations as a whole.
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Intelligence can be praised as a ^ ^lect, being a uni que manifestation of human dignity, i s
both poised and assailed as a quality in Wl When the
difference is so defined, it oeco.es easier to understand
why we sorneti.es say that a mind of admittedly penetrating
intelligence is relatively unintellectual, and why, by the
same token, we see among minds that are unmistakably intel-
lectual a considerable range of intelligence."^
However, the scholars ideas can be too abstract. Thus
Raymond Aron has written, "By devising a multiplicity of
schemata and models, the self-styled scientific study of
inter-state relations has often contributed to the decline
of the art of analysis rather than to the training of
minds. Consequently, scholars (particularly in the
Social Sciences) have paid insufficient attention as to how
their ideas can be implemented. Conversely American States-
men have too often neglected the vital role that theory can
have in directing policy? they have concentrated too much
upon the implementation of ideas that were theoretically in-
adequate. Thus policies that were successfully implemented
were often found to be inadequate. Theory must identify and
analyze the problem, it must provide direction, but theory
must also recognize that implementation is necessary if the
problem or difficulty is to be resolved. In this manner the
realm of ideas and the realm of practical solutions demon-
strate both their interdependence and their differences.
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However, excessive abstraction and inadequate concret,
application are accompanied by a third maoor difficulty,
that of professionalised knowledge. The serious nature of
these problem (and some of the reasons for the present
malaise) are discussed at length by Alfred North Whitehead
who has written thatt
is th^L^overy
6
^ £%JZ?$%&-%S
™
?es S!o^ali^nro?Ten? e, 0f the SUCCess of ^ Pro-f sionalising of knowledge, there are two ooint^ tnbe kept m mind, which differentiate our present a*efrom the past. In the first place, the rate ofprogress is such that an individual hu^aS being, ofordinary length of life, will be called upon t? face
r^Uatl °nS ^ich find no Parallel in his past?
^ fifed person for th* fixed duties, who in older
-
eS/aS SUChT a g°ds^d, in the future will bea public danger.
,
In the second place, the modernprofessionalism m knowledge works in the oppositedirection so far as the intellectual sphere is con-cerned. The modern chemist is likely to be weak in
zoology, weaker still in his general knowledge ofthe Elizabethan drama, and completely ignorant ofthe> principles of rhythm in English versification,it is probably safe to ignore his knowledge of an-
cient history. Of course I am speaking of general
tendencies? for chemists are no worse than engineers,
or mathematicians, or classical scholars. Effective
knowledge is professionalised knowledge, supported
by a restricted acquaintance with useful subjects
subservient to it.
This situation has its dangers. It produces
minds in a groove. Each profession makes progress,
but it is^ progress in its own groove. Now to be
mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a
given^ set of abstractions. The groove prevents
straying across country, and the abstraction ab-
stracts from something to which no further atten-
tion is paid. But there is no groove of abstrac-
tions which is adequate for the comprehension of
human life.""
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statesmen and relatively -rcu u few men of exeat jyit.n * ,
.
ferea intellectual abil-
* ave pretty in . practical sense^^
capaMHties inmates that there are ^ thesg
realms. Yet at times a person ^^ ^^ ^
does transcend these barriers T p t>< J
'
B
* Bury writes of a
great statesman and conqueror of long agoi
fluence on the cou?sp It ^appreciable in-
dent has diverted lit vl±ZTf%i^ n° SUCh ?cci "festly and utterly as thp Lily, I ^ 50 mani "
only been begun. Many^ A^pSftiSS ^transformation of his Asiatic empire had beefini-tiated,— plans which reveal his orifH nJH ill
conception, his breadth of grasp (sif )
f
hold of facts, his faculty for organisation HEwonderful brain-power, - but allele schemedand lines of policy needed still many years ofdevelopment under the master's shaping and hid-ing hand The unity of the realm/whicfwafanessential part of Alexander's conception, disap-peared upon his death. The empire was broken upamong a number of hard-headed Macedonians,' capable
f^Ll nr i£al/Ul!rS ! but ^ithout the higher qual-ities of the founder's genius. They maintainedthe tolerant Hellenism which he had initiated, —his lessons had not been lost upon themj and thushis work was not futile; the toils of even thosetwelve marvellous years amoothed the path forRoman sway in the East, and prepared the groundfor ohe spread of an universal religion. "5o
However, a person of Alexander's capabilities appears
only once in an age, a statesman like Churchill appears once
in a century. In the modern era (except for occasional
flashes of brilliance) the capabilities of leaders often
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barely exceed a level of basic competence. Yet the rapi(J
rate of change and the turbulence of the international realm
.n the modern era confront statesmen with unprecedented prob-
lems. Expert opinion may be divided or problems may appear
that are insoluable.
Therefore. Kissinger found that, given his diplomatic
priorities, most of his ideas concerning the development of
a more mature partnership with Western Europe, were often
very difficult to even tolerate let alone implement. Thus
statesmanship (the realm of practical solutions) won out
over scholarship (the realm of ideas) in this case. Yet
what general lesson can be learned from a study of Kis-
singer as a scholar-statesman that can be of value in the
conduct of American foreign policy? No matter how care-
fully crafted, ideas represent finite, abstract solutions
that require implementation in an environment that is
characterized by an absence of final solutions. In these
circumstances a quest for dogmatic certitude is a recipe
that will probably end in catastrophe. Increased know-
ledge is of great value and yet in the statesman's realm
there is an irreducible aspect that does not yield to
rational analysis. In an age and a society often preoc-
cupied by the search for rational solutions, it is vital to
understand both the possibilities for and the limitations
upon ideas and reason in the international realm. It is
the awesome responsibility of the statesman to correctly
judge the path his nation must take for his In*-<nve l n ideas may lead
to disaster or they may change the course of history. Con-
secuently. the successful statesman leaves hehind an endur-
ing legacy which demonstrates that he has understood the
connection, the interdependence, between the worlds of the
scholar (the realm of ideas) anH +h Q ^+ *.; 3X1(1 the statesman (the realm
of practical solutions).
In a situation characterized by unprecedented social,
economic, and political changes on a global scale, where
both ancient problems (war) and new problems (environ-
mental, the destruction of the rain forests) threaten the
state, where nationalism is a vital political force for some
and dilution of sovereignty a reality for others, the poten-
tial exists for both leaders and the public alike to take
refuge in simplistic solutions and bellicose rhetoric. No-
where is this tendency more pronounced than in the United
States. In a brilliant essay Kissinger writes, "In a so-
ciety that has prided itself on its "business" character,
it is inevitable that the qualities which are most esteemed
in civilian pursuits should also be generally rewarded by
high public office. As a result, the typical cabinet or
sub-cabinet officer in America comes either from business or
from the legal profession. But very little in the experi-
ence that forms these men produces the combination of po-
litical acumen, conceptual skill, persuasive power, and sub-
stantive knowledge required for the highest positions of
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government. "57
What is occurring in the United States is a dangerous
widening of the gap between intellect and policy or to put
it another way, between the policymaker and the intellectual.
Thus, in recent decades, we witness the rise of the national
security state, the increasingly beseiged and beleagured at-
titude of both leaders and the public with respect to world
politics. Yet what can be done? Again we turn to Kissinger.
"The solution is not to turn philosophers into kings or kings
into philosophers. But it is essential that our most eminent
men in all fields overcome the approach to national issu
an extra-curricular activity that does not touch the core of
their concerns. The future course of our society is not
matter to be charted administratively. »5Q A partial soluti
to this dilemma. Kissinger continues, is that "A way must be
found to enable our ablest people to deal with problems of
policy and to perform national service in their formative
years. This is a challenge to our educational system, to the
big administrative hierarchies, as well as to national po-
licy."^
For American statesmen, the intellectuals, and the pub-
lic, the trials of the past ten years reflect the participa-
tion of the United States in world politics. As Raymond
Aron writes, "It appears as if the intellectuals, academics,
and journalists have not yet accepted the fact that it is
entirely ' normal 1 for the American republic to participate
les as
(
a
' on
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s
in the play or inter-state relations. In their revision
fro. the horrors and absurdities of the Vietnam War they have
conjured up, in order to rationalize their detachment from
the outside world, an imaginary picture of spheres of influ-
ence stabilized once and for all, a Soviet Union permanently
satisfied with the status quo, Japan and Europe already great
Powers, and an armed force never to be used again. Some of
them reconstruct an imaginary history in which the United
States is supposed to have provoked Stalin, while others at-
tribute urban decay, crime, racial tension, and all the ill
with which American society is manifestly afflicted to th
cost of exercising power. «6o The Americans should learn that
the United States, despite its triumphs and tribulations, is
now unquestionably a part of the inter-state system.
The United States can, within the limitations imposed by
its political system, provide important leadership in the
world community. In the waning decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, the necessity of resolving international political,
economic, and environmental problems will become paramount
if a more just and orderly world community is, eventually, to
be constructed. The necessity of international cooperation,
while avoiding the scourge of war, will impose a heavy bur-
den upon the vision and skills of those responsible for the
foreign policy of their countries. The United States will,
on many occasions, find this burden onerous. But by virtue
of its power and the appeal of its ideals, the Americans
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canno*.^ * Nation of their obligations.
avo.a the responsibilities of leadership that, in concert
««.
^
others of similar views, the world so definitely needs.
The Un.ted States aust, therefore. be guided by statesmen
whose vision and skill, are superior to those of their pre-
decessors. In this never-ending quest for wisdom. knowledge
of the successes and failures of Henry Kissinger, who corn-
banes to a rare extent the learning of the scholar with the
ability of the statesman, should contribute usefully to the
great tasks that lie ahead.
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